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OVERTURNING THE LAST STONE: THE FINAL STEP
IN RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL
OPINIONS
David R. Cleveland*
I. BACKGROUND
"When over 500 of the best judges, lawyers, and law
professors in America get into a fight over a proposed rule, no
stone will be left unturned, and no argument will be left
unmade."' Yet in the adoption of the new Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1, permitting citation of unpublished
decisions issued after January 1, 2007, the most significant stone
2remains unturned. That stone bears the label "precedent."
* Assistant Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
Professor Cleveland would like to express his gratitude to his colleagues Kathy Cerminara,
Michael Dale, and Joel Mintz for their invaluable advice, and also to his students Brooke
Guenot and Jamie Cohen for their outstanding research assistance.
1. Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 30 (2005) [hereinafter Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished
Opinions]. Professor Schiltz was the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure during the drafting, comment, and recommendation period of
new Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. His article is an excellent discussion of that Rule, the arguments
presented for and against it, and the process by which it gained approval. Professor Schiltz
is exactly correct in the quoted text that the argument about the precedential value of
unpublished opinions was not left unmade; however, this critical underlying issue was left
unaddressed, and explicitly so, by the Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress.
At roughly the same time, Professor Schiltz-again benefiting from his wealth of
experience with the process-wrote an interesting article outlining the arguments for and
against Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and suggesting that the rule regarding citation was a tempest
in a teapot with little practical effect to recommend (or disparage) it, though he ultimately
came to support it. The gem of Professor Schlitz's article, though, is his careful distinction
between citation, as an issue of sound and fury signifying very little, and precedent, which
he acknowledges as "extremely important." Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little:
Explaining the Sturm Und Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 1429, 1463 (2005) [hereinafter Schiltz, Much Ado About Little].
2. This issue is not is truly fresh, as much has been written on it already. See n. 5,
infra. Still, the issue of precedential status for "unpublished" opinions remains unresolved.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 2009)
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
Despite the Rule's adoption, the most critical questions
regarding precedent remain: Do American courts have the
authority to render decisions not binding on future courts, and,
even if they do, should they issue such decisions? These
questions were expressly avoided by the Committee and the
Supreme Court in approving the new federal rule, 3 as well as the
first committee to propose a limited publication plan in 1973. 4
Nonetheless, they merit further consideration by everyone who
practices before, sits on, or is concerned with our nation's
courts.
5
3. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (acknowledging that "Rule 32.1 is
extremely limited .... It says nothing about what effect a court must give to one of its
unpublished opinions or to the unpublished opinions of another court.")
4. Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, Committee on Use of Appellate Court
Energies, Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions: A Report of the Committee on
Use of Appellate Energies of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice 20 (Fed. Jud. Ctr.
& Natl. Ctr. for St. Cts. 1973) [hereinafter Standards for Publication] (recommending
adoption of a policy of non-citation and issuance of a statement in which "nothing is said
about precedential value").
5. This is not to say that there hasn't been much written and published over the years
on the issue of unpublished cases, much of it addressed to the specific topic of precedent.
See e.g. Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of
Appeals, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 555 (2005); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal Fiction of the
"Unpublished" Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of
Candor, 1 Seton Hall Cir. Rev. 27 (2005); Lawrence J. Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions:
An Appropriate Expedience or an Abdication of Responsibility? 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1215
(2004); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55
Hastings L.J. 1235 (2004); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of
Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1435 (2004); Amy E. Sloan, A
Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions by Statute or
Procedural Rule, 79 Ind. L.J. 711 (2004); Norman R. Williams, The Failings of
Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 761
(2004); Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions,
76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 755 (2003); Michael B.W. Sinclair, Anastasoff Versus Hart: The
Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential Authority to Circuit Court
Decisions, 64 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 695 (2003); Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent:
Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive
Community, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 399 (2002) [hereinafter Robel, Practice of Precedent]; Lauren
K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government
Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 940 (1989) [hereinafter
Robel, Myth]; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 573 (1981) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, The Price of Reform]; William L.
Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits,
1979 Duke L.J. 807 (1979) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication];
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 1167 (1978) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules].
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II. INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970s, the members of the judiciary
fundamentally changed the nature of precedent in the federal
courts. They did so relatively quickly and quietly: first, by
issuing decisions not designated for publication and not citeable,
and then, by denying these decisions precedential status. The
number of these unpublished decisions had risen to over eighty-
6four percent of all circuit decisions in 2006. While Rule 32.1
restores citeability to these decisions, it does nothing to address
the more critical issue of whether these decisions can be denied
precedential weight, and even if so, whether they ought to be
denied such value.
7
The history of this process reveals that removing the
precedential status of some federal decisions was not, at least
initially, an explicit part of the plan for limited publication or
citation. While concern over the increasing volume of federal
case decisions was expressed as early as 1915, a mere twenty-
one years after the Federal Reporter began publishing cases
from the Courts of Appeals, it was not until 1964 that the current
publication/citation/precedent landscape began to take shape.8 In
1964, the Federal Judicial Conference recommended that the
Courts of Appeals should report only those decisions that would
be of "general precedential value" in order to deal with "the ever
increasing practical difficulty and economic cost of establishing
and maintaining accessible private and public law library
facilities."9 Little action was taken on this suggestion until the
1973 Committee on the Use of Appellate Court Energies of the
Federal Judicial Center's Advisory Council on Appellate
6. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business 52 (Table S-3),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/tables/s3.pdf (2006) [hereinafter Judicial Business
Table S-3] (showing percent unpublished in the twelve-month period ending Sept. 20,
2006, to be 84.1%) (accessed Oct. 20, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process).
7. Fed R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n.
8. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 177,
184 (1999); Donna Stienstra, Unpublished Dispositions: Problems ofAccess and Use in the
Courts ofAppeals 5 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1985).
9. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States: March 16-17, 1964 at II (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1964)
[hereinafter 1964 Judicial Conference Report].
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Justice' issued a report, Standards for Publication of Judicial
Opinions, recommending limited publication and citation that
included a draft plan for the courts of appeals to adopt." In that
report, non-publication and non-citation seemed to go hand in
hand because permitting citation would create a market for these
decisions. With this model in hand, the courts began to adopt
rules limiting publication and citation.'
2
By 1974, each circuit had submitted plans to the Judicial
Conference for how it would limit publication and citation. 13
Despite their lack of uniformity, or perhaps because of it, the
federal Judicial Conference was pleased with the state of affairs,
viewing each of the circuits as a legal laboratory that would
accumulate experience and refine the rules accordingly.'
4
However, the Conference's statements reveal that while it
thought, "the possible rewards of such experimentation are so
rich," the plan was not necessarily a permanent solution.'
5
Neither the 1964 Conference nor the 1973 Committee was
inclined to deny precedential status to these new unpublished
opinions. 16 Publication plans would limit publication to those
cases of greatest, broadest precedential value, but that did not
inherently diminish the precedential value of other cases. 17 In
fact, the Advisory Council expressly considered a provision
assigning unpublished opinions no precedential value, but it
10. This committee will be referred to hereinafter as "The 1973 Committee."
11. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4.
12. Id. at app. I (setting out proposed text for model rule); see also Williams, supra n.
5, at 770 n. 29 (quoting text of rule).
13. David Greenwald & Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1133, 1142 (2002); Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 8.
14. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States: March 7-8, 1974 at 12 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Judicial
Conference Report]; see also Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 9, 13 (noting that it was the initial
hope that several years of experience would allow the development of a single model for
use across the federal circuits, and also noting the 1978 Judicial Conference stance to
continue experimentation under a variety of plans).
15. 1974 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 14, at 12 (indicating that "the
Conference agreed that it should not be discontinued until there is considerably more
experience under the diverse circuit plans").
16. Williams, supra n. 5, at 770-71 n. 29.
17. 1964 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 9, at 11 (setting out text of resolution
approved at those proceedings: "That the judges of the courts of appeals and the district
courts authorize the publication of only those opinions which are of general precedential
value and that opinions authorized to be published be succinct").
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purposely avoided making such a suggestion to avoid the
"morass of jurisprudence" such a debate would entail.' 8 Initially,
most federal courts of appeals took a similar approach by
adopting publication plans that did not mandate a lesser or
different precedential status for unpublished decisions but
merely avoided their precedential effect by making them non-
citeable. 19 However, within a few years, the federal court rules
made these unpublished cases non-precedential.2 °
While this may seem a small and innocuous step to some,
particularly those who have studied and practiced law solely in
the period when unciteable and non-precedential unpublished
opinions were the norm, a decision to remove precedential value
from some decisions was a radical paradigm shift. For the first
time in the history of Anglo-American common law, courts were
free to render opinions that played no part in prescribing the law
in similar future cases. Future factually similar cases would find
no refuge, by precedent or reason, in these prior "unpublished"
decisions. These unpublished cases were now neither evidence
of the law nor the law itself. As Judge Richard Arnold
explained:
If we mark an opinion as unpublished, it is not precedent.
We are free to disregard it without even saying so. Even
more striking, if we decided a case directly on point
yesterday, lawyers may not even remind us of this fact. The
bar is gagged. We are perfectly free to depart from past
opinions if they are unpublished, and whether to publish
them is entirely our own choice.
2 1
That this fundamental shift in jurisprudence has caused
significant debate is not surprising. What is surprising however,
is that even though the debate has addressed the propriety of
both non-citation and non-precedent, the rulemaking has focused
on the procedural half of the matter (citation) and not the
substantive half (precedent). With the adoption of Rule 32.1,
lawyers are no longer "gagged," at least as to unpublished
decisions rendered after January 1, 2007; however, the
18. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20.
19. Williams, supra n. 5, at 771.
20. Id. at 772-73.
21. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. App. Prac. & Process
219,221 (1999).
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unpublished cases they cite are still of less than full precedential
value.
22
The issue of citation was the subject of a lengthy debate
and rulemaking process under the Rules Enabling Act.23 The
result was Rule 32.1, which permits citation to unpublished
opinions rendered after January 1, 2007.24 This Rule followed
several years of contentious debate.25  The "unpublished-
opinions issue has been the subject of prolonged and, at times,
even bitter controversy." 26 As noted at the beginning of this
paper, Professor Schiltz commented in describing the breadth of
this debate that "[w]hen over 500 of the best judges, lawyers,
and law professors in America get into a fight over a proposed
rule, no stone will be left unturned, and no argument will be left
unmade." 27 Unfortunately, while the citation issue was resolved
by new Rule 32.1, 28 one stone in this discussion remained
22. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (pointing out that the rule "says
nothing about what effect a court must give to one of its unpublished opinions or to the
unpublished opinions of another court," and noting as well that it "addresses only the
citation of federal judicial dispositions that have been designated as 'unpublished' or 'non-
precedential'-whether or not those dispositions have been published in some way or are
precedential in some sense" (emphasis in original)).
23. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2008) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
24. The rule provides:
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been:
(i) designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential,"
"not precedent," or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
25. Schlitz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1429-30 ("On the day that I became
Reporter, the issue of unpublished opinions was the most controversial issue on the
Advisory Committee's agenda. Eight years later, the issue of unpublished opinions
continues to be the most controversial issue on the Advisory Committee's agenda. I have
devoted more attention to the unpublished-opinions issue than to all of the other issues the
Advisory Committee has faced-combined."); Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions,
supra n. 1, at 23 ("This seemingly modest proposal-in essence, a proposal that someone
appearing before a federal court may remind the court of its own words-is extraordinarily
controversial. . . . Only once before in the history of federal rulemaking has a proposal
attracted more comments."). See also Adam Liptak, Federal Appeals Court Decisions May
Go Public, 151 N.Y. Times A21 (Dec. 25, 2002) (summarizing then-current situation in
various federal and state appellate courts).
26. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1458 (referring to Fed. R. App. P.
32.1).
27. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 30.
28. State courts continue to be divided on the issue. See e.g. Melissa M. Serfass &
Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and
RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL OPINIONS
unturned: the precedential status of these unpublished opinions.
This fundamental question is explicitly avoided by Rule 32.1:
Rule 32.1 is extremely limited.... It says nothing about
what effect a court must give to one of its unpublished
opinions or to the unpublished opinions of another court.
Rule 32.1 addresses only the citation of federal judicial
dispositions that have been designated as "unpublished" or
"non-precedential"-whether or not those dispositions have
been published in some way or are precedential in some
sense. 
29
However, while the Committee took no explicit position on
what precedential weight is to be accorded these "unpublished"
decisions, the Committee has implicitly created a regime in
which such decisions are accorded persuasive, but not binding,
precedential weight. So at best, the Rule itself takes no position.
More practically and realistically, the Rule creates a scheme that
accords such decisions only a lesser, persuasive authority-an
authority on par with a treatise, law review article, or extra-
jurisdictional decision, and a far cry from the binding
precedential authority given to a similar case fortunate enough
to be designated for publication.
While all parties are likely weary from the recent struggle
over citation of unpublished opinions, all interested parties
ought to return "once more unto the breach" 30 to examine,
discuss, debate, and resolve the issue of the precedential status
of these unpublished decisions. This article is intended to
stimulate and reinvigorate that debate by refocusing the
discussion on precedent now that the issue of citation has been
determined. Part III of this article will briefly outline the history
of publication and precedent in ancient, early English, and
founding-era common law in the United States. Part IV will
similarly examine the modem United States publication practice.
Part V will canvass the debate over the precedential status of
Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. App. Prac. & Process 349 (2004). Although this
comprehensive survey remains a useful source of historical information, the reader should
note that, because there has been much activity in the field since 2004, much of the
information in it is outdated.
29. Fed R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (emphasis in original).
30. William Shakespeare, Henry V, act 3, sc. 1 (available at http://www.shakespeare-
literature.com/HenryY/l0.html) (accessed Nov. 3, 2008; copy of relevant page on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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unpublished opinions focusing on the period of limited
publication. Denying the precedential status of decisions of the
federal courts suffers potential Constitutional infirmities,
fundamentally alters the common law method of jurisprudence,
and offends our community understanding of the common law
legal system. After reviewing the arguments over whether courts
may continue the practice of declaring some opinions non-
precedential, Part VI will then discuss whether courts ought to
continue denying precedential status to some opinions and touch
briefly on proposed solutions that address the practical needs of
the federal judiciary.
One cannot deny the pragmatic difficulties that the federal
court system faces in adjudicating the ever-increasing number of
cases. In 1970, the Courts of Appeals disposed of 10,699
cases, 31 while in 2005, the Courts disposed of 67,582 cases.
32
During that same period the number of active circuit judges
increased much more modestly, from ninety-seven to 167.33
Clearly, the primary hurdle in returning all cases to full
precedential value is their sheer volume. 34 Without minimizing
this difficulty, answers must be found to address this issue that
properly respect the fundamental aspect of the common law
system-that "judges must respect what they have done in the
past, whether or not it is printed in a book.
' 35
III. HISTORY OF PUBLICATION AND PRECEDENT
There is an inherent human desire for stability and
continuity in decisionmaking. Looking to the past for guidance
31. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, United States Courts of Appeals
Workload Statistics for the Decade of the 1970's at 2 (1980) (tbl. B 1).
32. U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics, U.S. Courts of Appeals-
Judicial Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtsofappeals.html [hereinafter 2006
Caseload Profile] (click "Federal Court Management Statistics," then click "Courts of
Appeals" under "Federal Court Management Statistics-2006," then select "National
Totals," and click "Generate" to view two-page chart) (accessed Nov. 6, 2008; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
33. Id. See also James C. Duff, Annual Report of the Director, 2006 (Admin. Off. of
the U.S. Cts. 2007); Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Judicial Facts and Figures 1 (2006),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/alljudicialfactsfigures.pdf (accessed Oct.
8, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
34. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 221-22.
35. Id. at 225.
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and direction is thus inherent in an institutionalized justice
system.36 Whether explicitly binding or not, decisions of the past
have a powerful impact on judges' decisions, for "out of self-
doubt, humility, or respect for prior generations, judges
throughout history have often sought guidance from those who
came before them."37 Ancient civilizations had some signs of
this respect for what had come before, but it is in twelfth-century
England that the roots of our modem conception of precedent,
publication, and common law can be found. This tradition of
common law, though not identical to that which we use today,
was understood by the founding generation to include unfettered
citation and precedent.
A. Ancient Publication and Precedent
Ancient civilizations in Greece, Rome, and Egypt all relied
upon past decisions to guide them in resolving disputes, and the
Egyptians had even prepared a system of law reports to remind
them of past rulings.38 However, a reverence for prior rulings is
not the same as a duty to follow precedent. Stare decisis, the
obligation to follow prior decisions-even those the judge
disagrees with-is a function of the common law.39 Courts of
ancient Greece, Egypt, or Rome may have followed prior
decisions, but they do not seem to have viewed themselves as
"'bound' by them." 40 For example, early Roman praetors
published edicts, which were principles derived from actual
36. Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. Va. L. Rev.
43 (2001).
37. Id. at 54.
38. See Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making 171-76 (7th ed., Clarendon Press
1964).
39. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *70 (stating that
"precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust"). See also James
Kent, Commentaries on American Law, vol. I, *473-76 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ed.,
12th ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1873) (stating that the best evidence of the common law is
found in the decisions of the courts, that those decisions are precedents for future cases
resting on analogous facts, which judges are bound to follow unless it can be shown that
the law was misunderstood, and that this is just, because when a rule has been deliberately
adopted and declared, members of the community ought to be able to rely upon it to govern
their contracts and affairs).
40. Allen, supra n. 38, at 170.
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controversies brought before them.4 1 These edicts were then
republished at the outset of a new praetor's term of service and
each remained in effect throughout his terms as a "perpetual
edict. 4 2 While not limiting on the authority of the praetors,
these edicts served to establish and demonstrate to the public the
judicial customs that would be followed and the principles
applied to a given dispute.43
During the sixth century, Roman emperor Justinian would
consolidate the judicial, legislative, and executive power in his
own hands and prohibit the publication of interpretations of the
law, believing that use of past decisions as a guideline for
resolving present disputes led to inconsistencies in the law.44
Out of Justinian's model, European civil law was developed.45
But the use of prior decisions to aid in resolving current disputes
would be seen again, in even stronger form, in English common
law. Modem English courts (that is, courts of England since the
reign of Henry II), and by extension American ones, developed
into common law systems giving a special authority to prior
decisions.46
B. Early English Publication and Precedent
The law of England preceding the reign of Henry II in the
mid-twelfth century was exceedingly local and relied heavily on
local customs. 47 Indeed, there were three separate systems of
law in England following the Norman Conquest: the laws of
Wessex, the laws of Mercia, and the Danelaw. 48 In application,
the law fractured even further:
41. Anika C. Stucky, Student Author, Building Law, Not Libraries: The Value of
Unpublished Opinions and Their Effects on Precedent, 59 Okla. L. Rev. 403, 409 (2006)
(citing Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Law of Judicial Precedents, or The
Science of Case Law (West Pub. Co. 1912)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America,
54 Am. J. Comp. L. 67, 67-68 (2006).
47. J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 14-15 (3d ed. Butterworths
1990).
48. Id. at 15.
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[T]here were differences of detail, particularly in
procedure, in each of the thirty-two counties. There were
the courts of shires, hundreds and boroughs, the courts of
lords, and the courts of the king. Trial by oath, ordeal or
battle was universal; but the details varied from place to
place and according to the status of the parties. Proceedings
were oral, and therefore legal tradition was unstable.49
Litigation was reportedly as uncertain as a game of dice.5 °
Such was the state of the law in the first half-century or so
following the Norman Conquest, but Henry II eventually united
England under a common system of laws against which local
custom could not stand.5' A treatise of the law under Henry II,
traditionally attributed to Sir Ranulf de Glanvill (and often
called simply Glanvill), indicates a coherent system of law
involving both a central court and itinerant (circuit) court
judges. 5 What followed was a professional bar and a business
of law so important that the arguments of members of the bar
and the court itself were being recorded in books.53 These
arguments and the decisions of the court, once recorded, served
as tools for the learning of the law, navigation of the court
system by practitioners, and an aid to consistency in
decisionmaking by courts.
In the 1250s, Henry de Bracton, who was an accomplished
circuit and assize judge as well as a member of the nascent court
of the King's Bench, attempted to explain the principles and
procedures of English law through a collection of cases (the
Note Book) and an accompanying treatise (Treatise on the Laws
of England) commonly referred to simply as Bracton.55 These
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing Leges Henrici Primi (c. 1118)).
51. Id. at 16. Baker's delightful turn of phrase is that, "[a]gainst that uniform system,
local custom would thereafter be seen at best as exceptional and at worst as exceptionable."
Id.
52. Id. at 15-16, 22.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England 334 (2d ed.
W.W. Norton & Co. 1980).
55. Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae [On the Laws and
Customs of England] (1569) (George E. Woodbine ed., & Samuel E. Thorne trans.,
Belknap Press 1968) (searchable Latin and English text also available at http://hls15.law
.harvard.edu/bracton) (accessed Nov. 12, 2008; copy of title page on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process). See also J. W. Tubbs, The Common Law Mind: Medieval
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works collected and discussed in detail five hundred cases,
which Bracton believed were illustrative of English law.56 He
collected and made notes regarding over two thousand cases,
whether for his use on the bench or specifically for his writing is
unknown. 57 His collection and reliance upon cases demonstrates
a strong belief in the value of precedents, and he stated that "if
like matters arise let them be decided by like (si tamen similia
erinerint per simile iudicentur), since the occasion is a good one
for proceeding a similibus ad similia."
58
Bracton's selection of cases, choosing older decisions of
respected judges, such as Martin Pateshull and William Raleigh,
over those of his contemporaries, indicates a disdain for his
contemporaries' departure from past decisions, and the work
was written, according to its preface, to prevent the newer
generation of judges from unwittingly leaving the proper course
settled by their wise predecessors in past cases.59 Bracton's
treatise was an important development in the history of both
publication and precedent because it both indicated existing
reliance upon precedent and facilitated future reliance upon and
use of prior cases:
The influence of Bracton on the common law in succeeding
centuries, though variable, has been significant. Bracton
summed up the law as it had developed by the middle of
the thirteenth century and passed it on to future generations
of lawyers. He accomplished for the law in the thirteenth
century what Blackstone accomplished for it in the
eighteenth. For a century after its appearance, Bracton's
great book dominated English legal thought and study.
60
Famed English legal historian Frederick William Maitland
labeled the era "the age of Bracton" and called the work "crown
and Early Modern Conceptions 7-20 (Johns Hopkins U. Press 2000); Baker, supra n. 48, at
201-02.
56. See T. Ellis Lewis, The History of Judicial Precedent I, 46 L.Q. Rev. 207, 209-212
(1930). Some evidence suggests that this collection of cases from the plea rolls was started
much earlier (c. 1220-30) and that Bracton was merely the final editor and publisher. See
Baker, supra n. 47, at 201-02.
57. See Lyon, supra n. 54, at 334; Lewis, supra n. 56, at 209-12; Tubbs, supra n. 55, at
18.
58. Tubbs, supra n. 55, at 18-19. See also Lyon, supra n. 54, at 334.
59. Baker, supra n. 47, at 225.
60. Lyon, supra n. 54, at 435-36.
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and flower of English medieval jurisprudence." 6 1 Whether taken
as evidence of extant practice or noted for its influence on the
generations of lawyers to follow, Bracton's treatise is important
for its use of cases to support arguments about the law.62
Soon after Bracton's efforts, and certainly by 1260, the
practice of recording the arguments and decisions, in "the very
words of judges and pleaders" was being followed.63 Indeed, the
Year Books reveal that both counsel and the court in these
arguments were themselves citing to prior decisions and openly
admitting that their decisions would be viewed as precedent in
later cases. 64 One such case reveals a judge, perhaps speaking
directly to a case reporter, saying, "one may safely put that in his
book for law.' 65 However, it is important to note that these case
reports were not crafted by the courts in the manner of modem
American decisions. They were taken down by private reporters
who often made errors, but these errors were thought to be
avoided in the long term by reference not merely to a single
precedential case, but to long and frequent repetition of a given
type of common usage ("common learning") among the bar.66
This type of learning was brought to a court's attention in the
form of reference to prior cases, each of which brought
something to the perception of common learning being upon the
side of the advocate.
The Year Books certainly reveal both the use and
importance of precedent in the common law system as early as
the mid-thirteenth century. But they also reveal that precedent is
not tied inextricably to publication and certainly not to formal,
lengthy, dissertational written opinions so common in American
courts today.67
61. Id. at 333-34. Maitland himself quoted Edmund Burke expressing this concern
about the end of Year Books and published reports: "To put an end to reports is to put an
end to the law of England." Frederick William Maitland, Frederick William Maitland,
Historian 112-13 (Robert Livingston Schuyler ed., U. of Cal. Press 1960).
62. Tubbs, supra n. 55, at 20.
63. Baker, supra n. 47, at 225.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Midhope v. Prior of Kirkham (1313) 36 SS 178, per Stanton, J.).
66. Id. at 226.
67. Id. at 204 (explaining that even when the only record of decision was the courts'
rolls, lawyers and judges would rely upon their own memories and understanding of the
cases' decisions, "vouch[ing] the record" as needed). The lengthy dissertational model has
been dubbed the "Friendly treatment" or "the Learned Hand model" after judges who were
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The next major step in the history of case reporting and
precedent was the publication by Sir Edward Coke of a thirteen-
volume treatise of past cases, typically referred to as "The
Reports." 68 This is not to say that Coke's works were the only
systematic case reports of the era. Others include Plowden's
Commentaries and Bulstrode's careful reporting of decisions of
King's Bench under James I and Charles I, as well as many less
complete reports. 69 Sir Coke's volumes were the most well
known, likely due to his comprehensiveness, style, and personal
accomplishments.7 ° Both Coke's Reports and his personal
attempts to claim more of the King's power over the law for the
courts themselves served to increase the power of precedent.7'
For example, Coke cited to both ancient and recent precedent in
his attempts to limit the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical and
chancery courts, to deny the King's power to make arrests or
alter the common law, and to argue that acts of Parliament
contrary to common law ("common right and reason") were
void.7
Coke put common law and precedent at the center of the
judicial exercise. While still not as strict as the concept of
binding precedent would become in later years, the idea of a
body of precedent, which would become increasingly binding
through long use and experience, was viewed as a strength of the
common law system.73 Indeed, this refinement through repeated
application was viewed as an important element of the common
law, which Coke perceived as having been "refined" by "long
known for such writings. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 1485-88
(noting a nostalgic reverence for the type of careful deliberation and lengthy opinions
rendered by preeminent Judge Henry J. Friendly of the Second Circuit). See also William
M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273, 278 (1996) (discussing
"the Learned Hand model," consisting of oral argument in most cases, discussions among
the members of the bench, and judges writing their own opinions instead of relying on
drafts composed by clerks or staff attorneys).
68. Healy, supra n. 36, at 62.
69. Baker, supra n. 47, at 209-10.
70. Stucky, supra n. 41, at 413.
71. Healy, supra n. 36, at 63.
72. Id.
73. Id. For an example of the inexorable command of vertical binding precedent in
modem American courts, see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (noting that "a
precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be").
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and continual experience" of judges seeking to ever refine the
law further by "declaring its principles with even greater
precision and renewing it by application to the matter at hand. 74
Coke's idealistic vision of improving the law itself through
accumulation of applications of the law should be realized in
modem common law systems. We possess the ability to record
both argument and decisions with greater certainty, to retain
those records more permanently, and to disseminate the
decisions to a wider audience. More applications of the
principles of law to facts, such that the principles are tested and
refined, improves our understanding of the principles and gives
greater certainty to those seeking to conform their conduct to
them.
In the wake of increasing interest in precedents, and their
greater availability in the form of written reports, the bar was
faced with two critical problems in ascribing the decisions of
courts the kind of binding authority that they now possess in
modem American courts. The first problem facing the courts in
Coke's era was the still-prevalent belief in natural law. The
belief in universal, unchanging principles of justice and right
unavoidably raised the question of how the decisions of prior
cases could be "the law" when "the law" was derived from a
higher authority.75 This was not an insurmountable challenge to
the development of binding precedent, given that the source of
natural law was itself in the process of being wrested away from
the crown and into the hands of the judiciary. Both Coke and
later English jurists subscribed to a declaratory theory of law
that served as a compromise between natural law and the rising
importance of precedent.76 The declaratory theory states that
while not, strictly speaking, law themselves, decisions were "the
best proof of what the law is."' 77 Indeed, while they were less
willing to ascribe binding precedential authority to any single
74. Healy, supra n. 36, at 66 (citing John Greville Agard Pocock, The Ancient
Constitution and the Feudal Law 35 (Cambridge U. Press 1987) and H. Jefferson Powell,
The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513, 1537, & 1537
n. 91 (1987)).
75. Healy, supra n. 36, at 67.
76. Id. at 67-68.
77. Id. at 62 (quoting Coke); Blackstone, supra n. 39, at *69 (stating that cases, "are the
principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a
custom as shall form a part of the common law").
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decision, its adherents were keenly attuned to finding the
"current of authorities" or a "strong and uniform... train of
decisions., 78 The second issue impeding the increased reliance
on precedent as binding authority was the poor quality of the
reports throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.79
Judges of the era were unable to rely with much certainty on the
accuracy of a report unless they had confidence in the
competence and credibility of the reporter himself.80 This too
was not too much of a challenge for the common law. By the
mid-eighteenth century, reports of greater accuracy and
reliability were made, which increased the ability of judges to
more faithfully adhere to precedent.8 1
C. Modern English Publication and Precedent
With the rise of better publication standards came greater
adherence to the dictates of precedent. Throughout the latter half
of the eighteenth century, a major proponent of this view was Sir
William Blackstone. 82 Blackstone perceived the adherence to
precedent as not just a worthy idea, but as part of a judge's duty
under the declaratory theory.83 That is, it was the duty of judges
to state and apply the law rather than to make and remake it:
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents,
where the same points come again in litigation: as well to
keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to
waver with every new judge's opinion; as also because the
law in that case being solemnly declared and determined,
what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now
become a permanent rule, which is not in the breast of any
subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to his
private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not
78. Healy, supra n. 36, at 68 (quoting in part James Ram, The Science of Legal
Judgments, 9 Law Libr. 76 (John S. Littell 1835)).
79. Id. See also T. Ellis Holdsworth, History of Judicial Precedent IV, 48 L.Q. Rev.
230-31 (1932).
80. See Allen, supra n. 38, at 219 (noting that "the doctrine of precedent had reached an
advanced stage of development in the eighteenth century," but that "the process which was
to establish the theory, in its full modem acceptation, was not yet complete").
81. Allen, supra n. 38, at 209; Tubbs, supra n. 55, at 181.
82. Healy, supra n. 36, at 70.
83. Blackstone, supra n. 39, at *69.
RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL OPINIONS
according to his own private judgment, but according to the
known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to
pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old84
one.
Blackstone viewed adherence to precedent as the generally
applicable rule and judicial discretion to ignore precedent as the
exception-an exception that was limited to instances in which
the precedent was "manifestly absurd or unjust" or
"contradictory to reason." 85 Especially telling about the rise of
the power of precedent in this period is that Blackstone's
jurisprudential opposite, Lord Mansfield, also perceived an
increased adherence to precedent, even as he questioned
Blackstone's assertion that it was the judge's duty.86 While
contemporaries Blackstone and Mansfield disagreed about the
power of the courts and the extent to which precedent bound
courts, the matter was decided in dramatic fashion in the case of
Perrin v. Blake,87 in which Blackstone's adherence to prior
decisions won out over Mansfield's attempt to cast aside the old
decisions as feudal in origin and outdated.88 Following this
major step in the rise of binding precedent, the effect of
precedent became well enmeshed in English jurisprudence:
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, courts began to
regard a line of decisions as absolutely binding, though
they could still depart from a single decision, or even two
decisions, for sufficient reasons. Gradually that exception
also disappeared and by the latter half of the nineteenth
century, courts asserted an obligation to follow all prior
cases, no matter how incorrect. Even the House of Lords,
which had never regarded its own precedents as binding,
declared in 1861 that it was absolutely bound by its past
decisions.
89
84. Id.
85. Id. at *70.
86. Allen, supra n. 38, at 211 (stating that Mansfield "had a deep impatience of the
unintelligent and mechanical use of precedent merely for its own sake and without any true
relevance to the underlying principles involved in a legal issue"); David Lieberman, The
Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain 126
(Cambridge U. Press 1989) (noting that Mansfield "never entirely ignored precedents").
87. 96 Eng. Rep. 392 (K.B.), 10 Eng. R. C. 689, 4 Bur. (Eng.) 2579 (1772).
88. Healy, supra n. 36, at 72.
89. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Blackstone's ideas of precedent, and of common law, are
well-documented in his Commentaries on the Laws of England,
which have been called "the magnum opus of the eighteenth
century" and "perhaps the most stylish and readable contribution
ever made to English legal literature." 90  More important,
Blackstone's Commentaries, as they became known, were
extremely influential in both England and America in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.91 As the eighteenth
century gave way to the nineteenth century, both a philosophical
shift and increasingly accurate case reports ushered in an era in
which decisions were both published and precedential in much
the way they are today.
D. Early American Publication and Precedent
"American courts have always adhered to a common law
system that is dependent upon precedent." 92 Though the exact
contours of the common law system varied among the colonies
and changed over time, the implicit reliance on inherited ideas
about the law is difficult to deny. As Justice Story explained,
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled, but
the principles of the decision are held, as precedents and
authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is
the constant practice under our whole system of
jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them when
they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always
has been, considered as the great security of our rights, our
90. Baker, supra n. 47, at 219.
91. William S. Brewbaker I1, Found Law, Made Law and Creation: Reconsidering
Blackstone's Declaratory Theory, 22 J. L. & Religion 255, 255 (2007) (asserting that "Sir
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England is arguably the single most
influential work of jurisprudence in American history") (footnote omitted). See also
Herbert J. Storing, William Blackstone 1723-1780, in History of Political Philosophy 622-
34 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed., U. Chi. Press 1987) (outlining Blackstone's
essential ideas and method); Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone as Architect: Constructing the
Commentaries, 15 Yale J.L. & Human. 103 (2003); Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering
Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1996); Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The
Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 Emory L.J. 437,
489-96 (1996); S.F.C. Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone's Achievement, I Oxford J. Leg.
Stud. 1 (1981); Rupert Cross, Blackstone v. Bentham, 92 L.Q. Rev. 516 (1976).
92. Suzanne 0. Snowden, Student Author, "That's My Holding and I'm Not Sticking To
It!" Court Rules That Deprive Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort the
Common Law, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1253, 1256 (2001) (footnote omitted).
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liberties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law
is justly deemed certain, and founded in permanent
principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of
particular judges. 93
However, American courts from their earliest days faced
the same barriers to the use of precedent as English courts:
belief in natural law and lack of quality reports.94 As in England,
these impediments were overcome. Blackstone's Commentaries
and his ideas were as resonant with American lawyers as they
were with English lawyers. Edmund Burke noted, "I hear that
they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's Commentaries in
America as in England." 95 A later writer's study of Blackstone
revealed that "[tihe Commentaries became the chief if not the
only law books in every [colonial] lawyer's office, and the most
important if not the only textbooks for [colonial] law
students."96 Numerous scholars have noted the profound effect
of Blackstone's common law scholarship on the thinking of both
the Revolutionary and Founding generations of America. 97
Blackstone's Commentaries have been described as the
"principal source" of legal education for Alexander Hamilton98
and an awe-inducing inspiration to the young James Kent.99 In
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Blackstone's
philosophy was married with increasing reporting of case
decisions. o Some judges actively collected, reported, and
digested the laws of their states themselves; others, like
Chancellor James Kent of New York, worked closely with a
reporter. 01 Much as it had in England, the law had become less
93. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 377
(Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (quoted in Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir.
2000), vacated as moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000)).
94. Healy, supra n. 36, at 73-74.
95. Edmund Burke, speech, On Conciliation with America (Mar. 22, 1775), in Edmund
Burke, Pre-Revolutionary Writings 206, 225 (Ian Harris ed., Cambridge U. Press 1993).
96. David A. Lockmiller, Sir William Blackstone 170 (U.N.C. Press 1938).
97. See e.g. William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and
Originalism, 19 Vt. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1994).
98. Jacob Ernest Cooke, Alexander Hamilton 29 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1982).
99. Bader, supra n. 97, at 11 (citing William Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent
LL.D. 18 (Little, Brown & Co. 1898)).
100. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 88-91 (Touchstone 3d ed.
2005).
101. Id. at 89.
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dependent upon natural or divine law and more a law of
artificial reason. 10 2 It also became more the function of a
professional, well-trained legal profession with an interest in
increasing the power of the court system. 10 3 Toward that end,
lawyers worked for the establishment of more common law
rules and practices.'
0 4
This move was quite successful though early America had
two additional problems to overcome before Blackstonian
adherence to precedent could flourish. First, it had to receive the
common law from England, develop its own common law, or
both. While Maryland had declared itself to be governed by the
common law in 1642, other colonies did not follow suit until the
early eighteenth century; by the time of the revolution, however
most had formally or informally adopted the common law.l °5
Second, the post-Revolutionary legal system'0 6 had to weather
the growing pains of a system of law both sprung from and
estranged from English common law and principles. Viewing
themselves as distinctly separated from the common law of
England and in the process of developing a common law of their
own, judges of the era seemed to discard precedents on a variety
of grounds. 10 7 One such ground was to simply take the exception
Blackstone had given and declare the precedents illogical,
unreasonable, or contrary to public policy.'0 8 Others viewed
English precedents as conflicting with a more important source
of authority, state law. 10 9 At the core of these decisions was the
102. Compare Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education:
An Historical Framework, 39 John Marshall L. Rev. 1041, 1099-1102 (2006) (recounting
at length the circumstances of Lord Coke's explanation of artificial reason in the law) and
Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 551, 585
(2006) (discussing Coke's description of artificial reason) with Carl F. Stychin, The
Commentaries of Chancellor Kent and the Development of an American Common Law, 37
Am. J. Legal Hist. 440, 451-52 (1993) (discussing Kent's similar view of American law as
founded upon such "cultivated and artificial reasoning").
103. Healy, supra n. 36, at 76; Stychin, supra n. 102 at 451-52.
104. Healy, supra n. 36, at 74-75.
105. Id.
106. To call it a "system" using the singular is a generalization made in attempt to take a
broad view. It was, of course, several colony or state systems, although they shared this
problem sufficiently to make this generalization reasonable.
107. Healy, supra n. 36, at 79-80.
108. Id. at 79.
109. Id.
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idea that English rules were inapplicable to American
circumstances. 0 As Lawrence Friedman put it, "ft]hey chiseled
law out of the hard rock of basic principle."" However, as
states resolved these issues by receiving the parts of English
common law that their lawyers believed were applicable and by
developing their own common law precedents, precedent took-
and has maintained-a prominent position in American
jurisprudence."12
Throughout the nineteenth century, stare decisis
strengthened in the United States as the above impediments
were overcome."13 The landmark case of Marbury v. Madison
emphasizes the importance of each judicial decision as an
element of the developing case law, for "[i]nherent in every
judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general
principle of law." 114 The centrality of adherence to precedent in
American law is also illustrated by Justice Story's well-known
comment, which is of particular interest in the present context of
courts issuing non-precedential decisions: "A more alarming
doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court than
that it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions,
and to decide for itself, without reference to the settled course of
antecedent principles."'' 5 From Justice Story's time to today,
adherence to precedent and the application of stare decisis have
been a prominent, if not the most prominent, feature of
American law. Indeed, "[o]ld common-law attitudes toward
precedent are so deeply ingrained in the behavior of American
lawyers and judges that they hardly rise to the conscious
level,"" 6 and "American attitudes toward precedent are the
attitudes of Coke, Blackstone, Marshall, and Kent, although
110. Id. at 79-80.
111. Friedman, supra n. 100, at 88.
112. Sellers, supra n. 46, at 67.
113. Healy, supra n. 36, at 87.
114. Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898, 899 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177-78 (1803)). Justice Marshall's famous declaration that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," and his somewhat less
famous, but no less important, statement that "[t]hose who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule" both appear in Marbury at 5 U.S.
177.
115. Story, supra n. 93, at § 377.
116. Sellers, supra n. 46, at 67.
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courts no longer feel the need to cite to these authors, or the
decisions on which they relied."'" 7 Yet, the "alarming doctrine"
perceived by Justice Story arguably exists today, when over
eighty percent of all decisions of the United States federal courts
are unpublished and essentially non-precedential, leaving courts
unbound today by what they did yesterday. That the concepts of
precedent and stare decisis are inherent in our legal system is
easy to see, but how we have reached a point when they are
avoidable in the vast majority of federal cases is more difficult
to understand.
IV. MODERN AMERICAN PUBLICATION AND PRECEDENT
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the
rise of comprehensive case reports, and with that development
came a renewed concern that this body of case law would prove
too much for the legal system to deal with. This concern
ultimately led to rules limiting publication of opinions, and, for
the first time in common law history, rules limiting the citation
of opinions. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the rules then came
to deny precedential status to these opinions. However, the
twentieth century also brought with it technological innovation
that allows for better management of and access to the ever-
increasing body of law. Moreover, lawyers' and judges'
attitudes towards these allegedly unimportant opinions suggests
that they are anything but unimportant.
A. Comprehensive Publication and the Concerns It Engenders
As noted above, while precedent and case publication are
not preconditions for each other," 8 the existence of reliable case
reports does strengthen the use of precedent.19 The desire for an
American common law led to the creation of various state
reporters, starting with Ephraim Kirby's 1789 Connecticut
Reports and Francis Hopkinson's Judgments in Admiralty in
117. Id. at 73.
118. Baker, supra n. 47, at 204 (explaining that even when the only record of decision
was the courts' rolls, lawyers and judges would rely upon their own memories and
understanding of the cases' decisions, "vouch[ing] the record" as needed).
119. Allen, supra n. 38, at 223-30 (discussing early English reports and reporters).
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Pennsylvania (also published that year). 120 By 1803, states had
begun designating official state reporters to increase the
reliability of reports and create more systematic coverage.'
2 1
What had once been the province of enthusiastic practitioners
became a government function, and while the government
production of an official reporter did give lawyers and judges a
common reference it was often slow and not as useful as the
former reporters. 12 Rather than being produced by an interested
practitioner or an efficient publisher, official reports of the era
were left in the hands of political appointees. 123 But that
condition would not last forever. John B. West and the West
Publishing Company would change the face of legal publishing
by producing more efficient, complete, and systematic reports.
West's goal was interesting in two respects. First, he
sought, "to collect, arrange in an orderly manner, and put into
convenient and inexpensive form in the shortest possible time,
the material which every judge and lawyer must use.' 24 This
statement reveals the importance, visible even to a non-lawyer,
that the legal system placed on its decisions. Second, West chose
to publish all judicial decisions, rather than choosing to publish
only a selected subset of them. This move was a departure from
past practice and had its critics, but West's perception of the
market was right-"[1]awyers chose the comprehensive style of
reporting, preferring that all precedent be available."',
25
Lawyers would want to read, and want to be able to rely
upon, all previous decisions in which a court applied the law in a
similar case. This desire has been repeatedly expressed by
lawyers. It can be seen in both the advocating for greater
120. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds
Substance, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 15, 19, & 19 n. 20 (1987).
121. Id. at 19.
122. Id. at 20.
123. Thomas A. Woxland, "Forever Associated With the Practice of Law ": The Early
Years of the West Publishing Company, 5 Leg. Ref. Serv. Q. 115, 119, 120 (Spring 1985)
(noting that in the early years "[t]he office of the state reporter was usually a patronage
position, occupied by a political crony rather than an efficient publisher," and that court
reporters were "given the exclusive right to record, print, and publish the decisions" of
particular courts).
124. Id. at 118-19 (citing A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 Am. L. Rev. 396, 406
(1889)).
125. Berring, supra n. 120, at 21.
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acceptance of the common law and the striving for greater, and
better, publication of court decisions.
This preference for access to the courts' actual opinions
was poignantly shown by the rejection of the American Law
Institute's attempt to replace case law with a Restatement that
extracted the "best" principles of law.' 26 Faced with a greatly
expanding number of decisions and a popular universal
reporting system, the American Law Institute perceived a mass
of case law in need of reduction and distillation. 127 Its goal was
to craft a restatement of the law that would obviate the need for
citation to cases by extracting the best principles and ignoring
the rest.128 But lawyers proved unwilling to rely on a secondary
source when the words of the courts themselves were before
them, and they continued to cite cases and to rely upon the
Restatement as a useful, but secondary, source. 1
29
While supplanting case decisions with summaries was
ineffective in reducing the increasing number of opinions to be
written, researched, and relied upon, simply choosing to return
to an era of limited publication was effective. In fact, it has been
so successful that over eighty percent of all federal decisions are
now unpublished.
B. The Birth of Limited Publication Plans
While increases in cases and reported opinions were noted
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
first rumblings about limiting citation began in the Third and
Fifth Circuits in the 1940s.130 Very little consensus was
achieved, however, until 1964, when the Federal Judicial
Conference recommended that the Courts of Appeals should
report only those decisions that would be of "general
precedential value" in order to deal with "the ever increasing
practical difficulty and economic cost of establishing and
126. Id. at 23.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1169 & 1169 n. 17.
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maintaining private and public law library facilities."'' Little
action was taken on this suggestion until in 1973 the Council on
Appellate Justice issued Standards for Publication of Judicial
Opinions, recommending limited publication and citation and
including a draft plan for the courts of appeals to adopt. 132 In
that report, non-publication and non-citation seemed to go hand
in hand because permitting citation would create a market for
these decisions. With a model in hand, the courts began to adopt
rules limiting publication and citation. 133 By 1974, each circuit
had submitted plans to the Judicial Conference for how it would
limit publication and citation. 134 Prior to these plans, the federal
courts of appeals had essentially all their opinions published. 135
Neither the 1964 Conference nor the 1973 Advisory
Council was inclined to deny precedential status to these new
unpublished opinions.'1 36  Publication plans would limit
publication to those cases of greatest, broadest precedential
value, but did not inherently diminish the precedential value of
other cases. 1  In fact, the Advisory Council expressly
considered a provision assigning unpublished opinions no
precedential value, but it purposely avoided making such a
suggestion to avoid the "morass of jurisprudence" such a debate
would entail. 138  Instead, it recommended merely denying
citation of the unpublished opinions as precedent and saying
nothing about their actual precedential value.' 39 Initially, the
courts of appeals took a similar approach by adopting
publication plans that did not mandate a lesser or different
131. 1964 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 9, at 11 (quoted in Arnold, supra n. 21,
at 219).
132. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4.
133. Id. at app. I; see also Williams, supra n. 5, at 770-71 n. 29.
134. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra n. 13, at 1142; see also Reynolds & Richman, No-
Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1170-71.
135. Berring, supra n. 120, at 15-20. (noting West Publishing Company's policy of
publishing all case opinions rather than some subset of them in a movement toward
complete publication); Jon A. Strongman, Student Author, Unpublished Opinions,
Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential
Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 195 (2001) (noting that the 1970s proved a
breaking point for the practice of uniform publication of federal circuit opinions).
136. Williams, supra n. 5, at 770-71 n. 29 (quoting 1973 report).
137. 1964 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 9, at 11.
138. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20.
139. Id.
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precedential status for unpublished decisions; they simply
restricted citation to unpublished opinions. 140 However, within a
few years, most federal court rules made these unpublished
cases non-precedential.141
Such a progression, from non-published to non-citeable to
non-precedential, seems logical and in its own way almost
necessary.142 Limited publication is not a new idea; it dates back
to the earliest reporters, who were selective in what they
published. 143 But declaring decisions to be unciteable, and
moreover, not precedent, was contrary to the entire history of the
common law system. This removal of decisions from the body
of common law was a fundamental shift in the common law
system that was truly unprecedented. 144 Even in the early days
of Yearbooks or the unsettled post-Revolution days of early
American courts, no matter how sparse the record, cases could
always be cited to the court as evidence of its past rulings. Now,
however, federal courts were unwilling to be bound by what
they had done in similar cases in the past; in fact, they were
140. Williams, supra n. 5, at 771.
141. Id. at 771-73.
142. "Unpublished" cases that remained citeable and precedential would be sought out
despite their formal publication status, but creating a rule that a decision is both non-
citeable and non-precedential effectively removes that decision from the body of common
law. Only by restricting opinions on all three grounds (publication, citation, and precedent)
could one hope to make some opinions truly "disposable." This, of course, was
unsuccessful because practitioners placed value on these opinions despite their diminished
status. See generally e.g. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5 (examining recent
surveys of federal judges and lawyers); Robel, Myth, supra n. 5.
143. Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions:
A Reassessment, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 119, 121 (1994).
144. Please forgive the pun, but synonyms did not adequately capture the concept quite
as well, because the shift plainly is without precedent. English and early American practice
uniformly allowed citation to and reliance upon prior decisions regardless of their
publication status. Modem English practice is similar to the historical practice in England:
Unreported cases are unlikely to be cited but may be cited, if appropriate. See Robert J.
Martineau, Appellate Justice in England and the United States: A Comparative Analysis
104 (William S. Hein & Co. 1990). But see F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to
Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the Law, 94 L. Libr. J. 563, 565-66 (2002)
(quoting Roderick Munday, The Limits of Citation Determined, 80 L. Socy. Gaz. 1337
(1983) (claiming that the British courts are "restricting the use of unreported materials
which the computer revolution has made available to the profession," and noting that, "[iun
particular, the House of Lords ... has effectively outlawed the citation of unreported cases
in argument before it")).
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unwilling to even be told about it,145 not because they had
decided it inapplicable, but because another panel of the court
had decided at the time of the decision that it would not aid
future decision-makers.
This shift was born not out of a philosophic or
jurisprudential need to prune the law; rather, it was created
because of a need to reduce the expense of publishing,
collecting, and maintaining law libraries as well as reducing the
workload of the federal judiciary and lawyers. 146 From that
perspective of pragmatic concerns, the early 1970s proved to be
a turning point. Between 1950 and 1970, federal case filings
rose from 2678 to 11,440, while federal judgeships rose from
sixty-four to ninety.148 Simply on a case-per-judge basis, judges'
workloads more than tripled over a twenty-year period. In
response, the 1973 Committee sought a pragmatic solution, 149
which was adopted and eventually extended by the federal
courts. Yet many of the Committee's pragmatic concerns are no
longer valid in light of the present state of legal information
technology and practices. And those that remain must be
weighed against the inherent value of precedent to our legal
system, either as an intrinsic limit imposed by our Constitution
or as a proper practice for the good of our legal system. These
issues are discussed further in Part IV.
C. Recent Technological Developments in Publication
Technological advances have drastically altered the
landscape of legal publishing and legal research over the last
145. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 221 (pointing out that "[t]he bar is gagged," but that "[w]e
are perfectly free to depart from past opinions if they are unpublished, and whether to
publish them is entirely our own choice").
146. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 6-8. The reader will note that, aside
from a general comment that "[u]nlimited proliferation of published opinions constitutes a
burden and a threat to a cohesive body of law," id. at 6, the balance of the Committee's
seven factors indicating that publication should be limited is made up of pragmatic
concerns about workload and logistics-many of which are wholly inapplicable in today's
legal information setting.
147. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, 391-93 (tbl. A.2)
(Harvard U. Press 1996).
148. Id. at 392, 397, 398.
149. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 21 (stating that the recommendation to
address only citation and not precedent "deals with use rather than philosophical effect").
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thirty to forty years. These changes alone cry out for a
reevaluation of the concept of limited publication and
precedent. 150 At the time of the 1964 conference first formally
proposing limited publication of federal opinions, computer-
assisted legal research was, at best, a theory. 151 By 1973, when
the Federal Judicial Center's Advisory Council released its
suggested standards for limited publication of judicial opinions,
computer-assisted research was in its earliest stages.' 52 The first
LEXIS system was released in April 1973, and by the fall of
1973, a small number of firms began using it. 153 By the time the
first Westlaw system was in place in April 1975, r54 the federal
Courts of Appeals had already created rules regarding limited
publication and the precedential value of unpublished opinions.
Since then, computer-assisted legal research systems have been
refined and improved dramatically.' 55 Indeed, advances in
information communication have revolutionized legal research
and access to legal information: "Legal information is no longer
available exclusively in print, and the researcher is now no
longer constrained by the limitations of the printed page," so this
information can be stored, indexed, and retrieved digitally with
just a few keystrokes. 56 Moreover, such access through
commercial databases is increasingly available online without
the need for dedicated in-office hardware or CDs full of cases.
This includes "unpublished" decisions, which are widely
available both through West's and LEXIS's online services, but
also in West's Federal Appendix, which has been publishing
"unpublished" cases since 2001.157
150. Kirt Shuldberg, Student Author, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished
Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 541, 551 (1997) (asserting that
"[t]hese historic rationales for the limited publication/no-citation plans warrant re-
examination in light of current technology").
151. Id. at 556.
152. Id.
153. William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77
L. Libr. J. 543, 553 (1985).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 554; Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 558.
156. Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 556.
157. Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New
Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 705, 709-10 (2006).
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This electronic and internet revolution is not solely the
province of private reporters, however. In 2002, Congress
enacted the E-Government Act, a law aimed at promoting
greater communication between the government and the
citizenry via electronic means. 158 In accordance with that law,
the federal courts are in the process of making all civil court
records (save those that are sealed) available online.' 59
The system of limited publication, non-citation, and non-
precedent was created in a legal setting limited to print resources
and without the indexed and non-indexed searching capabilities
of any computer-assisted legal research systems. In their current
formats, however, those systems make it possible to search cases
(and other sources) through both traditional indexed methods
and via full-text searching. These advances in legal information
technology should themselves justify a complete
re-examination of the need for a limited publication and
precedent regime.
D. Citation and Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals
Prior to Rule 32.1.
The 1973 Advisory Committee's report avoided the
"morass of jurisprudence" inherent in directly tackling the issue
of precedential status of unpublished decisions. 160  The
Committee shrewdly decided to refrain from declaring that
unpublished opinions were not precedent. It instead took a
position that "relies on the correspondence of publication and
precedential value on the one hand, and of non-publication and
non-precedential value on the other."' 16' Such a position "deals
158. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501, n. (2007) (referring to Pub. L. 104-13, which requires the
Chief Justice of the United States and all chief judges of federal courts to "cause to be
established and maintained... a website that contains the following information or links to
websites with the following information: . . . [a]ccess to the substance of all written
opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the
official court reporter, in a text searchable format") (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
159. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management on Privacy and Public Access
to Electronic Case Files (Sept. 2001) (available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/
Policy.htm) (accessed Dec. 2, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
160. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20.
161. Id. at21.
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with use rather than philosophical effect," 162 and leaves the
declaration that otherwise precedential opinions are no longer
part of the common law to the individual circuits. The
Committee's reliance on practice was effective, as the federal
circuits adopted non-publication rules and eventually augmented
them with non-precedent rules.' 6 3 So, with little consideration of
what the 1973 Committee had written off as "philosophical
effect," the rules of the federal courts of appeals quietly
removed many of their decisions from the body of precedent.
The number of decisions rendered as "unpublished" has risen to
just over eighty-four percent. 164 The correspondence between
non-publication and non-precedential value anticipated by the
Committee has come to pass.
Immediately prior to the adoption of the new Rule 32.1, all
thirteen circuits had a limited publication rule in place that
allowed for designation of some opinions as unpublished. 165 In
their criteria for deciding which cases were published and which
were not, all thirteen circuits' rules contained criteria that
generally touched upon the issue of precedent.' 66 In addition, all
thirteen circuits had some rule in place that governed the citation
of unpublished opinions.' 67 However, only two circuits accorded
any of their unpublished opinions the same status as published
decisions. 1
68
1. Publication
All thirteen circuits had rules allowing for limited
publication of judicial opinions.'6 9 There was little uniformity
162. Id.
163. Williams, supra n. 5, at 772.
164. Judicial Business Table S-3, supra n. 6 (showing percent unpublished in the
twelve-month period ending Sept. 30, 2006 to be 84.1%).
165. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351-57 (tbl. 1). See also Melissa M. Serfass &
Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of
Opinions, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 251, 253-57 (tbl. 1) (2001). The reader should note
that virtually all of the rules cited in these articles have since been updated. However, the
Serfass and Cranford articles provide accurate information about the rules as they existed
when each was published.
166. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351-57.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. Id.
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among the rules regarding publication, 17 and only two points
regarding these rules are of interest here. First, the rules varied
from those that presumed opinions would be published to those
that stated a policy against publication. 17 1 Second, several
circuits' rules epitomized the 1973 Committee's belief that by
designating certain opinions unpublished, the issue of precedent
would be answered inherently. Four circuits (the Third, Tenth,
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits) explicitly stated that the decision
to publish depended, at least in part, upon whether the deciding
court viewed the opinion as precedential. 172 These circuits
outright conflated the concepts of unpublished and
unprecedential, deciding as a single issue whether opinions
would be published and precedential.173 For example, the Third
Circuit rule referred to its unpublished decisions as its "not
precedential opinions."'174 Such a statement suggests that the
"correspondence" foreseen by the 1973 Committee was
accepted and applied by courts. Without the appellate system's
ever considering the jurisprudential underpinnings or having a
national debate on the issue, unpublished came to mean both
"unciteable" and "non-precedential" in most circuits.' 75 Of
course, when we speak of "publication" in the context of the
rules, we mean only that the court has designated the opinions as
"published" or "unpublished." As noted above, nearly all federal
appellate decisions are now-and for several years have been-
published in both commercial online databases and the Federal
170. Id.
171. Id. The reader might compare, for example, Serfass and Cranford's summary of
First Circuit Rule 36(b), which pointed out that "[i]n general, the court thinks it desirable
that opinions be published and thus be available for citation" and Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.1,
which provided that "opinions that may in any way interest persons other than the parties to
a case should be published" with, for example, their summary of Federal Circuit Internal
Operating Procedure 10, which reminded practitioners that "[t]he workload of the appellate
courts precludes preparation of precedential opinions in all cases," and pointed out that
"[u]nnecessary precedential dispositions, with concomitant full opinions, only impede the
rendering of decisions and the preparation of precedential opinions in cases which merit
that effort."
172. Id. at 351-57.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 352 (quoting 3d Cir. I.O.P 5.7).
175. Id. at 351-57.
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Appendix, as well as, increasingly, on the courts' own websites
under the E-Government Act.17
2. Citation
The 1973 Committee recognized that limiting publication
would be of no avail if citation to unpublished opinions
remained unrestricted. 177 Since the mid-1970s, all federal courts
of appeals have had some form of limited-citation rule, though
the rules varied widely in the extent of their restrictions. At the
time of the adoption of Rule 32.1, four circuits had rules
forbidding citation to unpublished opinions entirely.' 78  The
remaining nine circuits allowed citation to some degree when
the litigant believed no published opinion would serve as
well. 179 Of those nine, three circuits (the First, Eighth, and
Eleventh), specifically recognized that unpublished opinions
might be cited for their persuasive authority Even among the
nine circuits that allowed citation under certain circumstances,
most expressed some disapproval of the practice either by
saying that citation was "disfavored"' 81 or by using phrases like
"should not normally be cited."' 182 Only the D.C. Circuit
explicitly aJBroved citation as precedent without language of
reservation. It is these limited-citation rules, rather than rules
about limited publication or precedential effect, that are replaced
by Rule 32.1.4
Declaring unpublished opinions to be non-citeable had the
direct effect of denying their precedential effects in almost every
176. Gant, supra n. 157, at 709-10.
177. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 18-19.
178. See Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351-57.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. This was the language used by the First, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits. Id. at 351-56. Note that Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 was citation-friendly, but that
its I.O.P. 5 stated that "[t]he court does not favor reliance on unpublished opinions." Id. at
356.
182. Id. at 353.
183. Id. at 356. (quoting D.C. Cir. R. 36(c)(2), which indicated that while the decision to
issue an unpublished decision meant that the deciding panel saw "no precedential value" in
the opinion, the rules plainly allowed citation as precedent, which left the determination of
precedential effect up to the court to which the opinion was cited).
184. See Fed. R. App. 32.1 & advisory comm. nn.
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circuit. 185 The extent to which these decisions might be treated
as precedent varied widely across the circuits from those that
accorded them no value to those that accorded at least some of
them full precedential value.
186
3. Precedent
The 1973 Committee's proposal to remove unpublished
opinions from the body of citeable law effectively answered the
question of whether those decisions are precedential. In a
modem jurisprudential version of "out of sight-out of mind,"
unpublished decisions continued, from a rules perspective, to be
unciteable until the advent of Rule 32.1, and by extension, they
were usually unprecedential.
Of the thirteen circuits, only two, the Fifth and D.C.
Circuits, retained any precedential status to their unpublished
opinions. The Fifth Circuit gave precedential value to decisions
prior to January 1, 1996, while the D.C. Circuit gave
precedential value to decisions after January 1, 2002.187 Neither
of these rules made it clear that they meant binding precedential
effect, but that seems to be the implication." Four other
circuits' rules suggested that their unpublished decisions might
have some persuasive value. 189 The remaining six circuits
denied unpublished opinions any precedential effect, either
explicitly or by completely forbidding citation.1 90 The denial of
binding precedential status expressly or by implication was
nearly ubiquitous in the federal courts of appeals, though a few
of them left some room open for a litigant to argue that a
decision had persuasive value. 191 Although all circuits have now
brought their citation rules into congruence with Rule 32.1, the
185. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351-57.
186. Compare e.g. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 354 (summarizing 7th Cir. R.
53(b)(2)(iv), which stated that unpublished orders should not be cited or used as
precedent), with e.g. id. at 353 (quoting from 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3, which stated that
"[u]npublished opinions issued before January 1, 1996, are precedent," but cautioned that
they should not normally be cited).
187. See id. at 353, 356.
188. Id.
189. See generally id.
190. See generally id.
191. It appears that persuasive value would be the same value given to decisions of
courts in other jurisdictions, law review articles, secondary sources, and the like.
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new federal rule has not altered the state of affairs with respect
to precedent.
E. Rule 32.1
It was a long road from the creation of limited publication
and citation plans in 1973 to the 2006 enactment of Rule 32.1,
which restored citeability to unpublished decisions (at least
those issued after January 1, 2007).
1. History of the Rule
Upon enactment of the limited publication and citation
plans by all the circuits in 1973, the Federal Judicial Conference
was satisfied, viewing each of the circuits as a legal laboratory
that would accumulate experience and refine the rules
accordingly. 192 It did seem to acknowledge, however, that the
plan was not necessarily a permanent solution. 93 Still, the
relevant report indicates that "the possible rewards of such
experimentation are so rich, the Conference agreed that it should
not be discontinued until there is considerably more experience
under diverse circuit plans."' 9 4 It was apparently the hope of the
Conference that a common plan might develop. 95 It did not. Nor
was the issue revisited formally by the federal government until
the Federal Courts Study Committee was created in 1988 by
Congress.
The FCSC published a report in 1990 finding that "non-
publication and non-citation rules present many problems."'
' 96
Recognizing that the decision to limit publication and citation
was always one of pragmatism and never one of principle, the
Committee explained that "[t]he policy in courts of appeals of
not publishing certain opinions, and concomitantly restricting
192. 1974 Judicial Conference Report, supra n. 14, at 12.
193. Id. (stating that "[t]he Conference noted the view of its Committee and its
Subcommittee that further experimentation may well lead to the amendment of the diverse
circuit plans")
194. Id.
195. Id. (expressing the expectation "that eventually a somewhat more or less common
plan might evolve").
196. Federal Courts Study Committee, Report, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 733, 871 (1990).
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their citation, has always been a concession to perceived
necessity."' 197 In addition, the FCSC noted that both doctrinal
issues and application issues supported questioning of the non-
publication/non-citation rules.' 98While it was essentially a call
for the Judicial Conference to "review policy" on the matter, and
not a policy suggestion or analysis in and of itself, the FCSC
report seemed to suggest that a return to universal publication
might very well have been called for:
Universal publication has enough problems of its own that
we cannot recommend it now; but inexpensive database
access and computerized search technologies may justify
revisiting the issue, because these developments may now
or soon will provide wide and inexpensive access to all
opinions. 1
9 9
Though the 1990 Judicial Conference did not agree and
refused to study the matter, the FCSC's forecast has undeniably
come to pass; today, unpublished courts of appeals decisions are
routinely published in the Federal Appendix and online in both
commercial and government-operated databases. 20 0 And despite
the Judicial Conference's rejection of the FCSC's 1990
recommendation for revisiting the issue,201  the same
recommendation for further study was made two months later by
a long-term project within the Judicial Conference itself.202 The
Local Rules Project, which had been created by the Judicial
Conference in 1984, was in the midst of a review of all of the
federal courts' local rules to determine which rules were most in
conflict.20 3 One such area of conflict and concern was the
multiplicity of local rules governing publication and citation.20 4
197. Id.
198. Id. (noting that "[s]heer bulk prohibits universal publication in traditional hard-copy
volumes" and also acknowledging the "easy applications of established law to fact" in
many routine cases).
199. Id. at 871-72.
200. Gant, supra n. 157, at 709-10.
201. Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States: September 12, 1990 at 88
(noting Judicial Conference opposition to FCSC recommendation that "[a] representative
ad hoc committee under the auspices of the Judicial Conference should review policy on
unpublished court opinions in light of increasing ease and decreasing cost of database
access").
202. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1437.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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The Local Rules Project specifically recommended that the issue
was appropriate for resolution by a national rule and that the
Advisory Committee should consider amending the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure to implement such a rule.
20 5
The Judicial Conference Committee took the
recommendation and asked the Advisory Committee to consider
the issue.20 6 While the recommendation was placed on the
Advisory Committee's agenda, it languished in what a later
Advisory Committee Reporter would characterize as
"rulemaking hell. 20 7 Between a reluctance to address an issue
that the Judicial Conference had recently declined to study and
the Advisory Committee's more substantial task in "restyling"
all of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure into plain
language with a consistent style, no action was taken on the
issue throughout the mid-1990s. 20 8 In 1997, the Advisory
Committee completed the restyling project and, under the
direction of a new chair and a new reporter, it turned its
attention to the unpublished-opinions issue. 20 9 The Advisory
Committee's initial poll of the Circuits' chief judges indicated
that they were "virtually unanimous in their opposition to any
rulemaking on the topic,"210 and the Committee somewhat
reluctantly decided to "bow to the political reality"' 211 that "rules
regarding unpublished decisions have no chance of clearing the
Judicial Conference in the foreseeable future. 212 Still, the
Advisory Committee had questions about the issue, including a
concern that some circuits were refusing to make their
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1437-38.
209. Id. at 1438-39. See also Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules, Minutes-September 1997 Meeting pt. VII(C)(3),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ap9-97.htm (Sept. 12, 1997) [hereinafter Fall 1997
Minutes] (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
210. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
Minutes--Spring 1998 Meeting, pt. (V)(C), http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesfMinutes/0498
appellateminutes.htm (Apr. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Spring 1998 Minutes] (emphasis in
original) (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
211. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1440.
212. Spring 1998 Minutes, supra n. 210.
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unpublished decisions available, in any manner, to commercial
publishers like West and LEXIS.213 Also, the Solicitor General
believed that a rule should be proposed notwithstanding the
judges' objections. 214 The Committee had spoken, however, and
the issue would remain dormant until January 2001, when the
Solicitor General would again urge the Advisory Committee to
adopt a national standard governing the citation of unpublished
opinions.
215
Though both the Chair and the Reporter of the Committee
were uninterested in taking up the issue, the Solicitor General
and several Committee members believed that judicial sentiment
on the issue might have changed since 1997.216 This was a well-
founded belief given the selection of several new chief judges
and the then-recent decision of the Eighth Circuit in Anastasoff
v. United States,217  which held that a federal court is
constitutionally required to treat all its decisions as precedent.
218
Nonetheless, for scheduling reasons, the Advisory Committee
tabled the discussion until the next meeting, which did not occur
until April 2002.219 In preparation for this meeting, the new
chair, then-Judge Samuel A. Alito of the Third Circuit, now a
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, polled the chief
judges once again on both the issue itself and the Solicitor
General's proposal for a uniform rule.22 °
The uniform rule proposed by the Solicitor General at that
time was not the Rule 32.1 that would later be enacted; it was a
213. See Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1441.
214. Spring 1998 Minutes, supra n. 210. It is interesting to note that during the
discussion of this agenda item, one committee member "wondered whether the Committee
might propose a rule addressing only the question of whether unpublished decisions should
be treated as precedential," while another asked if it might "be worthwhile to pursue
rulemaking on the isolated question of the citation of unpublished opinions." Neither
narrow question was taken up, however, as the perception was that the judges were against
"any rulemaking on the topic." Id. (emphasis in original).
215. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1441 (citing Letter from Seth P.
Waxman, Solicitor Gen. of the U.S., to Will Garwood, Chair, Advisory Comm. on App. R.
1 (Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with Wash. & Lee L. Rev.) [hereinafter Waxman Letter]).
216. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1443.
217. 223 F.3d 898 (Sth Cir.), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
218. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1443.
219. Id. at 1444.
220. Id. (citing Ltr. from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 3d Cir., Chair,
Advisory Comm. on App. Rules, to R. Lanier Anderson, III, C. J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the
11 th Cir. (Feb. 22, 2002) (on file with Wash. & Lee L. Rev.) [hereinafter Alito Letter]).
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rule focused on uniformity across the circuits that had three
main features: First, citation of unpublished opinions would
continue to be disfavored; second, citation would be expressly
allowed on issues of res judicata, law of the case, collateral
estoppel, double jeopardy, sanctionable conduct, abuse of writ,
fact or adequacy of notice, and the like; and third, citation would
also be allowed when a party reasonably believed that the
unpublished opinion persuasively addressed a material issue that
was unaddressed by any published opinion. 1 The chief judges'
response to this proposal was far different from the one in 1997.
Instead of being unanimous, the judges' individual responses
were quite varied. The chief judges of three circuits, the Second,
Seventh, and D.C., did not respond.222 The chief judges of three
circuits, the Third, Tenth, and Eleventh, expressed support.
223
The chief judges of five circuits, the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Federal, expressed opposition.224 And the chief judges of the
remaining circuits, the Fifth and Sixth, expressed division
among their judges and a disinclination to alter standard
procedure, respectively.
225
It was this great variation in opinion, the Anastasoff
decision, and the then-recent liberalization of some circuits'
rules on citation that signaled a sea change in opinion on the
issue. For example, the D.C. Circuit had recently altered its rule
to permit citation of opinions after January 1, 2002, "as
precedent,, 226 and the internal operating procedures then in
force in the Third Circuit indicated that the court itself did not
cite unpublished opinions, but they did not restrict litigants from
doing so.227 In addition, the First Circuit had embarked on the
comment process to enact its own rule permitting citation in
221. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1441-42 (citing Waxman Letter,
supra n. 215).
222. Id. at 1444 (citing Auto Letter, supra n. 220).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1444-45.
225. Id.
226. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 356 (describing D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(1)(b), now
no longer in force). The provisions of former Rule 28(c)(1)(b) are now incorporated into
D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B).
227. Id. at 352 (describing former 3d Cir. I.O.P 5.7, now no longer in force). See also
Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 165, at 253 (describing former 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.8, apparently
in force before former 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7 became effective, and which contained virtually
the same language).
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some circumstances, which later became First Circuit R. 32.3.228
This change of perception about the importance of the issue was
reflected in the Advisory Committee's vote to propose an
amendment to the Federal Rules that would include a national
rule on the citation of unpublished opinions.
229
After finally taking up the issue, the Advisory Committee
turned its attention to the content of the proposed rule. The
possibilities ran the gamut from opposing all national
rulemaking to requiring all opinions to be written, published,
and precedential but the likely range of rules fell within a much
narrower field. Professor Schiltz played a pivotal role in
framing the debate and the actual rule by drafting three
alternative proposed rules. 231 Alternative A specifically
authorized courts to issue opinions that were non-precedential
and permitted the citation of such opinions without restriction.
Alternative B addressed only the issue of citation, permitting it
without restriction, but made no mention of precedential status
for such opinions. Alternative C hewed most closely to the
Solicitor General's position, permitting citation in a limited set
of circumstances and making no mention of precedential
232status. Alternative A was quickly rejected, as the Advisory
Committee, like the 1973 Committee before it, did not want to
get involved in the messy issue of precedential status.233
Between the other two, the Committee quickly rejected
Alternative C in favor of Alternative B. 2 34 Alternative B, which
228. Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 28, at 351 (describing former 1st Cir. R. 32.3, since
rescinded).
229. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
Minutes-Spring 2002 Meeting, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0402.pdf pt.
(V)(H) (Apr. 22, 2002), [hereinafter Spring 2002 Minutes] (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
230. See e.g. Spring 1998 Minutes, supra n. 210, at pt. (V)(C) (summarizing committee
members' discussion of various alternatives). See also Spring 2002 Minutes, supra n. 229
(setting out committee members' suggestions and concerns).
231. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1447-49.
232. Id. at 1448.
233. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
Minutes-Fall 2002 Meeting 35 (pt. (V)(F)), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app
1102.pdf (Nov. 18, 2002) (noting that committee members "were unanimous in wanting to
limit the involvement of the Committee to the issue of citation") (accessed Dec. 12, 2008;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
234. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1448.
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removed all restrictions on the citation of unpublished opinions
while not addressing their precedential force, was broader, but
also more controversial, than Alternative C.235 But as Professor
Schiltz reports, there was a feeling that "if the Advisory
Committee was going to pick a fight, it should at least pick one
worth fighting," and that Alternative C would remain a fallback
position. 36
In November 2002, the newly minted Rule 32.1 was
approved by the Advisory Committee with only stylistic
changes,237 and in June 2003, it was approved for publication by
the Standing Committee with no changes and very little
conversation 238 The subsequent publication and proffered
proposed amendments drew numerous comments by letter and
239
several requests to testify before the Advisory Committee.
Most of the comments opposed the rule; however, the vast
majority of those came from a single circuit-the Ninth-and
were "extremely repetitive," which suggested to Professor
Schiltz that
[o]bviously, there had been an organized campaign to
generate comments opposing Rule 32.1, as many of those
comments repeated-sometimes word-for-word-the same
basic "talking points" that had been distributed by
opponents of the rule.
240
Even after acknowledging these comments, the Advisory
Committee was firm in its support of the rule. At the
Committee's April 2004 meeting, every member, save one,
spoke in favor of the rule, and most did so in very serious terms,
arguing that "an Article III court should not be able to forbid
parties from citing back to it the public actions that the court
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1447-48.
237. For example, the admonition, "[a] court must not impose" was shifted from active
to passive voice to read, "[N]o restriction may be imposed," so as not to unnecessarily
antagonize the judges inclined to oppose the rule. See Schiltz, Much Ado About Little,
supra n. 1, at 1449.
238. Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Minutes-Meeting of June 9-10, 2003 8-9 (June 9-10, 2003), http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ST06-2003-min.pdf (noting then-Judge Alito's presentation of
the new rule and Judge Sirica's single comment about it) (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
239. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1450-51.
240. Id. at 1451.
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itself has taken" and pointing out that
[i]t is antithetical to American values and to the common
law system for a court to forbid a party or an attorney from
calling the court's attention to its own prior decisions, from
arguing to the court that its prior decisions were or were not
correct, and from arguing that the court should or should
not act consistently with those prior decisions in the present241
case.
Committee members called no-citation rules "extreme" and
"ludicrous," and one member-judge noted that limited citation
rules made federal circuit judges the only government officials
who can shield themselves from being confronted with their past
242actions. Members likewise dismissed concerns that permitting
citation would slow the wheels of justice by increasing
disposition times or make for rougher justice by encouraging
shorter opinions.243 Committee members, including three circuit
judges from circuits that had already liberalized citation to
unpublished opinions, noted that no such delays or other
problems were occurring in their circuits.24 Only a single
Committee member spoke out against the citation of
unpublished opinions.245 This member also opined that the
differing caseloads throughout the circuits justified different
approaches.246
Although the Advisory Committee was clearly in support
of the proposed rule, it was difficult to determine whether the
judiciary on balance was for it or against it. To address this
issue, the Standing Committee returned the proposal to the
Advisory Committee to have the issue studied further by the
Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the
241. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
and Procedure, Minutes-Spring 2004 Meeting 8 (Apr. 13-14 2004), http://www.uscourts
.gov/rules/Minutes/app0404.pdf (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
242. Id.
243. Id. (referring generically to "parade of horribles" forecast by commentators
opposing new rule).
244. Id.
245. Id. The member called the unpublished opinions "junk law" and stated that the
rulemaking body ought to wait for consensus on the issue.
246. Id.
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United States Courts. 247 Both the FJC and AO did study the
issue, and both studies refuted the claims made by opponents of
proposed Rule 32.1.248 First, the AO study found that a
permissive citation policy had no appreciable impact on either
median disposition times or the number of summary
dispositions. 249 Second, the FJC's survey of circuit judges
revealed that those judges believed, by a wide margin, that
permitting citation of unpublished opinions would not increase
the courts' workload either in checking citations or in preparing
unpublished opinions with greater care.250 Third, the FJC's
survey of judges in the two circuits that had recently liberalized
their rules on citation (the First and D.C. Circuits) revealed that
judges in those circuits had experienced no appreciable change
in their workload and that their method of dealing with
unpublished decisions had remained unchanged.25 1 Fourth, the
FJC's survey of attorneys found that attorneys also predicted or
reported no appreciable change in their workloads as a result of
more permissive citation practices.252 Many attorneys reported
that they already researched unpublished opinions, and most
predicted that the rule would be a positive change in their
practices.
253
247. Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Minutes-Meeting of June 17-18, 2004 11 (June 17-18, 2004), http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ST06-2004-min.pdf (accessed Dec. 12, 2008; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at
1453.
248. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1454-57.
249. Id. at 1454-55 (citing Memorandum from John K. Rabiej, Chief, Rules Comm.
Support Off., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts, to Advisory Comm. on App. Rules 1 (Feb.
24, 2005)).
250. Tim Reagan et al., Citations to Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of
Appeals 10, http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/citatio2.pdf/$file/citatio2.pdf (Fed.
Jud. Ctr. 2005) & id. at 38 (tbl. J, entitled "Unpublished Citation's Additional Work")
(accessed Jan. 5, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process);
Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1454-55.
251. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 12-13 & id. at 43 (tbl. 0, entitled "Work after Local
Rule Change"); Schiltz, Much Ado about Little, supra n. 1, at 1455-56.
252. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 17 & id. at 49 (tbl. U, entitled "Impact on Work of
New Rule"); Schiltz, Much Ado about Little, supra n. 1, at 1456.
253. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 15-17 & id. at 45-48 (tbls. Q-T, entitled,
respectively, "Wanted to Cite This Court's Unpublished Opinion," "Wanted to Cite
Another Court's Unpublished Opinion," "Would Have Cited This Court's Unpublished
Opinion," & "Would Have Cited Another Court's Unpublished Opinion"); Schiltz, Much
Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1456.
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By mid-2005, a national rule on the citation of unpublished
opinions seemed virtually assured. Members of the two key
committees were persuaded by the FJC and AO studies that a
national rule on the issue was appropriate. Two members of the
Advisory Committee still held out for a more limited rule akin to
what the Solicitor General had initially proposed, but that
Committee approved Rule 32.1, as written, in April 2005.254 The
Standing Committee unanimously approved the rule at its June
2005 meeting. 255 While the issue was much closer in the Judicial
Conference, that body resolved the impasse with an amendment
that limited the freedom of citation to decisions issued after
256January 1, 2007. The Supreme Court approved the new rule
without comment, and Congress did not act to block the rule.257
On December 1, 2006, Rule 32.1 took effect, but due to the post-
January 1, 2007, limitation it affected no decisions for one full
month.258
254. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
and Procedure, Minutes-Meeting of April 14-15, 2005 at 16 (Apr. 14-15 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0405.pdf (accessed Jan. 5, 2009; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). Readers interested in the committee
discussion preceding the vote of approval might wish to review the rest of the material in
Section IV(A) of these minutes.
255. Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Minutes-Meeting of June 15-16, 2005 10-11, http://www.uscourts.gov
/rules/Minutes/ST06-2005-min.pdf (June 15-16, 2005) (accessed Jan. 5, 2008; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). Although the text of the rule itself was
unaltered at this meeting, the Advisory Committee did vote to release with the rule only a
shortened version of the Committee Note. Id. at 11.
256. Judicial Conference of the United States Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 36-37, http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/sept05proc-final
.pdf (Sept. 20, 2005) (accessed Jan. 5, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process).
257. See Ltr. from John G. Roberts, Jr., C.J. of the U.S., to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker,
U.S. House of Rep. 1, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/LettersOrders.pdf (Apr. 12, 2006)
(transmitting attached order that amends then-existing rules to include new F.R.A.P. 32.1)
(accessed Jan. 5, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). See
also Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2074(a) (2008) (permitting the federal courts
generally to make rules in the absence of Congressional objection and permitting a rule
published before May 1 of a given year to take effect after December 1 of that year if
Congress takes no action to prevent its doing so) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
258. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (providing, in subsection (a)(ii) that it applies only to opinions
issued on or after January 1, 2007).
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2. The Text of Rule 32.1
The new rule, by its terms, addresses only the issue of
citation:
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict
the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments,
or other written dispositions that have been:
(i) designated as "unpublished," "not for publication,"
"non-precedential," "not precedent," or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
(b) Copies Required. If a party cites a federal judicial
opinion, order, judgment, or other written disposition that is
not available in a publicly accessible electronic database,
the party must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order,
judgment, or disposition with the brief or other paper in
which it is cited,
and the comment explicitly states:
Rule 32.1 is extremely limited. It does not require any court
to issue an unpublished opinion or forbid any court from
doing so. It does not dictate the circumstances under which
a court may choose to designate an opinion as
"unpublished" or specify the procedure that a court must
follow in making that determination. It says nothing about
what effect a court must give to one of its unpublished
opinions or to the unpublished opinions of another court.
Rule 32.1 addresses only the citation of federal judicial
dispositions that have been designated as "unpublished" or
"non-precedential"-whether or not those dispositions have
been 3ublished in some way or are precedential in some
sense.
This rule, which takes no position on the precedential status of
these unpublished-though now citeable--opinions, has
addressed, to borrow the phrasing of the 1973 Committee, only
259. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
260. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, advisory comm. n. on 2006 amendments (emphasis in
original).
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the "use" issue and not the greater issue of its "philosophical
effect."
2 61
Once again, the policy and rulemaking authority has
avoided the "morass of jurisprudence ' 262 involved in discussing,
debating, and deciding on the more critical issue of what
precedential effect these unpublished decisions should have.
Instead, the system's development is left once again to follow
the supposedly natural "correspondence" between publication
and precedential value.263 Relying upon that correspondence-
the natural trend of treating citeable things as precedent and
unciteable things as non-precedent-has led to the patchwork
rules that have governed since the mid-1970s. If part of the goal
of Rule 32.1 was to bring uniformity to the issue, it has mostly
failed.264 But more importantly, it has not only failed to resolve
the critical issue of whether these decisions are precedent, it has
chosen not even to address that issue. 265 Instead, the policy of
the 1973 Committee, to allow the pragmatic tail to wag the
jurisprudential dog, has been repeated. The policy that initially
led to the uneven rules regarding publication, citation, and
precedent, which in turn led to the Rule 32.1 debate and
proposal, is now being repeated.
What remains to be done, in the wake of Rule 32.1, is to
wade into the "morass of jurisprudence" and confront the issue
of precedential status. It is an issue of both principle and
pragmatism, of what we must do and what we ought to do. To
continue to pass on the important question in favor of the more
approachable question is to perpetuate a jurisprudence of doubt.
261. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 21 (stating of the recommendation to
address only citation and not precedent that "[i]t deals with use rather than philosophical
effect").
262. Id. at 20.
263. Id. at 21 (stating that the recommendation "relies on the correspondence of
publication and precedential value on the one hand, and of non-publication and non-
precedential value on the other.").
264. It has not even brought uniformity on the citation issue, as it is limited in
application to decisions issued after January 1, 2007. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a)(ii). This
is, at most, a partial partial solution.
265. Schiltz, Much Ado about Little, supra n. 1, at 1448 ("[M]embers concluded that the
Advisory Committee should not embrace one side or the other of the debate over the
constitutionality of issuing nonprecedential opinions. Rather, the Advisory Committee
decided to limit its involvement to the issue of citation. To date, the Advisory Committee
has not wavered from this position."). See also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n.
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What follows is an examination of the various doubts expressed
over the denial of the precedential status of some decisions
under the misnomer "unpublished opinions." These doubts are
both principled and pragmatic; that is, they address both
potential constitutional infirmities and perceived practical
problems with the practice of declaring some decisions ex ante
to be non-precedential.
V. THE DEBATE OVER PRECEDENTIAL STATUS OF UNPUBLISHED
DECISIONS
For the vast majority of the history of common law courts
in America and England, the publication status of an opinion
was not directly determinative of its precedential value. That is,
while it may have been difficult for litigants to find a court's
past decisions, nothing prevented a litigant from bringing such a
decision to the court's attention or suggested that the court need
not follow it.266 While the 1973 Committee's recommendation,
on its face, claims only to deal with whether an unpublished case
can be cited as precedent and not whether it is precedent, for all
practical purposes, this is a distinction without a difference. The
1973 Committee knew full well that the inability to cite a case
effectively removed it from the body of precedent as well as
from view; moreover, the Committee was aware that the trend
would be to treat non-citable items as non-precedents owing to
the "correspondence of publication and precedential value on the
one hand, and of non-publication and non-precedential value on
the other., 2
67
From the beginning, limited publication and citation rules
in the federal courts of appeals were heavily criticized. 68 As a
1985 FJC Staff Report explains, "[o]f the recent innovations,
none has been more controversial than the practice of disposing
of some cases without a published decision." 269 And a note
266. See Baker, supra n. 47, at 204 (pointing out that, even in the earliest days of
reporting cases, "[t]he rolls continued to be the most authoritative source of precedents into
later times, and it was common for counsel to 'vouch the record' when citing a previous
case.")
267. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 21.
268. Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 2.
269. Id. See also id. at 13-14 (discussing commentators' concerns about unfairness).
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critical of non-citation rules and the non-precedent effect that
followed them, for example, examines the limited publication
and citation rules existing in the federal courts of appeals in the
late 1970s, then proceeds to examine the rules' effect on the
precedential status of unpublished cases.270 Stating that "[t]hese
practices raise several problems," 271 the author considers the
importance of all cases in clarifying the law, the difficulty
unpublished opinions cause in the appeals process and several
potential Constitutional infirmities in the practice. 72 Similarly,
an authoritative article published in the late 1970s examines the
arguments in favor of limited publication and citation and finds
them both fundamentally flawed and vulnerable to considerable
counterattack.273 In fact, its authors note at the start of their
description of the arguments in favor of the then-existing rules
that
[t]he argument in favor of the limited publication and no-
citation rule has not been carefully and completely
delineated. Commentators have been content to
characterize it as an argument based on judicial economy,
although some of its other aspects have also been noted.
274
The article then proceeds to lay bare the unstated premises of the
limited-citation argument, refuting them at every turn and
270. David Dunn, Student Author, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 148 (1977).
271. Id. at 135.
272. Id. at 135-45.
273. See generally Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5. In addition to
this seminal article on the issue, Reynolds and Richman have been prolific in their further
examination of this and related issues, and in publishing their scholarship in this area. See
e.g. William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1723 (2005); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Justice and More Judges, 15
J.L. & Pol. 559 (1999); William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More
Federal Judgeships, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 37 (1999); William M. Richman, Rationing
Judgeships Has Lost Its Appeal, 24 Pepp. L. Rev. 911 (1997); William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, The New Certiorari Courts: Congress Must Expand the Number of
Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals to Restore Their Traditional Role, 80 Judicature 206
(Mar.-Apr. 1997); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on
the Titanic, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1290 (1996); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds,
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certioriari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81
Cornell L. Rev. 273 (1996); Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication, supra n. 5.
274. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1181 (footnotes omitted).
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ultimately adding significant counterarguments based on judicial
responsibility and accountability.
275
From the outset, considerable doubt about the wisdom of
limited publication, citation, and precedent has existed:
The case against the limited publication/no-citation rules is
a strong one. The premises upon which the rules are based
are subject to serious question, and powerful arguments can
be advanced against the entire concept. It is not surprising,
therefore, that a significant number of critics have spoken
against the system-critics from the bench, the bar, and the
schools.
Furthermore, the widespread adoption of the limited
publication/no-citation rules-a major change in the
operation of the circuit courts-has been accomplished
with relativel , little public debate or legislative
participation.
Still, such critics and their strong criticisms were unable to alter
the system, which was by then firmly fixed on limited
publication and citation as the pragmatic solution to the ever-
increasing federal caseload. Though both the 1973 Committee
and every official rulemaking body since has avoided the
underlying jurisprudential issues, both the issues and the
accompanying criticisms of the scheme remain.
A. Criticisms of the Premises of Limited Publication, Citation,
and Precedent
The justificatory arguments in favor of limited publication
and limited citation have already been aptly outlined
elsewhere. 277 It will nonetheless be helpful to take a similar
approach here, re-framing those arguments and revisiting them
in light of the courts' additional experience, the expanded
scholarship on the issue, and the opinion-publication realities
that presently exist.
275. Id. at 1167-1205.
276. Id. at 1205 (footnotes omitted).
277. The analysis in this section owes much to that undertaken by Professors Reynolds
and Richman in No Citation Rules, supra n. 5. See generally id.
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The premises 278 for preventing publication are essentially
three-fold: (1) appellate opinions can be divided into those that
make law and those that apply law, only the former of which
need to be published; (2) publication of all opinions imposes
costs on both the opinion creators (courts) and opinion
consumers (the public); and (3) judges can determine before
drafting an opinion whether a case is one that will make law or
one that merely applies law.
279
The premises for preventing citation were essentially two-
fold: (1) the costs savings envisioned by limiting publication
would be lost if citation were allowed; and (2) allowing citation
of unpublished opinions would result in unfairness between
litigants.2 80 These premises have now been largely rejected as
inaccurate and also as having been overcome by more important
concerns.2 81 Given that Rule 32.1 has resolved this issue in favor
of citation, there is no need to explicate this argument at great
length.282 But because the reasons for denying citation are often
imported into discussions of denying precedential status, it will
be touched on briefly.
Finally, the premises for preventing opinions from being
precedential are almost entirely implied, following without
separate principled consideration from the first two issues. 283
Essentially, those premises are also two-fold and mirror the
278. The use of the word "premises" is intended only to suggest underlying reasons that
have been specified for examination; it is not intended to suggest that this discussion
purports to be a formal logical proof. Like the surveys of the relevant arguments in favor of
no-citation rules in the articles that preceded this one, this is simply an effort to state
clearly, and to address directly, the reasons for limiting publication, citation, and precedent.
279. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1188-89; Standards for
Publication, supra n. 4, at 6-8.
280. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1188-89; Standards for
Publication, supra n. 4, at 19.
281. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 Arizona St. L.J. 1, 7 (2007) (noting the adoption of Fed.
R. App. P. 32.1 permitting citation, and characterizing the "charges leveled at
institutionalized unpublication" as "multiplicitous and damning"). See also Stephen R.
Barnett, No-Citation Rules under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. App. Prac.
& Process 473, 497 (2003) (noting that the citadel of non-citation was then falling).
282. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
283. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20-21 (relying entirely on the
correspondence between functional publication and precedent rather than addressing the
issue directly); Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (taking no position on the issue of
precedent).
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reasons for preventing citation: (1) the costs savings envisioned
by limiting publication and citation would be lost if decisions
were truly precedential; and (2) allowing unpublished cases to
have precedential value would result in unfairness between
litigants. In light of the developments in legal research
technology and the recent decision to allow all unpublished
cases to be cited, the foundation for denying certain decisions
precedential status is terribly weak--even before one addresses
the potential Constitutional infirmities and pragmatic objections.
B. Premises Supporting the Prevention of Comprehensive
Publication
The argument in favor of limiting publication of court
decisions is essentially a practical argument of judicial and
litigant economy. 284 It relies on three premises: (1) appellate
opinions can be divided into those that make law and those that
apply law, only the former of which need to be published; (2)
publication of all opinions imposed costs on both the opinion
creators (courts) and opinion consumers (the public); and (3)
judges can determine before drafting an opinion whether a case
is one that will make law or one that merely applies law. Each of
these premises is significantly flawed.
1. The Law-Making/Law-Applying Distinction
The most general and theoretical premise is that court
decisions serve one of two purposes. A given decision either
makes law (law-making) or merely applies the law (dispute-
resolving).28 According to this model, a given decision either
makes new law by expanding the scope of existing law or
writing a new principle into the body of law, or simply applies
284. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5 at 1188-89 (noting the
argument that "[p]ublication of all appellate opinions is excessively costly" with respect to
both judges' time devoted to writing additional opinions and lawyers' time expended on
researching an expanded group of opinions).
285. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 2-3.
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the law without altering it.286 If this dichotomy is meaningful,
then one would need only to look at the law-making decisions to
know the law and could safely ignore the dispute-resolving
cases, which merely apply the law to other circumstances.
This distinction itself is flawed in several respects. First, it
is false; it is a distinction without a meaningful difference. Any
decision, even one that merely applies the law to facts identical
to a prior case, makes law. The existence of multiple cases on a
given point adds to the predictive power of precedent. Because
the court has decided similar cases repeatedly, frequently, or
recently a lawyer may reasonably assume that it is more likely to
do so in the present case. The strength of the precedent, that is
how likely a court will be to justify departure from it, can be
determined from these qualities. In plain terms, an advocate
would rather argue from a line of cases showing repeated and
frequent application of law to similar facts that have been re-
affirmed recently, than merely rely on a single case. Repeated
applications demonstrate acceptance of a principle of law by
multiple courts and multiple panels, with each additional case
adding to the "well-established" line of authority advocates so
love to reference. Frequent application indicates a robust
principle in active use, which makes it harder for a court to
depart from that rule than would a single holding, which could
be viewed as idiosyncratic or aberrational. Recent applications
of the principle allow for an argument that the principle has not
faded over time in its applicability to modem societal and legal
circumstances. All of these benefits presume identical factual
settings, a true rarity, 287 but even in those cases, significant
predictive benefit can be garnered by later litigants.
Second, very few cases are identical in all respects to other
decided cases, and in this respect even minor variations matter.
286. Id. (contrasting opinions that "permit the parties and their attorneys to see that the
judges have considered their positions and arguments and to see the reasoning on which the
court reached its conclusion" with opinions that "provide the stuff of the law," which are
described as those that "permit an understanding of legal doctrine, and... accommodate
legal doctrine to changing conditions").
287. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 577 (1987) (pointing out
that "[n]o two events are exactly alike," and that "[flor a decision to be precedent for
another decision does not require that the facts of the earlier and the later cases be
absolutely identical," for "[w]ere that required, nothing would be precedent for anything
else").
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When a court decides that a case is factually similar enough to
come within the ambit of a given precedent, or when it decides
that it is factually dissimilar enough to fall outside the rule
articulated in a particular precedent, that adds something to the
law, even if the distinction is minor. The typical common law
action, after all, does not present binary questions about the
applicability or non-applicability of a general legal rule, such as
whether the tort of negligence requires causation. "Instead, the
determination of liability or no liability typically involves subtle,
circumstance-based questions like whether the defendant's
particular conduct, considered in light of decided cases, itself
amounts to a breach of duty. ' 28 8 Thus, each new, slightly
different, case represents an expansion, retraction, or
clarification of the law's reach, however, slight. Each case adds
something to the contours of the law.
Third, the publication of so-called dispute-resolving
opinions serves an important institutional goal in allowing for
proper review. Where decisions are not published, they are set
outside the courts' normal range of vision, which reduces the
likelihood of en banc or Supreme Court review. Take, for
example, the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Rivera-
Sanchez,289 in which the court acknowledged that no less than
twenty unpublished circuit opinions had been rendered on an
unresolved issue, and that those decisions had obviously divided
three ways on the proper rule to be applied. 290 Not only would
288. Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of
Precedent, 4 Green Bag 2d 17, 23 (2000). See also Healy, supra n. 36, at 66 (remarking on
Lord Coke's belief that judges should "refine" the law by "declaring its principles with
even greater precision and renewing it by application to the matter at hand," and citing
John Greville Agard Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge U.
Press 1987) and H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513 (1987)).
289. 222 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that twenty cases over a two-year
period had been resolved by unpublished opinion, yielding inconsistent outcomes until the
Ninth Circuit requested, in contravention of its own restrictive rules on citation, a list of
these opinions from counsel).
290. Id. Of the twenty decisions identified in Rivera-Sanchez, eleven decisions ruled in
favor of one procedure, six in favor of another, and three remanded to force the district
courts to take a position on the proper process. See also St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station
Employees, 484 U.S. 907 (1987) (Mem.) (Brennan, J. and White, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (pointing out that Fifth Circuit's unpublished opinion created a split between
the circuits on an "important question of federal law" that "could easily result in the same
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publication of these decisions have established a clear rule for
the circuit and avoided needless litigation, if the disparity
persisted due to an actual split between panels, it would have
allowed for an en banc resolution.
Similarly, lack of published opinions shields decisions from
Supreme Court review. Since the limited publication rules went
into effect in the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari on very few unpublished appellate decisions, though
that number is rising.291 This occurs because a circuit's decision
not to publish a given case signals that the case is routine, even
when it is not. For example in Edge Broadcasting Company v.
United States,2 92 the Fourth Circuit declared a federal statute
limiting lottery advertising unconstitutional in an unpublished
opinion. In its reversal of that decision, the Supreme Court
expressed surprise and dismay that a Court of Appeals could
perceive such a ruling as unworthy of publication.2 3 The hiding
of cases from Supreme Court review also occurs because lack of
detailed published opinions creates a less thorough record,
which itself discourages Supreme Court review. For example, in
County of Los Angeles v. Kling,294 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and issued a summary reversal in a case that the Ninth
Circuit had decided in a brief, unpublished, non-citeable
opinion, but Justice Stevens dissented, calling the Ninth
Circuit's practice "plainly wrong" and noting:
As this Court's summary disposition today demonstrates,
the Court of Appeals would have been well advised to
collective-bargaining contract, or identical ones, being interpreted in different ways in
different circuits").
291. David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate Over
Unpublished Opinions, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1667, 1684 & 1684 n. 61 (2005) (noting
that the court took only twelve such cases in the 1974 to 2000 terms and another twelve in
the 2001 to 2004 terms). See also David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass: Ending the
Jurisprudential Unpublication System, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 685 (2009). Of course, if
unpublished decisions were easy applications of settled law to obvious facts, the Supreme
Court should be granting certiorari in zero cases with unpublished decisions.
292. 956 F.2d 263 (tbl.) (per curiam), 1992 WL 35795 (4th Cir. 1992). Note that this
opinion appears to have been released for publication only on August 31, 1993. See Edge
Broad. Co. v. U.S., 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992).
293. U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co, 509 U.S. 418, 425 n. 3 (1993) ("We deem it remarkable
and unusual that although the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of
Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its
judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion.").
294. 474 U.S. 936 (1985).
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discuss the record in greater depth. One reason it failed to
do so is that the members of the panel decided that the
issues presented by this case did not warrant discussion in a
published opinion that could be "cited to or by the courts of
this circuit, save as provided by Rule 21(c)." . . . That
decision not to publish the opinion or permit it to be
cited-like the decision to promulgate a rule spawning a
body of secret law-was plainly wrong.
The brevity of analysis in the Court of Appeals'
unpublished, non-citable opinion, however, does not justify
the Court's summary reversal.
For, like a court of appeals that issues an opinion that may
not be printed or cited, this Court then engages in decision-
making without the discipline and accountability that the
preparation of opinions requires. 295
Finally, by not publishing opinions, the courts of appeals
avoid creating clear circuit rules, thus obfuscating circuit splits.
This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court never takes
notice of unpublished opinions-it does 29 6 -or that the Court
has accepted the appeals courts' claims that these decisions are
non-precedential. 297 Neither is true. Nevertheless, it seems clear
that non-publication interferes with the proper review process in
federal cases. Indeed, the concern that this is occurring has been
noted by individual Justices of the Supreme Court. For example
though the Court denied certiorari in Smith v. United States,299
Justice Blackmun noted that "[b]ecause the Court of Appeals'
unpublished opinion cannot be squared with our harmless-error
precedents, I would vacate the judgment and direct the Court of
Appeals to review the sentence under the proper standard,"
295. Id. at 938, 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes and internal citations omitted).
296. See e.g. Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 199, 241-50 (2001) (collecting
Supreme Court decisions and denials of writs involving unpublished decisions in an
appendix).
297. See e.g. C.I.R. v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) ("The Court of Appeals exceeded its
jurisdiction regardless of nonpublication and regardless of any assumed lack of
precedential effect of a ruling that is unpublished.").
298. 502 U.S. 1017 (1991) (Blackmun, O'Connor, & Souter, JJ., dissenting from denial
of writ of certiorari).
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stating in addition that
[t]he fact that the Court of Appeals' opinion is unpublished
is irrelevant. Nonpublication must not be a convenient
means to prevent review. An unpublished opinion may
have a lingering effect in the circuit and surely is as
important to the parties concerned as is a published
opinion.
Similarly, in Waller v. United States,300 two justices dissented
from a denial of certiorari on the ground that a recent
unpublished decision of the Ninth Circuit put it at odds with the
First Circuit.
30 1
In addition to promoting proper review, publication of
dispute-resolving opinions serves another important function:
preserving judicial accountability and the perception of judicial
accountability. What was once perceived as the "weakest"
branch 30 2 is now perceived as increasingly powerful, and by
some, as too powerful.30 3 Calls for greater judicial accountability
and transparency are likewise on the rise. The idea that an
appellate court can make law that is good in only a single
instance and not to be relied upon by later litigants is contrary to
the public's sense of how a court ought to proceed. We have
long viewed courts as our guardians of fairness and protection
against all others-individuals, organizations, and even the other
two branches of government.
299. Id. at 1019-20 & 1020 n.*.
300. 504 U.S. 962 (1992) (White & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting from denial of writ of
certiorari).
301. Id. at 964-65 (White & O'Connor JJ., dissenting); see also Hyman v. Rickman, 446
U.S. 989, 990-92 (1980) (Blackmun, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of
writ of certiorari on the ground that the unpublished opinion at issue was in conflict with
opinions of other circuits on the issue of right to appointed counsel).
302. See The Federalist No. 78 at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (reprinted in The Federalist
Papers (New Am. Lib./Mentor Books 1961)).
303. See e.g. Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of
and Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 Geo. L.J. 899, 901 (2007) (citing data from
two national surveys indicating that twenty-eight percent of Americans polled believed that
the Supreme Court "has too much power"); Jonah Goldberg, Senate "Show Trial" is
Product of a Too-Powerful Court, USA Today 1 A (Jan. 11, 2006) (taking position that
Senate's rigorous examination of nominees for Supreme Court is justified by significant
power invested in Justices, here likened to "unelected monarchs"); Lance Eric Neff, Keys
to the Kingdom: Interpretive Power and Societal Influence During Two Ages, 7 Fla.
Coastal L. Rev. 697, 700-01 & 701 n. 19 (2006) (noting that the judiciary is commonly
perceived as being "too powerful" and relatively unaccountable).
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2. Costs to the Courts and the Public
Assuming that decisions can be meaningfully divided into
those that need publishing and those that can safely remain
unpublished, the second premise then states that the publication
of all opinions imposes undue costs on both the courts and the
public. These costs can be divided, for the sake of analysis, into
four parts: the costs of creating decisions, the costs of
publication, the costs of consumption, and the costs to the
system.
The costs of creating these decisions include the use of
judicial resources sufficient to produce what might be called a
publication-worthy opinion.30 4 In 1978, the perception was that
greater study was needed to determine if there were any cost-
savings associated with the widespread use of unpublished
opinions. 30 5 Given the current state of affairs, where all
decisions, including those designated as "unpublished," are
published by commercial legal publishers, the courts' own
websites, or both, it seems untrue that the costs of publication
are deleterious to the courts. 3 0 6 The costs of publication, which
are essentially the costs of publishing and disseminating the
decisions, were once claimed to be too great for publishers to
bear: "The burden on the publishing industry to continue to
supply a complete reporting services [sic] at prices that are
reasonably tolerable appears to be beyond their capacity., 30 7 It is
unclear what support ever existed for this proposition, but any
concerns about the cost of publication being too great for the
publishers seems thoroughly undercut by the increasing use of
computer-assisted legal research, online access to legal
databases, and the courts' own provision of full-text searchable
opinions pursuant to the E-Government Act.
30 8
304. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2001) (characterizing the
"solemn judicial act" of opinion writing as "an exacting and extremely time-consuming
task").
305. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1191.
306. Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 558 (forecasting, more than a decade ago, that the
library of the future might be designed for readers who "sit at computer terminals searching
through compact discs or on-line information rather than browsing through bookshelves").
307. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 8.
308. Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 558.
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Another cost often claimed to justify limited publication is
the cost of consumption. This includes the costs of maintaining
libraries as well as the costs of searching the opinions once
published. °9 The former cost, while real, is adequately
addressed by technology, government provision of opinions, and
so forth. The latter is unavoidable unless literal publication can
be prevented. While the courts can designate certain opinions as
unpublished, it cannot prevent litigants from taking the time to
review them-a practice that litigants seem eager to engage
in.31 Litigants will continue to do so now that such decisions are
citeable. This cost, like the cost of actual publication, seems to
be willingly borne by litigants who want to know what the court
has done in the past. This impulse reflects a strong intuitive
sense of how the courts work (and should work), which no
amount of limiting publication can rebut.
311
Finally, a perceived cost that is occasionally mentioned,
and has been since the advent of universal publication of court
decisions, is that the system itself may be crushed under the
avalanche of new opinions. There is simply, the argument goes,
too much case law for the legal system to work with, which will
lead to unspecified ills. 312 This argument is difficult to counter
because of its lack of specificity. Some have suggested that it
reflects nothing more than "a longing for an earlier, simpler day
when an attorney supposedly could practice out of Blackstone
and a few volumes of state reports." 313 In addition, it is a
difficult sentiment to credit when some judges suggest that the
problem is that there are too few precedents rather than too
309. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 7-8.
310. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 405-06 (examining then-recent surveys
of federal judges and lawyers); see also Robel, Myth, supra n. 5, at 949 (noting in a
discussion of lawyers' interest in unpublished opinions that it would, for example, be
difficult to "discern" a "pattern" of the court's favoring or disfavoring certain arguments or
types of cases "if one were limited to the court's published expressions").
311. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 406 (pointing out that "unpublished
opinions are routinely (indeed, promiscuously) cited by the federal courts of appeals and
relied upon by the federal district courts").
312. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 6 (asserting that "[t]he limits on the
capacity of judges and lawyers to produce, research and assimilate the substance of judicial
opinions are dangerously near").
313. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1191.
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many. 314 Moreover, the fear of a crush of case law is countered
by both present practice and the desire of modem practicing
lawyers to embrace more, not less, case law. For example, the
number of federal appellate court dispositions either published
(5506) or total (34,580) in the twelve-month period ending
September 30, 2006, would no doubt have seemed outrageously
high to a practitioner in 1915, but the number has not proven
crushing to the system.3 15 Indeed, those whom this alleged cost
would potentially crush have shown both a willingness to
research additional (that is, unpublished) decisions, even when
they were unciteable and treated as non-precedents.
316
Moreover, the practitioners and judges in circuits that allow the
citation of such opinions have reported little or no additional
cost in doing so. 31TAt bottom, the limitation of precedents based
on the premise that it would be too much law for lawyers to
work with must be rejected because it makes no sense and leads
to a perverse conclusion:
Surely proponents of this "fairness" rationale cannot mean
that the courts ought to adopt Harrison Bergeron-like rules
that level the playing field by imposing artificial
impediments on lawyers smart enough to follow
developments in their field of specialty. Yet that is their
inescapable implication.
318
314. Posner, supra n. 147, at 166. See also Commission on Structural Alternatives for
the Federal Courts of Appeals, Working Papers at 48 (1998) (Thirty-seven percent of
federal district judges surveyed indicated some area of circuit law as "inconsistent or
difficult to know" and twenty-nine percent identified the problem as a lack of circuit
decisions on point).
315. Judicial Business Table S-3, supra n. 6, at 52 (showing data on published,
unpublished, and total dispositions in period surveyed).
316. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 15-17 (indicating that survey data shows attorneys'
strong desire to use unpublished opinions); see also Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n.
5, at 401 (noting that "lawyers and judges value these opinions despite the rules limiting
citation"). See also Robel, Myth, supra n. 5, at 957-58 (indicating that government-agency
lawyers consult and use unpublished opinions); Schiltz, Much Ado about Little, supra n. 1,
at 43-45 (collecting arguments in favor of Fed. R. App. P. 32.1).
317. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 17 (49 tbl. U) (indicating that judges in circuits
allowing citation have reported, on average, no appreciable impact in their work caused by
allowing citation to the now published, unpublished decisions). See also Schiltz, Citation of
Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 43-45 (collecting arguments in favor of Fed. R. App.
P. 32.1).
318. Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 288, at 21-22 (footnote omitted).
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Finally, no one has yet fully tallied the cost of "running the
unpublication machine," but "[s]uch partial accounts of these
processes as they exist suggest that they are an enormous drain
on court resources." 319 Moreover, it is quite possible that the
current practice of preventing many cases from being published
and precedential adds to the courts' workload:
The current appellate practice of hiding precedents may
have an adverse effect on the courts' workload. The greater
the number of precedents, the greater the volume of law,
the greater the number of solutions to legal issues, and the
easier it would be to determine whether an authoritative
answer to a legal issue has been judicially sanctioned.
Assuming that most lawyers would not raise issues on
appeal that an appellate court would consider already
decided, an increased volume of law would serve to lower
the number of appeals and the number of issues raised in
those cases that are appealed far more effectively than
sanctions for frivolity.
Whatever the support for limited publication on cost
grounds initially, changes in technology and the undoing of
citation limitations seem to indicate that little support for limited
publication remains.
3. Judicial Ability to Distinguish Law-Making from Law-
Applying Ex Ante
The final premise, that judges can determine, before
drafting an opinion, whether a case is of the law-making variety
or merely dispute resolving, is both critical to the idea of limited
publication and at the same time wholly without merit. This
premise would suggest that it is critical to the idea of limited
publication because it is the court's ability to designate some
319. Pether, supra n. 5, at 1522 (footnote omitted). The evocative phrase "unpublication
machine" refers to the entire process of producing unpublished decisions and then dealing
with them after they are, perhaps ironically, published. Maintaining a two-track system and
dealing with two tiers of cases carries unstudied costs.
320. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 769 (footnotes omitted) (citing, among other sources,
Posner, supra n. 147 at 166 (suggesting that "the aggregate value of unpublished opinions
as sources of guidance to the bar and to lower-court judges .. .might well outweigh the
costs.., of publishing")).
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cases as law-making (to be published) and dispute-resolving (not
to be published) that allows for the judicial time-savings of
writing a less thorough, detailed, and polished opinion. Without
the ability to determine in advance whether a case will lead to a
published decision, the court would gain very little in the way of
cost savings. 321 At the same time, the premise that judges can
make this determination ex ante is inherently flawed.
First, the concept that any case can be said to be purel 2y
dispute-resolving with no lawmaking value is itself in error.
Because there is a value in even the slightest change in the law
as well as repetitions of the law's application, "[t]he legal
system needs not merely the leading case but also the
expansions and contractions of old, verbally stable rules that are
found in humdrum applications, or what we might call the 'rules
in operation. 
323
Second, we are all poorly suited to predict the future. As
Justice Stevens succinctly states:
A rule which authorizes any court to censor the future
citation of its own opinions rests on a false premise. Such a
rule assumes that an author is a reliable judge of the quality
and importance of his own work product. If I need
authority to demonstrate the invalidity of that assumption, I
refer you to a citizen of Illinois who gave a brief talk in
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania that he did not expect to be long
remembered. Judges are the last persons who should be
authorized to determine which of their decisions should be
long remembered. 324
Third, judges are poorly situated at the time they write an
opinion to know what value that opinion may have to future
litigants. The value of a decision as a precedent lies in its factual
similarity to a case that follows it. The present system of
allowing judges to decide prospectively which of their decisions
are law and which are not "starkly reverses centuries of common
321. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1191-93.
322. See Section V.B. 1, supra.
323. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 769.
324. John Paul Stevens, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Remarks (I11. St. B. Assn. Centennial
Dinner, Springfield, I11. Jan. 22, 1977), quoted in Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules,
supra n. 5, at 1192 (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae Chi. Council of Law. at 37, Browder
v. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (available at 1977 WL 189280)).
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law tradition." 325 The power and the duty to determine the
precedential effect of a decision has traditionally rested not with
the precedent-making court but with the precedent-applying
court.3 2 6 It is only with a set of new facts in hand, to which the
rule is to be applied, that a court can determine whether a prior
case is or is not a valid precedent.327
Fourth, evidence suggests that many cases that are plainly
law-making are being designated unpublished.328 These include
novel interpretations of the law, reversals of what the district
court believed to be the law, split decisions, decisions at
variance with other panels of the same appellate courts, and
decisions that evidence circuit splits, to name a few.3 29 In fact,
choosing incorrectly imposes additional costs on the system by
hiding cases from review, preventing exposure of splits within
and between circuits, depriving litigants of precedents from
which to determine behavior and outcomes, encouraging
identical cases to be brought when they could be avoided,
disparate treatment of litigants, and erosion of respect for the
courts.
3 3 0
In addition, those arguing from the premise that judges can
distinguish readily between cases that make law and those that
apply it presume that judges are making determinations about
what will and will not be published based only on whether the
case adds something new to the law. If judges are making
publication decisions based on other facts, and both first-hand
accounts and objective research indicate that this is so, then the
system is even more flawed. Judge Richard Arnold of the Eighth
Circuit expressed uneasiness at the system, which encourages
strategic thinking among judges wishing to establish certain
325. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 772.
326. Id. at 773.
327. Id. Accord K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 53 (Oceana Pub., Inc. 1973)
(pointing out that "the true rule of the case [is] what it will be made to stand for by another
later court" (emphasis in original)). See also id. at 62-66.
328. Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 71, 120 (2001). See
also e.g. U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 425 n. 3 (expressing surprise and dismay at
one circuit's decision to render an unpublished decision charting new Constitutional
ground).
329. Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 113-14.
330. See e.g. Section V.B.1, supra.
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precedents or to avoid establishing others:
[I]f, after hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks
that a certain decision should be reached, but also believes
that the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she
can achieve the result, assuming agreement by the other
members of the panel, by deciding the case in an
unpublished opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the
rug. Again, I'm not saying that this has ever occurred in
any particular case, but a system that encourages this sort
of behavior, or is at least open to it, has to be subject to
question in any world in which judges are human beings. 331
Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit was even more concerned and
even more candid, pointing out that
a double track system allows for deviousness and abuse. I
have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished
decision incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to
avoid a time-consuming public debate about what law
controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go
along with a result they do not like so long as it is not
elevated to a precedent. We do occasionally sweep
troublesome issues under the rug, though most will not stay
put for long.
332
The full scope and effect of incidents like those Judge Wald
experienced are difficult to measure. One study of published and
unpublished decisions on asylum cases in the Ninth Circuit 333
has indicated that judges engage in strategic decisionmaking
about publication that is unrelated to the precedential value of a
particular case:
[V]oting and publication are, for some judges, strategically
intertwined: for example, judges may be prepared to
acquiesce in decisions that run contrary to their own
preferences, and to vote with the majority, as long as the
331. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 223.
332. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1371, 1374 (1995) (discussing her own observations as a
judge on the D.C. Circuit).
333. David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 817, 823 (2005) (observing that "[t]he
empirical literature on publication is sparse").
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decision remains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent
if the majority insists upon publication.334
Other studies have indicated that many unpublished opinions are
lengthy, complex, or otherwise seemingly deserving of
publication. 335 Finally, the prospect that some judges may be
using unpublished opinions for reasons other than those
envisioned by the limited publication rules has not gone
unnoticed by the Supreme Court. In a recent interview, Justice
Stevens expressed his concern with the use of unpublished
opinions and his increased willingness to review them
Q: Is the decision to grant or deny cert. influenced by
whether the opinion from the court below is a published or
nonpublished opinion?
A: Well, I tend to vote to grant more on unpublished
opinions, on the theory that occasionally judges will use the
unpublished opinion as a device to reach a decision that
might be a little hard to justify.336
While the number of federal cases filed continues to grow,
there is little to suggest that limiting publication is an answer,
much less a good answer, to reducing the stress on the courts.
Whatever arguments once existed to recommend the practice of
334. Id. at 820.
335. See e.g. id. at 820-29 (collecting prior research); Brian P. Brooks, Publishing
Unpublished Opinions: A Review of the Federal Appendix, 5 Green Bag 2d 259, 260-63
(2002); Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 120 (finding that unpublished decisions have
an effect on the substance of the law and that unpublished decisions are not simply routine
applications of the law but contain "a noticeable number of reversals, dissents, or
concurrences," and remarking on "significant associations between case outcome and
judicial characteristics"); Robert A. Mead, "Unpublished" Opinions as the Bulk of the
Iceberg: Publication Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts
of Appeals, 93 Law Libr. J. 589, 601-03 (2001) (examining publication rates by subject
matter in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits over a six-month period and finding great disparity
in publication rates, especially in areas where the government is a litigant); Pamela Foa,
Student Author, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication
Rule, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 309, 315-40 (1977) (analyzing results of a six-month study of
Seventh Circuit cases, which revealed that fifteen percent of unpublished cases were
substantively significant and met the publication standards); Wald, supra n. 332, at 1374
(noting that a six-month study had found that forty percent of unpublished D. C. Circuit
cases arguably met the publication standards, and noting in addition that the percentage
might be much higher in 1995).
336. Jeffrey Cole & Elaine E. Bucklo, A Life Well Lived: An Interview with Justice John
Paul Stevens, 32 Litig. 8, 67 (Spring 2006).
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using unpublished opinions, they have been largely refuted and
undercut by developments of the last thirty-five years.
C. Premises Supporting a Bar on Citation to Unpublished
Decisions
The argument in favor of limiting citation is essentially one
of a perceived necessity to support the practice of limited
publication. Limiting citation to some portion of the courts'
decisions serves no purpose of its own; there is no inherent
value in preventing litigants from mentioning what the court has
done in similar cases in the past. It is a practice undertaken to
enable limited publication practices to exist. While the practice
of limiting publication continues, the practice of limiting citation
has come to an end with new Rule 32.1-at least in regard to
decisions issued after January 1, 2007. However, because the
premises underlying the limitation of citation of unpublished
opinions so closely parallel those for denying unpublished
opinions precedential status, and because the practice continues
in some states, the citation issue will be examined briefly here.
1. Cost Savings
The core premise in favor of limiting citation of
unpublished decisions is that such a limitation is necessary to
prevent the decisions' use, which is in turn necessary because
use would undermine the cost savings to judges, consumers,
publishers, and the system itself. This premise is flawed. To the
extent that the "sausage" of unpublished decisions is "not safe
for human consumption" as Judge Kozinski has claimed,337 the
preferable remedy would be to stop making the sausage in the
present manner and make a better product, not to continue
making it and throwing it away.
Evidence suggests that both judges and attorneys bear little
or no cost in citing these decisions because they are already
researching them. In the modern legal publishing scenario,
337. Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
32.1, 51 Fed. Law. 36, 37 (June 2004).
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where unpublished decisions are nearly universally published in
West's Federal Appendix, West's and LEXIS's online services,
on the courts' own websites, and elsewhere, the costs of
publication are already sunk--citation itself adds no additional
costs to the equation. The heuristic lawyers use to find cases in
online databases locates unpublished cases right along with
published ones, and lawyers review them both.338 In those
circuits where citation has been recently allowed, very little
additional costs in either researching or opinion writing have
been noted.339 To the extent that cost was an issue it has been
overcome by technological advances and the competing value of
allowing litigants to tell a court what it has done in the past.
2. Fairness to Litigants
Part of the justification for limiting citation rests on the
premise that unfairness would result by allowing those with
better access to decisions to cite them. This premise was flawed
when limited citation rules were imposed in the early 1970s and
continues to be flawed, although for a different reason, in the
modem setting. During the early era of non-citation rules,
"unpublished" cases were truly not published and access to them
was available only by actually visiting the court clerk and
copying the decisions. 34  The premise in favor of non-citation
presumed that preventing citation of these decisions would
prevent their use entirely and resolve the perceived unfairness
338. See e.g. Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog That Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules,
Judicial Conference Rulemaking, and Federal Public Defenders, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1491, 1535-36 (2005); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, The Constitutionality of No-
Citation Rules, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 287, 301-02 (2001).
339. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 17 & id. at 49 (tbl. U, entitled "Impact on Work of
New Rule") (indicating that judges in circuits allowing citation have reported, on average,
no appreciable impact in their work caused by allowing citation to what might now be
termed published unpublished decisions). Note that "costs" in this context include time and
effort as well as strictly monetary costs.
Although Reagan's survey is still useful, now that Rule 32.1 has created a uniform
rule permitting citation of unpublished decisions in all federal courts of appeals, a more
uniform national study can-and probably should-be done to assess the costs, if any,
associated with permitting citation.
340. Goering, supra n. 5, at 38 (noting that when limited publication and citation rules
were first adopted, research in unpublished opinions was available only to institutional
litigants with the incentive and ability to collect and index them).
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that disparity of access caused.341 As the 1973 Committee
explained, "[i]t is unfair to allow counsel, or others having
special knowledge of an unpublished opinion, to use it if
favorable and withhold it if unfavorable. 3 42 This premise was
flawed at the outset for two reasons.
First, large law firms, organizations, and other repeat
players retained their advantage with respect to unpublished
decisions and perhaps even gained additional advantage. These
repeat players could still afford to cull the clerk's records for
similar cases and unpublished decisions and could pull from
them the winning reasoning. While they were unable to cite the
decisions as authority, they could have superior knowledge
about the court's recent rulings and access to the court's own
reasoning and language. This information could be used in
crafting their arguments to the court, which, it should be
immediately apparent, gave them an incredible advantage: They
could repeat to the court its own reasoning, perhaps even in its
own words.3 4 3 Thus, the advantage was maintained even without
citation because repeat players and large institutions could do all
this without ever having to cite that authority to the opposing
side.
Second, in this era in which so-called unpublished
decisions are increasingly-and now nearly ubiquitously-
published, there is no real disparity between the parties.344 Any
litigant with access to the Federal Appendix, online research
systems, and, increasingly, the courts' own websites, now has
access to the unpublished decisions of the courts.345 Moreover,
researching those decisions does not appear to place a burden on
the parties. Attorneys report that they already research such
unpublished decisions. Also, to the extent the use of such
opinions has recently increased, as in the D.C. Circuit after it
341. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 19-20.
342. Id. at 19.
343. Katsh & Chachkes, supra n. 338, at 301-02 (noting that unpublished opinions are
searched because lawyers find value in repeating the court's own reasoning and language
back to it and noting cases in which courts have referred in later cases to language in
unpublished opinions).
344. Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 558.
345. Id.
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liberalized its citation policy, attorneys have reported no
significant increase in workload.346
Limitation of citation was a practice founded largely on a
perceived need to protect the cost gains of the limited
publication regime. Practice, both initial and present, suggests
that the limitation of citation is both ineffective and unnecessary
to cost containment in the limited publication regime. The recent
adoption of Rule 32.1 suggests that litigants are unwilling to
ignore unpublished decisions, primarily because they believe
them to be of value and are willing to bear the costs of
researching them. Additionally, the rule will equalize the
playing field between institutional repeat players and other
litigants.
D. Premises Supporting the Denial of Precedential Status to
Unpublished Decisions
As noted above, neither the 1973 Committee nor the
drafters of Rule 32.1 have directly confronted the precedential
status of unpublished decisions. The creation of limited
publication and limited citation rules was undertaken with an
understanding that limiting publication and citation would have
the effect of limiting the precedential status of decisions,347 but
whether such an effect was desirable or rested on sound
jurisprudential premises seems not to have been an issue.
Likewise, in crafting the new rule the Committee expressly
avoided addressing the issue,348 but the Advisory Committee's
Reporter has acknowledged that the precedent question is an
extremely important one-far more important than the issue of
citation itself.
49
Defense of the practice of limiting precedential status of
unpublished opinions as a goal unto itself has often been
346. Reagan et al., supra n. 250 at 17 & id. at 49 (tbl. U).
347. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20-21.
348. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, advisory comm. nn.
349. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1463 (stating that "Rule 32.1 is not,
in fact, an important rule," but also acknowledging "that there are closely related issues-
such as whether unpublished opinions should or must be treated as precedential-that are
extremely important").
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discussed as bound into the larger question of limiting
publication, and it largely tracks the premises above. First, it is
suggested that limiting precedential status is required to preserve
the cost gains realized by limiting publication. Second, the
premise holds that allowing unpublished cases to have
precedential value would result in unfairness between litigants.
The flaw in the first of these is apparent given the market for
unpublished opinions and their common usage by both litigants
and courts, even in the absence of full precedential status. The
flaw in the second is much the same as in the citation discussion:
To the extent that any disparity of access to unpublished
opinions exists, limiting precedential status does not resolve that
disparity, and to the extent that no meaningful disparity now
exists, the rule serves no purpose.
The first premise states that if unpublished decisions are
precedential, they will need to be prepared with greater care, a
market will spring up for their use, and litigants will need to
research them.350 It is plain to see that the last two have occurred
even in the absence of precedential status, perhaps because the
sense within the system that a court is bound to take note of
what it has done yesterday and act similarly today is extremely
strong.351 That belief has created a market for unpublished
decisions and made the research of them standard practice
among litigators.
The second premise, which is similar to the unfairness
concern with citation, states that allowing unpublished cases to
have precedential value would result in unfairness between
litigants. As noted in regard to citation, the rule does nothing to
prevent that advantage of those in the know and, in fact, tends to
increase their advantage, at least while access disparity exists.
When no access disparity exists, and litigants would research the
cases anyway, then the playing field is already equal and the rule
prohibiting precedent is unnecessary. This is increasingly the
case. Unpublished decisions are widely available and studies
have indicated that they are searched anyway.
How the courts decide to denominate their decisions (as
published or unpublished) is itself relatively unimportant. The
350. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20.
351. See generally e.g. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5.
RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL OPINIONS
legal system has traditionally made whatever use of the
decisions it finds appropriate and will continue to do so.
Whether to allow citation of the decisions is a question
answered, at least for the federal court system, by Rule 32.1,
which prevents courts from restricting citation of decisions
regardless of whether they are formally designated for
publication or not. The real question, then, is whether decisions
may be designated as non-precedential, and, even if so, whether
they ought to be. Whether they can be is subject to several
challenges on Constitutional grounds ranging from core
questions of the courts' powers under Article III to implied
rights such as substantive due process.
1. Judge Arnold's Originalist Argument
The most well known, as well as the most fundamental,
alleged constitutional infirmity with the process of denying the
precedential status of unpublished cases is that Article III of the
Constitution does not give federal courts the authority to decide
which of their cases are precedential and which are good only
for a single time and place. The crux of this argument is that all
cases decided by the federal courts are precedent. The foremost
proponent of this view, in both time and importance, was Judge
Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit,352  although some
proposed a similar view of precedent prior to Judge Arnold's
writings,35 3 and many picked up the banner after Judge Arnold's
provocative decision in Anastasoff354 Others, Ninth Circuit
352. See Arnold, supra n. 21; Anastasoffv. U.S., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated 235
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
353. See e.g. Bader, supra n. 97, at 9-11 (emphasizing the importance of precedent to
the lawyers and judges of the Revolutionary generation); Re: Rules of US. Court of
Appeals for Tenth Circuit; Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1992)
(Halloway, Barrett, and Baldock, JJ., dissenting) (recognizing that "[e]ach ruling,
published or unpublished, involves the facts of a particular case and the application of
law-to the case," and taking the position that "all rulings of this court are precedents, like
it or not, and we cannot consign any of them to oblivion by merely banning their citation");
Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723
(1988).
354. See e.g. Penelope Pether, Take a Letter, Your Honor: Outing the Judicial
Epistemology of Hart v. Massanari, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1553 (2005); Cappalli, supra
n. 5; Sinclair, supra n. 5; Steve Sheppard The Unpublished Opinion: How Richard
Arnold's Anastasoff Opinion is Saving America's Courts from Themselves, 2002 Ark. L.
Notes 85 (2002); Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix:
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Judge Alex Kozinski among them, have rejected Judge Arnold's
Constitutional analysis.355
2. The Eighth Circuit Speaks: Anastasoff v. United States
The Eighth Circuit in Anastasoff declared the Circuit's rule
denying precedential status to unpublished opinions in violation
of Article 111.356 The opinion, authored by Judge Arnold, held
that denying decisions precedential status exceeded the court's
judicial power. 357
The Anastasoff panel followed a prior unpublished
opinion, 358 believing itself Constitutionally required to do so
because the panel issuing the unpublished opinion had
previously rejected "precisely the same legal argument"359 made
by the plaintiff before it. Citing to the text of then-current Local
Rule 28A(i), which stated that "[u]npublished opinions are not
The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 1 (2002); Kenneth
Anthony Laretto, Precedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of "No-Citation "
Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1037 (2002); Charles R.
Eloshway, Student Author, Say It Ain t So: Non-Precedential Opinions Exceed the Limits
of Article 11 Powers, 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 632 (2002); Johanna S. Schiavoni, Student
Author, Who's Afraid of Precedent?: The Debate Over the Precedential Value of
Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA Law. Rev. 1859 (2002); Merritt & Brudney, supra n.
328; Sheree L. K. Nitta, Student Author, The Price of Precedent: Anastasoff v. United
States, 23 U. Haw. L. Rev. 795 (2001); Strongman, supra n. 135; Lance A. Wade, Student
Author, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument Rules
Prohibiting Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 695 (2001); William J.
Miller, Student Author, Chipping Away at the Dam: Anastasoff v. United States and the
Future of Unpublished Decisions in the United States Court of Appeals and Beyond, 50
Drake L. Rev. 181 (2001); Jennifer Adams, Student Author, Law Today; Gone Tomorrow,
53 Baylor L. Rev. 659 (2001).
355. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.). See also, e.g., R.
Ben Brown, Judging in the Days of the Early Republic: A Critique of Judge Richard
Arnold's Use of History in Anastasoff v. United States, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 355
(2001); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke L.J.
503 (2000); Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, Student Author, The Anastasoff Case
and the Judicial Power To "Unpublish " Opinions, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 135 (2001).
356. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d 898.
357. Id. at 899 ("We hold that the portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that unpublished
opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports to
confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the 'judicial.').
358. Christie v. U.S., No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam)
(unpublished).
359. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
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precedent," Anastasoff argued that, as a non-precedent, the
earlier case did not bind the panel by which her case was
heard. 6 The court disagreed:
Although it is our only case directly in point, Ms.
Anastasoff contends that we are not bound by Christie
because it is an unpublished decision and thus not a
precedent under 8th Circuit Rule 28A(i). We disagree. We
hold that the portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that
unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional
under Article III, because it purports to confer on the
federal courts a power that goes beyond the "judicial."36 1
In holding the Eighth Circuit's rule unconstitutional, the
Anastasoff decision reinvigorated a national debate on the issues
of limited publication and citation.362 Though the Anastasoff
case would eventually become moot, leading to the opinion's363
being vacated, Judge Arnold's opinion resonated with many
courts, lawyers, and commentators and rankled others.365
Prior to deciding the Anastasoff case, Judge Arnold had
expressed concern about the process of allowing unpublished
decisions to be treated as non-precedential.36  In both his
article367 and the original Anastasoff opinion,368 he expressed a
firm belief that "all decisions have precedential significance."
369
His article closes by asking whether "the assertion that
unpublished opinions are not precedent and cannot be cited" is a
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Leane C. Medford et al., Anastasoff v. U.S., 20 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 26 (Nov. 2001)
("Although vacated, Anastasoff breathed new life into a continuing controversy over the
precedential effects of unpublished opinions, receiving national attention from the
judiciary, legal commentators and practitioners.").
363. Anastasoff v. U.S., 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("The
controversy over the status of unpublished opinions is, to be sure, of great interest and
importance, but this sort of factor will not save a case from becoming moot. We sit to
decide cases, not issues, and whether unpublished opinions have precedential effect no
longer has any relevance for the decision of this tax-refund case.")
364. See n. 354, supra.
365. See n. 355, supra.
366. Arnold, supra n. 21.
367. Id.
368. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d 898.
369. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 222. See also Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899-900 (discussing
various earlier articulations of the "doctrine of precedent," and noting that its components
"were well established and well regarded at the time this nation was founded").
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violation of Article III, and the decision in Anastasoff provides
the answer: "[T]he portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that
unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under
Article III, because it purports to confer on the federal courts a
power that goes beyond the 'judicial.' ' 370 In arriving at that
conclusion, the court in Anastasoff considered
" the text of Article III,
" the meaning of the relevant clause and the doctrine of
precedent at the time of its framing, and
* the message it sends to allow courts to decide cases
and declare them ex ante to be non-precedential. 37 1
Though the most that can be claimed is that Article III
implies the limitation proposed because no explicit discussion of
precedent is contained in its text, Judge Arnold makes a
compelling case. Article III states that "[t]he judicial power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in
such inferior courts as the congress may, from time to time,
ordain and establish., 372 The critical phrase is "judicial power,"
which is explained no further within the text. What is meant (or
was meant or understood by the Framers, if that is the method of
Constitutional interpretation to be employed) by "judicial
power" requires additional examination. Judge Arnold's thesis is
that the phrase "judicial power" is a grant of limited power and
that power does not extend to rendering non-precedential
opinions.373 Anastasoff sets forth an originalist argument
supporting this conclusion.
374
As a first principle, Anastasoff finds that every judicial
decision is a declaration of law, which must be applied in
subsequent similar cases:
Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and
interpretation of a general principle or rule of law. This
370. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
371. Id. at 899-904.
372. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
373. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
374. Id. at 899-904.
RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL OPINIONS
declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary
for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to
similarly situated parties. These principles, which form the
doctrine of precedent, were well established and well
regarded at the time this nation was founded. The Framers
of the Constitution considered these principles to derive
from the nature of judicial power, and intended that they
would limit the judicial power delegated to the courts by
Article III of the Constitution.
375
In support of this conclusion, the Anastasoff court cites Marbury
v. Madison, which offers the perspective that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. 376
In addition, the court examines the Framers' understanding
of the doctrine of precedent as part of their notion of judicial
power, in part by looking to the sources that influenced the
Framers, such as the writings of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone.
377
In reviewing these sources, the court finds ample evidence that
within the common law system, "the judge's duty to follow
precedent derives from the nature of the judicial power itself. 378
Judge Arnold, like Blackstone, views each decision of the court
to add to the body of law, "the law in that case, being solemnly
declared and determined, what was before uncertain, and
perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule. ' 379 The
Anastasoff court then turns its attention to the writings of the
Framers themselves, including James Madison's understanding
of the courts as bounded by the "authoritative force" of "judicial
precedents" 380 and as observing the "obligations arising from
judicial expositions of the law on succeeding judges," 1 and
Alexander Hamilton's emphatic statement:
375. Id. at 899-900 (footnotes omitted) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1
Cranch 137, 177-78 (1803); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Ga., 501 U.S. 529, 544
(1991); Cohens v. Va., 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821)).
376. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
377. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900-04.
378. Id. at 901 (footnote omitted).
379. Id. (quoting Blackstone, Commentaries at *69).
380. Id. at 902 n. 10 (citing James Madison, Letter to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25,
1831), reprinted in The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James
Madison 390, 390-93 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed., Brandeis U. Press 1981)).
381. Id. at 902.
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[T]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict
rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out
their duty in every particular case that comes before
them.
382
However, it was not only the Federalists whose writings
reveal a well-established understanding of precedent as part of
the judicial power in the new government, because "the Anti-
Federalists also assumed that federal judicial decisions would
become authorities in subsequent cases" 383 and were concerned
that
one adjudication will form a precedent to the next, and this
to a following one. These cases will immediately affect
individuals only; so that a series of determinations will
probably take place before even the people will be
informed of them.
384
Another Anti-Federalist, writing as "the Federal Farmer"
expressed the concern that the federal courts to be established
would have "no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the
divisions in equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore in the
supreme court for many years will be mere discreion. These
contemporary writings reveal an understanding that the courts
under the new Constitution would be of binding authority. 3
86
While modern justifications of precedent tend toward the
pragmatic, 387 for the Framers, the concept of precedent was part
382. Id. at 902 (citing Federalist Papers No. 78, at 510).
383. Id. at 902-03 (citing Essays of Brutus, XV (Mar. 20, 1788) in The Complete Anti-
Federalist vol. 2, 441 (Herbert J. Storing ed., U. Chi. Press 1981); Letters from The
Federal Farmer No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), in id. at 244).
384. Id. at 903 n. 13 (quoting Essays of Brutus, supra n. 383, at 441).
385. Id. (quoting Letters from The Federal Farmer No. 3, supra n. 383, at 244).
386. Id. at 901-02; see also Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the
Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1075, 1101 (2003) (pointing out
that "remarks on the subject of precedent of these most prominent Federalists and Anti-
Federalists show that they adhered to a theory of precedent basically consistent with the
major common-law treatises of the day, and that they believed that the accumulating force
of precedents would, over time, tend to authoritatively 'fix' the meaning of the
Constitution," and noting that "[o]ne theme to be found in their remarks is that adherence
to precedent forestalls the accumulation of arbitrary power in the courts").
387. See e.g. Schauer, supra n. 287, at 595-602 (noting that the authority of precedent is
commonly supported by arguments (1) from fundamental fairness, i.e., that like cases
should be treated alike; (2) from the need for predictability; and (3) from the recognition
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and parcel of their understanding of judicial power, a power that
was bounded by an obligation to find the law rather than make
it.388 That distinction meant much to the Framers, who were
successors to and believers in a declaratory theory of
adjudication.389 Whether the courts make law or find law is a
philosophic distinction with little meaningful difference
presently, though it reveals much about the view of precedent
that makes up the Framers' original understanding. What is
apparent from the earliest days of English common law and
throughout the framing of the Constitution is that each decision
rendered by a common law court has traditionally been part of
the common law, regardless of its publication status-at least
until the change in the early 1970s, of course.3 90 Though
Constitutional interpretation is a process fraught with
difficulties, it seems unlikely that the Framers would have
intended a system (or understood one) that would allow federal
courts to make decisions good in only single times and places
and having no bearing on later decisions.
Finally, the Anastasoff court carefully discriminates
between the practice of limited publication, which was the
traditional common law practice, and the practice of deciding ex
ante to deny the precedential status of some opinions, which was
unknown in the common law.39 1 Unpublished did not
historically mean unprecedential, and to equate the two flies in
the face of the expectations and experiences of English common
law and those of the founding generation of this country. 392 As
Anastasoff notes,
the Framers did not regard this absence of a reporting
system as an impediment to the precedential authority of ajudicial decision ... [J]udges and lawyers of the day
recognized the authority of unpublished decisions even
that it is an aid to judicial decisionmaking, preventing unnecessary reconsideration of
established matters).
388. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901-02.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 903.
391. Id.
392. Id.
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when they were established only by memory or by a
lawyer's unpublished memorandum.
3 9
This view of the Framers is consonant with that of earlier
generations, who held both written reports and decisions in the
rolls or manuscripts of the court to be valid authority.
394
It would be difficult to summarize the Anastasoff court's
position better than Judge Arnold himself did:
[I]n the late eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent
was well-established in legal practice (despite the absence
of a reporting system), regarded as an immemorial custom,
and valued for its role in past struggles for liberty. The duty
of courts to follow their prior decisions was understood to
derive from the nature of the judicial power itself and to
separate it from a dangerous union with the legislative
power. The statements of the Framers indicate an
understanding and acceptance of these principles. We
conclude therefore that, as the Framers intended, the
doctrine of precedent limits the "judicial power" delegated
to the courts in Article II.
395
In support of this conclusion, he provides a powerful quote from
Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States:
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled; but
the principles of the decision are held, as precedents and
authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is
the constant practice under our whole system of
jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them, when
they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always
has been considered, as the great security of our rights, our
liberties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law
is justly deemed certain, and founded in permanent
principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of
judges. A more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated
by any American court, than that it was at liberty to
disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for
393. Id. (citing Peter Karsten, Heart Versus Head: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth-
Century America 30 (U.N.C. Press 1997) and Jesse Root, The Origin of Government and
Laws in Connecticut (1798), reprinted in The Legal Mind in America 38-39 (Perry Miller
ed., Anchor Books 1962)).
394. See id. at 903 n. 14; see also Baker, supra n. 47, at 204.
395. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903.
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itself, without reference to the settled course of antecedent
principles.
396
Some have argued that the practice of declaring certain
(now most) decisions of the federal courts to be non-
precedential is not a cause for alarm. 397 The better perspective,
however, is that the practice causes an even more insidious harm
than cutting the courts free from precedent. Allowing courts to
choose at the time of opinion writing what decisions are and are
not precedent allows them to deprive the common law of
valuable precedents, to make law good only for a single time
and place, to treat similar cases dissimilarly, and to cause some
issues to evade review.398 Such a practice is less blatant, but no
less offensive to the Constitution and common law history.
Though the government would eventually concede the
point to the taxpayer, making the Anastasoff case moot, many
seized upon the vacated Anastasoff opinion to challenge the
policy of non-citation and non-precedent. 399 Indeed, the decision
reinvigorated the federal rulemaking process that led to Rule
32.1. 4 0 But Rule 32.1 does not resolve the core issues of the
precedential status of unpublished decisions and whether
designating cases non-precedential falls within or without the
Article III power of the court.
396. Id. at 903-04 (quoting Story, supra n. 93, at §§ 377-78).
397. See e.g. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We believe
Anastasoff overstates the case. Rules that empower courts of appeals to issue
nonprecedential decisions do not cut those courts free from all legal rules and precedents; if
they did, we might find cause for alarm.").
398. See e.g. Pether, supra n. 281, at 7-8 (2007) ("Given its origins, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the charges leveled at institutionalized unpublication are multiplicitous
and damning. They include the identifying of damaging 'rule of law effects' of the
practice, such as enabling powerful and repeat player litigants to rig the system of
precedent so it operates in their favor; unconstitutionality; lack of transparency and judicial
accountability, the enabling of judicial corruption or the engendering of public suspicion
that it is occurring, and the producing of public and practitioner disrespect for the judicial
system."); Patrick J. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 43-58
(collecting arguments in favor of Fed. R. App. P. 32.1).
399. See note 354, supra.
400. Medford et al., supra n. 362, at 26 (pointing out that, "[a]lthough vacated,
Anastasoff breathed new life into a continuing controversy over the precedential effects of
unpublished opinions, receiving national attention from the judiciary, legal commentators
and practitioners.")
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3. The Ninth Circuit Replies: Hart v. Massanari
The Anastasoff decision was widely praised.401 However,
the case did have its critics.4 °2 Perhaps the most vocal of those
was Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, who responded to
403Anastasoff in Hart v. Massanari. In Hart, Judge Kozinski
attacked Anastasoff s constitutional interpretations and advanced
several countervailing pragmatic reasons for declaring some
cases non-precedential. 4  In Hart, the court examined whether
an attorney should be disciplined for citing to an unpublished
decision in violation of then-current Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
which stated: "Unpublished decisions of this court are not
binding precedent... [and generally] may not be cited to or by
the courts of this circuit.
In the view of the Hart court, Article III provides no
limitation on judicial power that would prevent a federal court of
appeals from issuing non-precedential opinions:
Unlike the Anastasoff court, we are unable to find within
Article III of the Constitution a requirement that all case
dispositions and orders issued by appellate courts be
binding authority. On the contrary, we believe that an
inherent aspect of our fiction as Article III judges is
managing precedent to develop a coherent body of circuit
law to govern litigation in our court and the other courts of
this circuit. We agree with Anastasoff that we-and all
courts-must follow the law. But we do not think that this
means we must also make binding law every time we issue
a merits decision.
406
401. See n. 354, supra.
402. See n. 355, supra.
403. 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
404. Id.; see also Pether, supra n. 354, at 1556 (undertaking "a detailed critical discourse
analysis of the construction of a revisionist history of the United States doctrine of
precedent in Hart").
405. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 9th Cir. R. 36-3). Appellant's
counsel had relied upon the constitutional argument outlined by Anastasoff, which the
Ninth Circuit rejected. Id. at 1180 (holding former Rule 36-3 constitutional but declining to
impose sanctions because counsel's conduct in testing the rule's constitutionality was not a
"willful" violation).
406. Id. at 1180.
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a. The Hart Analysis
1. Anastasoff Overstates the Case.
To support its conclusion, the Hart court first asserted that
Anastasoff overstates the case:
We believe that Anastasoff overstates the case. Rules that
empower courts of appeals to issue nonprecedential
decisions do not cut those courts free from all legal rules
and precedents; if they did, we might find cause for
alarm.
40 7
It viewed the declaration of some cases to be non-precedent as
part of the courts' attempt to create a cohesive, pre-planned
body of law.
408
However, declaring decisions non-precedent at the time of
opinion is not a cause for alarm because it is so drastic, but
because it is so subtle. While allowing judges to ignore
precedent would permit them to choose what they want the law
to be in any given case, allowing them to decide what cases are
precedent has the similar effect of allowing them to choose what
they want the law to be (or not be) in all future cases. Moreover,
focusing as it does on only the originalist Constitutional
interpretation, Anastasoff actually understates the case against a
non-precedent regime. Other modes of Constitutional
interpretation exist and other arguments, Constitutional and
otherwise, also exist.
2. Article III's Grant of "Judicial Power" is Not
Limited.
Second, the court in Hart asserted that the "judicial power"
language in Article III contains no limitations, but is merely
409descriptive. In making that point, the opinion concedes that
other sections of Article III, such as the references to "Cases"
and "Controversies," have been held to be limitations, but
407. Id. at 1160.
408. Id. at 1177 (noting that the federal courts of appeals "select a manageable number
of cases in which to publish precedential opinions, and leave the rest to be decided by
unpublished dispositions or judgment orders").
409. Id. at 1160.
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suggests that the general reference to "judicial power" is
unlikely to state a similar limitation.410 The Hart court's stated
reasons for this conclusion are
* no other case has held the judicial power clause to
state a limitation;
" there are many other practices of the federal courts
that are not similarly challenged as beyond the limits
of judicial power; and
" the Constitution would seem to provide that Congress
could abolish the inferior federal courts altogether and
therefore could modify the courts' ambit to issue non-
precedential opinions without offending the
Constitution.4 11
The first two of these arguments do not touch the
Anastasoff opinion in any meaningful way. First, that a
provision has not been read in a particular fashion in the past
does not preclude a present reading of it in that fashion. Second,
that other established practices do not rise to the level of ultra
vires extra-judicial acts does not speak one way or another about
the constitutionality of the non-precedent rules then in force in
most circuits. Finally, that the Constitution would seem to
provide that Congress could abolish the inferior federal courts
altogether and therefore could modify the courts' ambit to issue
non-precedential opinions without offending the Constitution is
not a sound argument. As Hart acknowledged, the greater power
does not by necessity include the lesser. Moreover, the power
to command the courts to act in some unconstitutional manner is
not a lesser power than the power to abolish the inferior courts,
merely a different one. That Congress could abolish the inferior
federal courts does not automatically vest in it a right to require
the courts to act in some particular fashion, let alone an
unconstitutional one. Thus, this argument ultimately begs the
question rather than resolving it. More important, it is not the
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1160-61.
412. Id. at 1161.
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power of Congress at issue in either Hart or Anastasoff, the
heart of the matter here is whether the courts may, consistent
with their judicial power, render decisions that are not
precedent. Whether Congress could specifically order them to
do so is neither relevant nor helpful to the analysis.
3. Judge Arnold Got the History Wrong.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the "judicial
power" clause offers a limitation on judicial power and is
implicated here, Hart next proceeds to attack the historical
analysis in Anastasoff Before doing so, however, it foists upon
Anastasoff a false premise, one that Anastasoff does not require.
That is, Hart suggests that to succeed in its constitutional
analysis, Anastasoff must demonstrate that the Framers
understood a rigidity of precedent similar to that present in the
federal court system today.413 The opinion then proceeds to
demonstrate that the Framers' understanding of precedent was
not nearly as rigid.414 However, the analysis in Anastasoff does
not rely on a claim that the Framers held a view of precedent
identical (in terms of rigidity or any other factor) to that
followed in the courts today; it is focused on whether the act of
the federal courts in issuing non-precedential opinions falls
outside what the Framers would have considered "judicial
power." 4
15
After all of that, the court in Hart conceded the point
critical to Anastasoffs analysis (that precedent was well-
established at the time of the Constitution's framing), while
contesting a point that is immaterial (the precise strictness with
which precedent was then applied):
While we agree with Anastasoff that the principle of
precedent was well established in the common law courts
by the time Article III of the Constitution was written, we
do not agree that it was known and applied in the strict
sense in which we apply binding authority today.4
16
413. Id. at 1162-66.
414. Id.
415. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903 (concluding that "as the Framers intended, the doctrine
of precedent limits the 'judicial power' delegated to the courts in Article III").
416. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1174.
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The Hart analysis thus misses the larger point. The
constitutional argument in Anastasoff is not that the Framers
understood strict, binding, horizontal and vertical precedent
between and among the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals,
and the District Courts (only the first of which existed explicitly
at the time); 417 rather, it argues that the Framers understood and
intended that each decision rendered by the federal courts would
make law and contribute to the body of common law on which
later decisions rest.418 That is enough. The Framers were
familiar with both limited publication and a less stringent
meaning of precedent than is now applied, but they did
understand, and arguably intended, that the decisions of the
courts, whatever their individual and cumulative worth, would
be added to the common law and would then shape the law of
this nation. Instead, by present practice in most circuits, an
average of eighty percent of all decisions are removed from the
body of common law.
419
In addition, the court in Hart conflates the issues of
publication and precedent throughout its discussion of the
history. 42° For example, the court takes pains to describe the
inadequacies of the early common law and founding-era case
reports and notes that the increased quality of case reports led to
an increasing rigidity of precedent.42 From this, the court argues
that the era before quality reports was one without an
understanding of precedent.4 2 This unnecessarily confuses the
417. "Horizontal precedent" refers to the binding power of decisions of a coordinate-
level court, and "vertical precedent" refers to the binding power of a superior-level court.
418. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904-05. The relevant language bears quoting in full:
[W]e stress that we are not here creating some rigid doctrine of eternal
adherence to precedents. Cases can be overruled. Sometimes they should be. On
our Court, this function can be performed by the en banc Court, but not by a
single panel. If the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty, or if other exigent
circumstances justify it, precedents can be changed. When this occurs, however,
there is a burden of justification. The precedent from which we are departing
should be stated, and our reasons for rejecting it should be made convincingly
clear. In this way, the law grows and changes, but it does so incrementally, in
response to the dictates of reason, and not because judges have simply changed
their minds.
Id.
419. Judicial Business Table S-3, supra n. 6.
420. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1162-66.
421. Id. at 1166-69.
422. Id.
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two issues of publication and precedent. While the improved
accuracy and ubiquity of case reports can be credited as a factor
in strengthening the concept of precedent within the common
law,423 it does not follow logically that precedent was unknown
or impossible in the face of limited publication.
4 24
The crux of the Hart decision reveals the most critical point
of disagreement between the two cases. Anastasoff relies on the
assumption that cases are decided on the law and left to future
panels to apply to later cases, thus creating the law.425
Conversely, the Hart opinion relies on the assumption that
courts rule in order to develop a coherent and internally
consistent body of case law.426 If the Hart theory is correct,
which would mean that judges are-and ought to be-deciding
prospectively which of their decisions are law and which are not
for the purpose of crafting a body of coherent case law, this
"starkly reverses centuries of common law tradition., 427
4. The System Advocated in Anastasoff is Unworkable.
Finally, the court in Hart makes its pragmatic argument
that writing a precedential opinion is "an exacting and extremely
time-consuming task., 428 This overstates the importance of a
lengthy, dissertational opinion, which is not the sine qua non for
all precedential cases. Courts are bound by what earlier courts
have done, not what they have said, and in many cases a short
description of the decision, the authority relied upon, and the
operative facts that bring this case within the ambit of the prior
authority will be entirely sufficient.429 In addition, while the
pragmatic concern is undeniable, the rulemakers have avoided
423. Allen, supra n. 38, at 230 (pointing out the importance to an eighteenth-century
judge of establishing a reporter's reliability). See generally Bening, supra n. 120.
424. See Section III.D., supra.
425. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905 (characterizing the creation of new decisional law as
incremental); accord Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 773 (explaining that it is the precedent-
applying court that determines a decision's precedential effect); Llewellyn, supra n. 327, at
52, 63-66 (noting that it is the precedent-applying court that determines the scope of the
precedent-writing court's decision, the words used by the precedent-writing court
notwithstanding).
426. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1176.
427. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 772.
428. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177.
429. See e.g. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 771-72.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
the jurisprudential in favor of the pragmatic for far too long.
Judge Arnold states this view eloquently in Anastasoff.
It is often said among judges that the volume of appeals is
so high that it is simply unrealistic to ascribe precedential
value to every decision. We do not have time to do a decent
enough job, the argument runs, when put in plain language,
to justify treating every opinion as a precedent. If this is
true, the judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the
remedy is not to create an underground body of law good
for one place and time only. The remedy, instead, is to
create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if that is
not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a
competent job with each case. If this means that backlogs
will grow, the price must still be paid. At bottom, rules like
our Rule 28A(i) assert that courts have the following
power: to choose for themselves, from among all the cases
they decide, those that they will follow in the future, and
those that they need not. Indeed, some forms of the non-
publication rule even forbid citation. Those courts are
saying to the bar: "We may have decided this question the
opposite way yesterday, but this does not bind us today,
and, what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did
yesterday." As we have tried to explain in this opinion,
such a statement exceeds the judicial power, which is based
on reason, not fiat.430
The Eighth Circuit's then-current rule served to bar citation of
unpublished opinions, thus hiding them, not in fact, but in legal
effect, from the litigants' and courts' use. New Rule 32.1 allows
the litigants to tell the court what it has done yesterday, but it
does nothing to resolve the underlying question of how a court
must treat its prior decisions.
431
VI. CURRENT STATUS OF THE ARTICLE III DEBATE
The final chapter on this constitutional debate has not yet
been written, for Anastasoff was vacated as moot on other
grounds,432 and Hart answered the question only for the Ninth
Circuit. Though Rule 32.1 addresses the citation issue, the
430. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904 (italics in original).
431. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
432. Anastasoff, 235 F.3d 1054.
RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL OPINIONS
underlying issue of precedential status remains.433 Many believe,
as the dissenting judges of the Tenth Circuit did back in 1986
when they opposed the practice of issuing non-precedential
opinions, that
[e]ach ruling, published or unpublished, involves the facts
of a particular case and the application of law-to the case.
Therefore all rulings of this court are precedents, like it or
not, and we cannot consign any of them to oblivion.... No
matter how insignificant a prior ruling might appear to us,
any litigant who can point to a prior decision of the court
and demonstrate that he is entitled to prevail under it should
be able to do so as a matter of essential justice and
fundamental fairness. To deny a litigant this right may well
have overtones of a constitutional infringement because of
the arbitrariness, irrationality, and unequal treatment of the
rule.4
34
But the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, though
numerous petitions for certiorari have been filed on it,435 and at
least three Justices have expressed a view of the history of
precedent similar to that described by Judge Arnold.436
433. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, advisory comm. n.
434. Re: Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit. Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955
F.2d 36, 36-38 (1992) (Halloway, Barrett, & Baldock, JJ. dissenting) (citation and footnote
omitted).
435. Twice during the early stages of limited publication and citation, the Supreme
Court chose not to address the issue. See Do-Right Auto Sales v. US. Ct. of Appeals, 429
U.S. 917 (1976) (denying writ of mandamus filed following Seventh Circuit's striking of
citation to unpublished opinion from party's brief); Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Correction,
434 U.S. 257 (1978) (after granting certiorari on publication issue, Court did not address
it). See also Dunn, supra n. 270, at 142-43 (discussing arguments and opinions in Do-
Right); Br. of Petr. at 7, 50-56, Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Correction, 434 U.S. 257 (1978),
1977 WL 204850 (indicating that a court's "inherent power to withhold any of its opinions
from publication and to a priori deprive such opinions of precedential value" was among
the questions presented in Browder, and then raising arguments against the non-publication
policies of the courts below). See also Cleveland, supra n. 291.
436. Rogers v. Tenn., 532 U.S. 451, 472 n. 2 (2001) (Scalia, Stevens, & Thomas, JJ.
dissenting) ("[tihe near-dispositive strength Blackstone accorded stare decisis was not
some mere personal predilection. Chancellor Kent was of the same view: 'If a decision has
been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in favor of
its correctness; and the community have a right to regard it as a just declaration or
exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it.' 1 J. Kent,
Commentaries *475-*476 (emphasis added). See also Hamilton's statement in The
Federalist: 'To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out
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Moreover, the rule-making body for the federal courts has
consistently avoided the issue.43  This difference of opinion
remains unresolved.
Other Constitutional interpretive doctrines exist, beyond
the originalist battlefield on which both Anastasoff and Hart
engaged this issue. Those modes of interpretation could be
applied to the issue now that the related issue of citation of
unpublished opinions has been resolved by Rule 32.1, and it is
time for courts, rulemakers, and commentators to return their
attention to the core of the matter: precedent. At least one aspect
of that issue of precedent involves resolving the question of
whether the issuance of non-precedential opinions lies within or
without the "judicial power" granted to the federal courts. But
consideration of that issue does not raise the only constitutional
infirmity of the practice.
A. Equal Protection
In addition to the Article III judicial power argument, it has
been suggested that the scheme of declaring some decisions
non-precedential violates the Equal Protection Clause.438 The
gist of this claim is that the practice treats similarly situated
litigants in a disparate manner.
The core guarantee of the Equal Protection clause is that
similarly situated persons should be treated alike,440 and the
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that Fifth and Fourteenth
their duty in every particular case that comes before them.' The Federalist No. 78, p. 471
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961)") (emphasis in original).
437. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20-21. See also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
advisory comm. n.
438. See generally e.g. Strongman, supra n. 135; Wade, supra n. 354; Miller, supra n.
354.
439. Strongman, supra n. 135, at 220.
440. See e.g. Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Va., 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). Equal protection is guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment in regard to state action and the Fifth Amendment in regard to federal action.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (noting that "it would be unthinkable that the
same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government" through the
Fifth Amendment than on state governments through the Fourteenth).
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Amendment equal protection are congruent. 441 From this it
follows that the federal courts must treat similarly situated
litigants alike unless an appropriate justification for disparate
treatment exists.
Equal protection involves twin inquiries: (1) the standard of
review applicable to the government's conduct, and (2) whether
the challenged discrimination is sufficiently justified under that
standard. The standard of review applicable to the issuance of
non-precedential opinions is arguably strict scrutiny, because
this is the standard applied to cases involving a suspect class or
the inhibition of a fundamental right.442 If so, the conduct at
issue-the use of non-precedential opinions-is not sufficiently
justified to meet that standard. The practice of designating
opinions as unpublished and non-precedential certainly
implicates a fundamental right, and it might also be regarded as
involving a suspect class.
443
1. Unequal treatment of similarly situated parties.
The discrimination that occurs in a regime of non-
precedential opinions is that similarly situated litigants, indeed
even the same litigant in the same factual setting, may be treated
differently by the courts. This is exemplified by a pair of cases
in which the Dallas Area Rapid Transit authority received
diametrically opposed decisions from the Fifth Circuit without
explanation in a span of just three years. In 1999, a district court
held that "DART is a political subdivision of the state of Texas,
and is therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh
441. See e.g. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2 (1975) (pointing out that
"[t]his Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been
precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment," and
citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
442. See e.g. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (applying strict
scrutiny to a statute limiting free speech).
443. See e.g., Pether, supra n. 5, at 1444-1445 (citing M. Margaret McKeown, J., U. S.
Ct. of App. for the 9th Cir., What is "Authority"? Panel Presentation, Assoc. of Am. Law
Schools (Jan. 3-6, 2001) (suggesting a "private history" of the origins of the limited
publication initiative rooted in screening out civil rights and prisoner appeals)).
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Amendment," 444  which holding the Fifth Circuit affirmed
without comment in an unpublished opinion.445 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari, so the litigants in DART (and similarly
situated litigants) must have felt about as secure as possible that
the rule establishing their immunity was settled in the Fifth
Circuit. So it seemed fitting that when the question of DART's
Eleventh Amendment immunity was again brought before the
district court in 2000, the court held that "[iut is firmly
established that DART is governmental unit or instrumentality
of the State of Texas" and therefore entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity," 6  relying on the Fifth Circuit's
affirmance in Anderson just one year prior. However, this time
the Fifth Circuit held that DART was not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, despite Fifth Circuit case law that dated
back to 1986.447
The Fifth Circuit was wholly dismissive of the prior result
in Anderson (and two similar cases), stating that "[a]lthough all
three cases upheld DART's immunity from suit, they are neither
binding nor persuasive in this context." 448 So, because the prior
case holding DART immune was unpublished, it was not
accorded precedential weight under the relevant Fifth Circuit
Rule,449 and the court felt free to depart from the earlier case
without distinguishing it in some fashion (which it could not
because the legally relevant facts were identical) or overruling
the law on which the case was based.450 Though the Fifth Circuit
denied an en banc hearing, several judges dissented:
444. Anderson v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC (N.D. Tex. Sept.
29, 1998), aJf'd without opinion 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished),
cert. denied 529 U.S. 1062 (1999). Note that the district court's unpublished opinion is
available at 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15493; the material quoted from it in the text above
appears at *24.
445. Anderson, 180 F.3d 265.
446. Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Smith, Jones, & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc)
[hereinafter Williams I1].
447. Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2001).
448. Id. at 319.
449. Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4, then in effect, provided that "[u]npublished opinions
issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not precedent, except under the doctrine of res
judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case."
450. Williams, 242 F.3d at 322 (holding that "[t]he district court therefore erred in
finding DART immune from suit").
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The refusal of the en banc court to rehear this case en banc
is unfortunate, for this is an opportunity to revisit the
questionable practice of denying precedential status to
unpublished opinions. . . .I respectfully dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc, which would have given this
court an opportunity to examine the question of
unpublished opinions generally, an issue that is important
to the fair administration of justice in this circuit.451
The dissenters recognized the fundamental unfairness that
has occurred in treating DART differently in two identical cases
decided within two years, based not on factually distinguishing
factors or a change in the governing law, but merely the whim of
one panel choosing not to publish. The fact that the party was
DART in both cases makes it apparent that the defendant was
not only similarly situated in each case, but as far as legally
relevant facts go, it was identically situated. Yet, it was treated
differently. The dissent in Williams explains the fundamental
injustice aptly:
If the Anderson panel had published its opinion, it would
have been binding on the panel in the instant case-
Williams-and the result here would have been different.
Based, however, on the mere fortuity that the Anderson
panel decided not to publish, our panel in Williams was free
to disagree with Anderson and to deny to DART the same
immunity that Anderson had conferred on it less than two
years earlier.
What is the hapless litigant or attorney, or for that matter a
federal district judge or magistrate judge, to do? The reader
should put himself or herself into the shoes of the attorney
for DART. That client is told in May 1999, by a panel of
this court in Anderson, that it is immune, on the basis of a
"comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion." Competent
counsel reasonably would have concluded, and advised his
or her client, that it could count on Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
Then, in March 2000, in the instant case, a federal district
judge, understandably citing and relying on the circuit's
decision in Anderson, holds that "[i]t is firmly established
that DART is a governmental unit or instrumentality of the
451. Williams II, 256 F.3d at 260 (Smith, Jones, & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting).
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state of Texas." In February 2001, however, a panel,
containing one of the judges who was on the Anderson
panel, reverses and tells DART that, on the basis of well-
established Fifth Circuit law from 1986, it has no such
immunity. One can only wonder what competent counsel
will advise the client now.452
Indeed. How did the Anderson panel affirm such a plainly stated
grant of immunity in 1999 in the face of case law dating back to
1986? How could the Williams panel, in fairness and accord
with equal protection, treat DART differently without
distinguishing or reconciling the decision in Anderson? These
questions remain unanswered because the petition for rehearing
en banc was denied,453 as was the petition for certiorari. 4
Perhaps one of the most telling tales of unequal treatment
can be found in the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Rivera-Sanchez,455 in which the Ninth Circuit examined an issue
left unresolved following the Supreme Court's decision in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States.456 The Ninth Circuit was
forced to admit in Rivera-Sanchez that no less than twenty prior
panels had issued unpublished decisions on the matter at issue,
and those decisions split on the answer: Eleven cases were
remanded for re-sentencing, six were remanded for correction of
the judgment, and three were remanded for consideration of the
proper standard under Almendarez.457 For three years following
Almendarez, these Ninth Circuit cases had escaped review while
providing different answers to the same legal question. If not for
the Rivera-Sanchez court's request during oral argument that
452. Williams II, 256 F.3d at 260-61 (Smith, Jones, & DeMoss, J., dissenting from
denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
453. Williams II, 256 F.3d 260.
454. Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Williams, 534 U.S. 1042 (2001). The reader will note
that the Eighth Circuit's decisions in Anastasoff and Christie present a similar issue, albeit
one with a better outcome. The Anastasoff court held itself bound by the earlier
unpublished decision in Christie, but it could easily have chosen otherwise even though the
complaining taxpayers in the two cases were similarly situated. See §V.D.2, supra.
455. 222 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).
456. Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (leaving unresolved whether a
district court must re-sentence a defendant convicted of illegal re-entry following a
deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and § I 326(b)(2), or can merely correct the judgment
of conviction).
457. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d at 1062-63.
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counsel prepare and provide a list of unpublished cases, this
unequal disposition of cases would probably have continued.458
It is ironic that the Ninth Circuit panel's request for
counsel's citation of those unpublished decisions and its own
subsequent citation of them was in direct contravention of its
then-current rule on unpublished cases, which provided that
"[u]npublished dispositions and orders of this Court may not be
cited to or by the courts of this circuit,'A59 except in several
circumstances that did not apply to Rivera-Sanchez's situation.
The confusion within the circuit was resolved only because the
Ninth Circuit itself ignored its non-citation rule.
These are not isolated examples. In fact, "[e]mpirical
evidence suggests that cases such as Christie and Anderson are
more common than one might think. 46" For example, one study
of unpublished opinions found that publication decisions,
combined with limited citation/precedent rules, have an effect
on the substance of the law, and that unpublished decisions are
not simply routine applications of the law.461 Instead, they
contain "a noticeable number of reversals, dissents, or
concurrences," and appear to suggest "significant associations
between case outcome and judicial characteristics. 'A62
The authors of this study continue by pointing out the
dangers inherent in the practice:
Our findings thus yield troubling public policy implications
that make the constitutional issue posed by the Eighth
Circuit more stark. We know that at least some unpublished
decisions reach results with which other judges would
disagree, and that judges and courts also vary in their
tendency to publish outcomes. It follows that denying
precedential value to unpublished opinions gives judges
discretion to decide which of their rulings will bind future
458. Id.
459. For information about the former version of the Ninth Circuit rule, see Serfass &
Cranford, supra n. 165, at 255 & 255 n. 6 (referring to text of interim rule and indicating
that former version (in force when Rivera-Sanchez was decided) prohibited citation of
unpublished decisions).
460. Williams II, 256 F.3d at 262 (Smith, Jones, and DeMoss, J., dissenting from denial
of petition for rehearing en banc).
461. Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 120.
462. Id.
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decision-makers-and sets the stage for inconsistent
treatment of like cases. 463
It is this inconsistent treatment of like cases that is the most
troubling from an Equal Protection perspective, because "failing
to give unpublished opinions precedential effect raises the very
specter described by the Eighth Circuit: that like cases will be
decided in unlike ways."64 Clearly, the idea that these
unpublished opinions are issued in easy cases involving well-
established legal principles that add nothing to the body of law
and can safely be ignored rests on faulty empirical grounds.4
65
Given that unequal treatment exists, this government action
should be subjected to the appropriate scrutiny and its
justifications examined. The most appropriate standard is strict
scrutiny, and the process of declaring certain decisions non-
precedential cannot meet the justification standard required.
2. Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard, and it is not
met here.
The appropriate standard for such discrimination is strict
scrutiny because the unequal treatment here inhibits a
fundamental right. The right to a fair trial is certainly a
fundamental right: "Few, if any, interests under the Constitution
are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by 'impartial'
jurors, 466 and the Supreme Court has repeatedly held other
concerns, such as the right to counsel, to be important in
protecting the "fundamental right to a fair trial., 467 Among the
463. Id. at 120-21.
464. Id. (citing Anastasoff).
465. Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 288, at 20-21 & 21 n. 17. See also Stienstra, supra n. 8,
at 37 (noting that less than half the circuits routinely publish reversals); Hannon, supra n.
296, at 215-24 (noting the significant number of unpublished opinions involving reversals,
dissents, or concurrences).
466. Gentile v. St. Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia &
Souter, JJ., dissenting).
467. See e.g. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (indicating that peremptory
challenges are a means to ensure fundamental right to fair trial); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
U.S. 364 (1993) (recognizing that right to counsel exists to protect fundamental right to fair
trial); Chandler v. Fla., 449 U.S. 560, 577 (1981) (holding that judicial control of media
coverage of court proceedings is constitutional when exercised to "protect the fundamental
right of the accused to a fair trial").
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various other protections in service of an overall fair trial, the
court has expressed a concern for "equal justice. ' '468 This equal
justice is denied to parties before the court who, depending on
the day they arrive in court, receive different justice.4 69
The government cannot meet the standard of demonstrating
that this discrimination inhibiting a fundamental right is
necessary to achieve a compelling government interest, and that
it could not attain the goal through any means less restrictive of
the right.47° While the interest in dealing with the volume of
cases filed in federal court is compelling in a lay sense, it does
not meet the high standard the Supreme Court has required for a
compelling government interest. For example, the Court has
rejected claims that administrative efficiency was a compelling
government interest sufficient to justify discrimination based on
gender: "[O]ur prior decisions make clear that, although
efficacious administration of governmental programs is not
without some importance, 'the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency."'
471
Likewise, the Court has struck down a statutory provision
that inhibited the fundamental right to travel by imposing a one-
year waiting period on welfare benefits.472 The Court applied
strict scrutiny, stating that "[s]ince the classification here
touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its
constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of
whether it promotes a compelling state interest., 473 The Court
rejected arguments that administrative efficiency or the
budgetary benefits of the waiting period were compelling state
468. Strongman, supra n. 135, at 220 (citing Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)
(noting that the United States seeks to afford equal justice to all and special privileges to
none in administering its laws)).
469. Compare e.g. Williams II, 256 F.3d 260, with Anderson, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC
(N.D. Tex. 1998).
470. In this analysis, the government bears the burden of demonstrating both the
necessity of its action and the compelling governmental interest that action furthers. Erwin
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 767 (3d ed. Aspen 2006) (pointing out that "[u]nder
strict scrutiny it is not enough for the government to prove a compelling purpose behind the
law; the government must also show that the law is necessary to achieve that objective"
(emphasis in original)).
471. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (quoting Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S.
645, 656 (1972)).
472. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
473. Id. at 638 (emphasis in original).
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interests in the face of such a fundamental right:474
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving
the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately
attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public
assistance, public education, or any other program. But a
State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious
distinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not, for
example, reduce expenditures for education by barring
indigent children from its schools. Similarly, in the cases
before us, appellants must do more than show that denying
welfare benefits to new residents saves money. The saving
of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious
classification 4
75
Moreover, even if a compelling state interest can be found
here, the courts' non-precedent policies (which now apply to
eighty percent of federal circuit decisions) were not narrowly
tailored.476 First, the claim that these cases are not lawmaking is
belied by the high percentage of unpublished opinions that are or
contain reversals, dissents, and concurrences.477 Second, the
courts could accomplish their goal of streamlined opinion
writing by adopting a brief opinion format--one that sets forth
the bare minimum necessary to explain the prior precedent
under which a particular case falls, the relevant facts that bring it
within that case's control, and the result.478 Creating a two-
tiered, two-track system of adjudicating cases and rendering
opinions is not a good fit.
As with the core Article III issue, this potential
constitutional infirmity in the federal courts of appeals'
designation of the vast majority of their decisions as non-
precedential should be further examined and pressed in court.
474. Id. at 636-38.
475. Id. at 633 (footnote omitted).
476. The requirement that a government action is narrowly tailored means that the action
fits the compelling interest with "greater precision than any alternative means." Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n. 6 (1986) (citing John Hart Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 n. 26
(1974)).
477. See Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 288, at 20-21. See also Stienstra, supra n. 8, at 37
(noting that more than half the circuits did not automatically publish opinions reversing
decisions below); Hannon, supra n. 296, at 215-24 (noting the significant number of
unpublished opinions involving reversals, dissents, or concurrences).
478. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 795.
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Because of the importance of the right to a fair trial, this issue
should be decided by the United States Supreme Court.
B. Due Process
As with the Equal Protection claim, which has been raised
by commentators but not advanced before a court, it has been
suggested that the scheme of declaring some decisions non-
precedential violates Due Process requirements. 479 This claim
proceeds from the statement in the Due Process clause that "[n]o
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law,",480 which has been held to contain both
481
substantive and procedural requirements.
The substantive due process objection is similar to the
equal protection objection outlined above.482 The right to a fair
trial, as embodied in the requirement that courts should be
bound to follow prior decisions (or distinguish them or change
the law), is arguably a fundamental right and "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" as set forth in the Constitution.
483
The concept that a common law court would both look to prior
decisions and make decisions knowing that they would be
treated as precedential by later courts is intrinsic to our judicial
479. See generally Wade, supra n. 354. See also Miller, supra n. 354, at 204; Analisa
Pratt, Student Author, A Call for Uniformity in Appellate Courts' Rules Regarding Citation
of Unpublished Opinions, 35 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 195, 214-19 (2005).
480. U.S. Const. amend V.
481. See e.g. Wade, supra n. 354, at 717; Pratt, supra n. 479, at 214.
482. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are the source of both substantive due
process and equal protection rights, and the two types of protections are frequently found
concurrently. Both involve assessing the fundamental nature of the right asserted, the
justification of the government action, and the "fit" or burden of the government action.
Often the Court applies both, and finds the requirements of both to be met, but sometimes
the Court itself splits on which protection is a better analysis for a given problem. Compare
e.g. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978) with id. at 392 (Stewart, J. concurring)
(using an equal protection approach for the majority opinion, but having the concurrence
apply a due process analysis). While the difference is essentially one of phrasing, the
distinction is typically whether the inhibition of a right applies to everyone (due process) or
only to some (equal protection). Under either approach, depending upon who is viewed as
harmed by the non-precedential opinion regime, the core analysis and outcome are the
same.
483. See e.g. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring).
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system.4 8 4 The practice of the court, the argument proceeds, of
issuing non-precedential opinions infringes upon that right both
as to the party whose decision is made without that process and
as to those who would seek to rely upon that decision in the
future.485 If, then, the right is fundamental and the government's
action impinges on it, that action is subject to strict scrutiny and
must be justified by showing that the action is the least
burdensome means of achieving a compelling interest.486 As
discussed above in the equal protection analysis, the practice of
declaring opinions in advance to hold no precedential weight is
not a the least burdensome means of achieving any compelling
state interest.
The procedural due process requirement guarantees that
people deprived of life, liberty, or property are entitled to a
reasonable level of judicial or administrative process.487 This
"duty of government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking
when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions" serves "not
only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual," but "[i]ts
purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession
of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property., 488 In
setting the standard for what process is required, the Supreme
Court has relied upon traditional common law procedures,
stating recently in Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg:
As this Court has stated from its first due process cases,
traditional practice provides a touchstone for constitutional
analysis. . . .Because the basic procedural protections of
484. See Section III, supra.
485. Cf Loritz v. US. Ct. of Appeals for the 9th Cir., 382 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2004)
(finding that a litigant whose case was disposed of by unpublished opinion lacked Article
III standing because he was asserting due process rights of later litigants). But see id. at
992-93 (Beam, J., concurring) (stating that the necessary standing is created by plaintiffs
argument that prior unpublished case law, if it were precedential, would dictate a different
outcome).
486. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that classifications "affecting
fundamental rights... are given the most exacting scrutiny" (citations omitted)); Harper v.
Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966) (pointing out that the Court has "long been
mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection
Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and
carefully confined").
487. See e.g. Wade, supra n. 354, at 717; Pratt, supra n. 479, at 214.
488. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
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the common law have been regarded as so fundamental,
very few cases have arisen in which a party has complained
of their denial. In fact, most of our due process decisions
involve arguments that traditional procedures provide too
little protection and that additional safeguards are necessary
to ensure compliance with the Constitution....
Nevertheless, there are a handful of cases in which a party
has been deprived of liberty or property without the
safeguards of common-law procedure.... When the absent
procedures would have provided protection against
arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not
hesitated to find the proceedings violative of due
489process.
In Honda, the Supreme Court invalidated, on due process
grounds, Oregon's departure from the well-established common
law procedure of judicial oversight of punitive damage
awards. 490 In so doing, the Court examined this longstanding
check on excessive awards, which has been the common law
practice "for as long as punitive damages have been
awarded,",491 reviewed the history of judicial oversight of
punitive damage verdicts,492 and then placed its decision as
soundly within a long line of cases finding the Fifth (and
concomitant Fourteenth) Amendment due process guarantees
violated by procedures removing this "well-established
common-law protection., 493 The Court held that the protection
was deeply entrenched despite minor variations in its form
throughout common law history,494 and that the nature of the
489. 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994) (internal citations omitted). See also Wade, supra n. 354,
at 717; Pratt, supra n. 479, at 214.
490. Honda, 512 U.S. at 434-35 (recognizing that "[a] decision to punish a tortfeasor by
means of an exaction of exemplary damages is an exercise of state power that must comply
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
491. Id. at 421.
492. Id. at 421-29.
493. Id. at 430 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
272 (1856); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Brown v. Miss., 297 U.S. 278 (1936); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970); Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
494. Id. at 434-35 & 435 n. 12 (noting that the strength of judicial deference to jury
verdicts and the extent to which judicial review of jury verdicts was contested varied in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, yet finding the practice well-established overall
despite these differences). See also id. at 421-26 (detailing the established but not always
precisely identical practice of judicial review of jury verdicts).
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protection, as part of due process, created an "insurmountable
presumption of unconstitutionality because there was no
adequate replacement procedure and no societal transformation
justifying the departure."495 The Court contrasted the setting of
Honda, in which no societal transformation dictated the change,
with the setting of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,496 in
which modem changes in communication, transportation, and
business dealings made litigation in a distant forum less onerous
and more necessary.497 Similarly, the Court contrasted the
setting in Honda, in which no adequate alternative protection
was given, with that in Hurtado v. California,498 in which a
neutral magistrate was substituted in the criminal charging
process for the common law grand jury.499
In regard to the issue of denying precedential status to
unpublished decisions, Honda provides, by analogy, an
argument that the practice violates procedural due process. Like
the judicial oversight of punitive damage verdicts in Honda, the
precedential status of all opinions:
(1) is deeply rooted in common law tradition; (2) creates a
presumption of unconstitutionality if removed; (3) lacks an
adequate replacement procedure; and (4) was not abrogated
in response to constitutionally justifiable societal
transformation. 50 0
Thus, the practice of denying all decisions precedential status is
as violative of due process as is the denial of judicial oversight
of punitive damage verdicts. The practice of according all
decisions precedential status is deeply rooted in the common law501
tradition. Much like the practice of judicial oversight
examined in Honda, °2 the exact contours of the common law
practice in connection with unpublished opinions have not been
rigid or unchanging, but the core of the protection has existed
from early common law and has been adopted into modern
495. Wade, supra n. 354, at 718 (citing Honda).
496. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
497. Honda, 512 U.S. at 431.
498. 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
499. Honda, 512 U.S. at 431.
500. Wade, supra n. 354, at 722 (citing Honda).
501. See Section III, supra.
502. Honda, 512 U.S. at 434.
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practice. Just as the Court in Honda rejected the claim that a
lack of perfect uniformity in application of the rule undermines
the rule itself, here the Court should reject the claim that the
practice of adhering to precedent has changed over time. 50 3 In
some form sufficient to establish the principle that all decisions
of a common law court form precedent to which that court looks
in making future cases, the practice of referring to past cases
stretches back farther and is of more fundamental importance
than is the judicial oversight of punitive damage awards.5 °4
The removal of the practice of according precedential status
to all decisions creates a presumption of unconstitutionality that
cannot be overcome. For a reviewing court to find such an
action constitutional, the government must show that societal
transformation has necessitated such a change or that an
adequate replacement process has been put in place,50 5 neither of
which applies here.
While the booming caseload of the federal courts presents
an argument for societal transformation of a type, that argument
is flawed in two respects. First, unlike the change identified in
International Shoe, the change here is intrinsic to the court,
rather than to the society it judges. If such an internal need could
be considered a sufficient societal transformation, the court
would always be able to offer such a justification by explaining,
"we need the change." Second, the practices within the legal
system demonstrate a resilient insistence on the citation of and
reliance on unpublished decisions as some form of precedent,
even in the face of rules to the contrary. Studies have shown that
both lawyers and courts have frequently relied upon and cited
unpublished decisions, even when circuit rules restricted
them. 50 6 This suggests that it is not that society has moved on,
503. Id.
504. Wade, supra n. 354, at 723 (pointing out that "[t]he history of lawyers citing to all
prior judicial decisions is much lengthier than the comprehensive punitive damage review
considered 'deeply rooted' by the Honda Court" and that "[w]hereas the Honda Court
traced the practice of punitive damage review to the mid-seventeenth century, the ability to
cite prior decisions dates back four hundred years further-to the middle of the thirteenth
century," and then asserting that "[t]he long history of this citation procedure is sufficient
to indicate a deeply-rooted common law practice in accord with Honda").
505. Honda, 512 U.S. at 431-32.
506. See Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 15-17 (reporting that a Federal Judicial Center
survey of federal practitioners indicated widespread research of unpublished decisions and
the perceived usefulness of those opinions). See also Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n.
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but that the courts themselves have abrogated this doctrine
against societal interests. Finally, society has transformed in
ways that cut against such a justification. The unpublished
decisions of the federal courts of appeals are now uniformly
citeable thanks to new Rule 32.1.507 Such decisions are widely
available in the Federal Appendix, on West's and LEXIS's
online services, and on the courts' own websites. ° 8 Even with
citation restrictions in place, past practice suggests that these
opinions will be looked at and used.509 If anything, society has
pushed back against the encroachment on this traditional
common law protection. Nor have any adequate alternate
procedures been substituted. It is difficult to imagine what
alternative procedure could be substituted to meaningfully
replace the ability of litigants to rely upon a court's following its
decisions from one case to the next absent some factual
distinctions or changes in the law.
As with the other Constitutional questions surrounding the
practice of issuing non-precedential opinions, this issue should
be pressed by litigants and Supreme Court review sought (and
granted). Even if none of these arguments is ultimately
successful, and the Supreme Court decides that cases can be
designated as non-precedential, the question remains as to
whether they ought to be. That question embodies both
pragmatic costs of denying some decisions precedential status
and an inquiry into what we, as members of the legal
community, perceive the purpose of courts and court decisions
to be. While the issue of volume in the federal courts is
apparent, declaration of some decisions as non-precedential is
not a necessary response. Nor, in the minds of many, is it a
desirable one.
5, at 401 (indicating that "evidence suggests that lawyers and judges value these opinions
despite the rules limiting citation," and that "[t]his valuation, in turn, suggests a cultural,
rather than a rule-bound, conception of stare decisis"); Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 78
(revealing that nineteen percent of attorneys polled reviewed either "most or all" or "most
or all in one or more areas of the law" and forty percent reported reviewing unpublished
cases that come up during their research); Katsh & Chachkes, supra n. 338, at 301-02
(noting that a "prudent" lawyer researches unpublished opinions to mine the court's past
practices, reasoning, and language regardless of publication or citation rules).
507. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
508. See generally Shuldberg, supra n. 150.
509. See Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 404-09. See also Robel, Myth,
supra n. 5, at 962 (noting that "some litigants can and do use these opinions").
RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL OPINIONS
C. Pragmatic Objections to Precedential Status and Proposed
Solutions
Even if the Supreme Court were to resolve all of the above
questions in favor of the practice of rendering non-precedential
opinions, the answer of whether the courts may issue them does
not resolve the question of whether they ought to issue them.
The practice of issuing non-precedential opinions is a failed
experiment in addressing the federal courts' volume issue.
Litigants' and courts' continued use of unpublished opinions,
even throughout a period of restricted citation, demonstrates that
reliance upon prior decisions is deeply embedded in our legal
culture and our rule-based legal system. 510 This legal culture is
based on an expectation of consistency, development of the law
through accretion of precedent, and analogical reasoning. With
the enactment of Rule 32.1, which permits citation of
unpublished decisions, the rules denying some decisions
precedential status makes even less sense.511 Permitting citation
undercuts the presumption that less time can be spent on
opinions merely because they are unpublished. 512 These
decisions will be scrutinized, their reasoning adopted, and their
authority urged upon the courts, whether as precedent or merely
as past practice.
Reasoning by analogy and appeal to precedent are part of
life, both lay and legal.514 Reliance upon past decisions is
expected and practiced by lawyers, litigants, and judges alike.515
Failure to respect these expectations about precedent, such as by
declaring decisions not precedent ex ante, is harmful to the
510. See generally id. & id.
511. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
512. See Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 18 (pointing out that "[a]n opinion that
meets the needs of the parties ... can be written with the assumption that the parties are
familiar with the background of the case," but that "[a]n opinion for the whole world
cannot rest on such assumptions").
513. See Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 400. See also Robel, Myth, supra n.
5, at 962.
514. Schauer, supra n. 287, at 572.
515. See Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 400. See also Robel, Myth, supra n.
5, at 962.
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courts' public image and self-image alike.516 While there are no
easy solutions, there is merit in wading into the "morass of
jurisprudence" surrounding the issue and taking a stand based on
jurisprudential grounds:
It is often said among judges that the volume of appeals is
so high that it is simply unrealistic to ascribe precedential
value to every decision. We do not have time to do a decent
enough job, the argument runs, when put in plain language,
to justify treating every opinion as a precedent. If this is
true, the judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the
remedy is not to create an underground body of law good
for one place and time only. The remedy, instead, is to
create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if that is
not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a
competent job with each case. If this means that backlogs
will grow, the price must still be paid.
517
Solutions to this problem seem to fall into three categories.
First, written opinions could be brief and limited to only the
necessary information. Second, courts could take the time to
write full discursive opinions and accept the backlogs. Third,
Congress could act, on its own or in response to the above, to
add federal judgeships or, more drastically, limit or alter the
federal jurisdiction.
1. Legal Reasoning and Precedent
Precedent is not merely a cornerstone of common law; it is
inherent in the human experience. From the young child going
off to first grade who proclaims that she ought to get a new
backpack because her brother got a new backpack when he
started first grade to the clerk who is unwilling to accept a filing
by fax simply because he has never done so in the past,
precedent is part of our sense of fairness and propriety. Even
small children understand and naturally apply appeals to
precedent as argument for what they want. This behavior
continues into adulthood as we frequently justify our actions as
in accordance with past practice or argue for others to alter their
516. Pether, supra n. 5, at 1483-84; Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5,
at 1199-1204.
517. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.
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past practices in our favor. Indeed, the idea that someone is
"setting a bad precedent" is part of the common vernacular.
In the American legal community, the importance of
precedent is even greater.518 At its core, the common law
requires practitioners to analogize cases to determine applicable
legal principles and whether they apply to given facts.519
Llewellyn explains this well when he says:
We have discovered that rules alone, mere forms of words,
are worthless. We have learned that the concrete instance,
the heaping up of concrete instances, the present, vital
memory of a multitude of concrete instances, is necessary
in order to make any general proposition, be it rule of law
or any other, mean anything at all.
520
Declaring some decisions non-precedential merely because they
apply the same rule of law applied in earlier cases deprives the
law of these instances. It is from these instances that society can
discern the strength and limits of the rule. It is exceedingly rare
that a decision adds nothing to the law. 52' Each decision adds
either a slight expansion of the rule to a certain set of facts,
limitation of the law to a certain set of facts, or merely the
weight of a newer and additional decision, which affirms the
resilience of the rule. Each instance of applying law to facts,
which the court has been charged with doing anyway, provides
another example that can inform individuals in ordering their
affairs as well as in evaluating whether to bring a similar
challenge to court. This process of building and refining the
common law comports with Lord Coke's perception that the law
would be "refined" by "long and continual experience," with
judges "declaring its principles with even greater precision and
renewing it by application to the matter at hand."52z This process
is being diminished by the growing body of non-precedential
opinions.
518. See generally e.g. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5; Robel, Myth, supra n.
5.
519. Llewellyn, supra n. 327, at 66-69.
520. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
521. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 222-23.
522. Healy, supra n. 36, at 66 (citing John Greville Agard Pocock, The Ancient
Constitution and The Feudal Law (Cambridge U. Press 1987)).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
One commentator described the effect of this deprivation of
precedent with a vivid metaphor, stating that "[t]he doctrine of
precedent is like a pointillist painting with judicial opinions as
the carefully placed points providing depth,, 523 and then noted
that when some of the points are removed, the overall picture is
made less distinct, its contours less clear.524 The power of this
metaphor is magnified by the extent to which non-publication
has now expanded. Over eighty-four percent of all federal
appellate decisions are now unpublished. Imagine a pointillist
painting missing eighty-four percent of its points! This principle
is the same as Llewellyn's "heaps": The common law functions
based on repeated applications of the rule of law, applications
that provide fodder for inductive reasoning about what the rule
is, and more critically, analogical reasoning about how the rule
is (and will be) applied.526 This is why scholarly writers talk of
the common law being "deprived" of precedent, 527 and why
Judge Arnold noted:
I would take the position that all decisions have
precedential significance. To be sure, there are many cases
that look like previous cases, and that are almost identical.
In each instance, however, it is possible to think of
conceivable reasons why the previous case can be
distinguished, and when a court decides that it cannot be, it
is necessarily holding that the proffered distinctions lack
merit under the law. This holding itself is a conclusion of
law with precedential significance .... Every case has some
precedential value, maybe not much, but some.
528
523. Strongman, supra n. 135 at 195.
524. Id.
525. Judicial Business, Table S-3, supra n. 6, at 52 (showing the percent unpublished in
the twelve-month period ending Sept. 30, 2006, to be 84.1).
526. Llewellyn, supra n. 327, at 12, 48-50.
527. Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 73 (noting that limited publication can "deprive
litigants of useful precedent"). See also e.g. Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of
Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and
Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 757, 785-800 (1995)
(describing consequences of limiting precedent); Foa, supra n. 335, at 338-40 (noting
"loss" to bench and bar occasioned by Seventh Circuit rule).
528. Arnold, supra n. 21, at 222-23.
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Whether it is exalted as by Blackstone529 or feared as by
Brutus, 530 the sense that what a court does sets a legal precedent
that must then be followed or distinguished is fundamental to
our legal system. 531 This fundamental nature is apparent in the
actions of both lawyers and judges, who have continued to use
all cases despite the last three decades' practice of limited
publication, citation, and precedent.
2. Judges and Lawyers Find Unpublished Cases
Authoritative.
Though some part of the case for limited citation has been
made on freeing lawyers from the need to research the growing
body of case law, the evidence su2ggests that lawyers are all too
willing to undertake that search. Likewise, limited publication
rules were also supported by vague statements that too many
precedents would overwhelm the law, 533 and this, too, has
proven inaccurate.534 Whether they were false premises or
because modem information technology has outpaced and
outmoded these ideas,535 lawyers have continued to seek
529. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900 (citing Blackstone, supra n. 39, at *69: "it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents").
530. Id. at 903 n. 13 (citing Essays of Brutus, XV, supra n. 383: "[O]ne adjudication will
form a precedent to the next, and this to a following one. These cases will immediately
affect individuals only; so that a series of determinations will probably take place before
even the people will be informed of them," and Letters from The Federal Farmer No. 3,
supra n. 383: "no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in
Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be mere
discretion").
531. Llewellyn, supra n. 327, at 61.
532. Compare Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 7 (pointing out that "[t]he
endless search for factual analogy requires immense expenditures of time and funds"), with
Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 401 (stating that "evidence suggests that
lawyers and judges value these opinions despite the rules limiting citation," and that "[t]his
valuation, in turn, suggests a cultural, rather than rule-based conception of stare decisis").
533. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 6 ("[c]ommon law in the United States
could be crushed by its own weight if the rate of publication is not abated").
534. Shuldberg, supra n. 150, at 558-59.
535. See Hannon, supra n. 296, at 206, 209 n. 48. See also Boggs & Brooks, supra n.
288, at 18 (contending that "[t]he 'unpublished opinions' debate ... is badly misnamed,"
because "[b]etween Lexis and Westlaw, Internet sites maintained by universities and some
of the circuit courts of appeals, and networks of attorneys practicing in particular fields, it
is the rare opinion that is not disseminated for mass consumption").
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precedents in courts' prior decisions even in the face of
publication and citation restrictions.
5 36
Limiting publication of certain cases was intended in part
as a cost-saving measure. 537 Limiting citation was seen as a
necessary step in preserving the efficiency gained in limiting
publication. 538 The issue of limiting (or denying) precedential
status to these cases has been carefully avoided.5 The hope was
that courts could issue written opinions only for their law-
making decisions and not for their law-applying decisions,
which would result in a savings in terms of both opinion
creation costs and opinion use costs. To prevent a market for
arising for these unpublished opinions, however, a citation ban
was needed. Finally, in order to justify a citation ban, many
circuits declared these opinions as non-precedential. 540
These ideas are, one by one, faltering. Whatever additional
savings were envisioned by preventing unpublished opinions
from being physically published has not come to pass given the
ubiquity with which new unpublished cases are collected and
published. Likewise, with the enactment of Rule 32.1, the
citadel of non-citation has fallen, at least in the federal
system.541 That decisions of the courts, which were viewed by
lawyers and judges as having some value, even throughout the
536. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 414 (noting "the depth of our historical
cultural commitment to justification").
537. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 6-8. See also Boggs & Brooks, supra n.
288, at 19 (counseling against defending "on high theory a practice that is in fact justified
for simple efficiency reasons"); Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 402 (tracing
the shifting and highly pragmatic rationales for limited publication and citation).
538. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 18-21; Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation
Rules, supra n. 5, at 1185-86; Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 404 (also noting
unequal-access argument against allowing citation).
539. Standards for Publication, supra n. 4, at 20-21 (recommending denying citation to
unpublished decisions and avoiding the "morass of jurisprudence" involved in directly
declaring them non-precedential, thus leaving the development of the precedential value of
unpublished decisions to the "correspondence of publication and precedential value on the
one hand, and of non-publication and non-precedential value on the other"); Fed. R. App.
P. 32.1 advisory comm. n. (stating that "Rule 32.1 is extremely limited.... It says nothing
about what effect a court must give to one of its unpublished opinions or to the unpublished
opinions of another court").
540. Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1179-81.
541. See Barnett, supra n. 281 (referencing, by the use of "siege" and "battlefield" in his
title, Judge Cardozo's famous phrase in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445
(N.Y. 1931), that the assault on the citadel of privity was proceeding apace to make a
similar claim regarding no-citation rules).
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non-citation era, should be properly viewed as precedential
seems a logical final step.
Surveys of judges and lawyers in the federal system have
indicated that the attempt to create a body of "disposable
opinions" that could be produced more cheaply and ignored by
later litigants and courts has failed.542 Lawyers and judges
already make use of unpublished, unciteable opinions. Surveys
conducted in the 1990s by the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts (dubbed the "White
Commission" in honor of its chair, Justice Byron White),
queried federal trial and appellate judges as well as a random
selection of attorneys with cases filed before the federal
courts. 543 Although the White Commission's primary area of
interest was the desirability and feasibility of splitting the Ninth
Circuit and similar structuring issues, 544 it did touch upon the
issue of unpublished, non-citable, non-precedential opinions, as
part of an overall practice of "differentiated decisional
processes. ,
5 4 5
The White Commission surveys of lawyers and federal
judges revealed that federal judges and lawyers alike looked to
and cited unpublished opinions with a frequency that suggested
that they found them to be of value.546 For example, nearly one
in five lawyers reported that they review most or all unpublished
542. See generally Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5 (examining recent surveys
of federal judges and lawyers). See also Robel, Myth, supra n. 5, at 1 (coining the term
"disposable opinion" in reference to unpublished, unciteable opinions of the federal
circuits).
543. See Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 3 (stating that the response rate was eighty-six
percent among appellate judges, eighty-one percent among district judges, and fifty-one
percent among attorneys queried).
544. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final
Report at ix (1998) [hereinafter White Commission Report].
545. Id. at 21-22. The White Commission discussed the marking of certain types of
appeals at or near the time of filing as in need of less attention, which might typically mean
no oral argument, staff-drafted dispositions, and unpublished decisions. This process may
have its own issues of constitutionality and propriety, but that issue is beyond the scope of
this article. See e.g. Pether, supra n. 5, at 1438, 1491-92.
546. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 405-09 (summarizing the relevant data
from the white Commission's surveys of federal judges and lawyers, which were
conducted in 1998, at a time when limited citation rules were still in effect in most
circuits).
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decisions in their circuit in at least one area of law.547 Moreover,
another forty-four percent of lawyers reported reading
unpublished opinions that come up in the course of their
research. 548 With nearly two-thirds of lawyers who responded
reporting that they "do not feel free to ignore these opinions
either generally or with respect to specific cases," Dean Robel
was right to note that lawyers read these cases, "because they
provide useful information in support of their clients' cases." 5 9
Even when such rules are in place, preventing lawyers from
citing (or from being obligated to cite) unpublished opinions,
such opinions are still researched because it is "prudent" and
because lawyers believe that they "indicate how the appellate
court has ruled in the past and thus might rule in the future. 55 °
In addition to this cultural conception of precedent, which
lawyers believe in despite non-precedent rules, lawyers are
aware pragmatically that unpublished decisions continue to have
some precedential effect despite the rules. Two attorneys from a
prominent national law firm described the potential benefit this
way: "[I]t behooves counsel to review unpublished opinions
because they still may influence a court that reads (or
remembers deciding) them itself."551 Evidence suggests that
these lawyers are correct. 552 At least one study has found the
citation of unpublished decisions to be common in the federal
courts of appeals, often in support of the court's legal
analysis.553 Such use is not surprising given that judges both
read and consider unpublished opinions, according to the White
547. Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 78 (showing that nineteen percent reported
reviewing either "most or all" or "most or all in one or more areas of the law").
548. Id. (indicating that forty percent reported reviewing unpublished cases that come up
during their research and another four percent reported reading only that subset of those
that arise out of the districts in which they practice).
549. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 406 (2002) (citing Katsh & Chachkes,
supra n. 338).
550. Id.
551. Katsh & Chachkes, supra n. 338, at 302.
552. See Hannon, supra n. 296, at 235 (tbl. 6) (noting courts' citations to their own
unpublished opinions). See also Johns v. State, 35 P.3d 53, 65 (Alaska App. 2001)
(Mannheimer, J., concurring) (noting the routine usage of unpublished opinions by
Alaska's lower courts).
553. See Hannon, supra n. 296, at 235 (tbl. 6).
RETURNING PRECEDENTIAL STATUS TO ALL OPINIONS 169
Commission survey.5 54 For instance, over one quarter of
appellate judges responded that they review all unpublished
decisions of their circuits either before or soon after they are
issued, and that number is fifty percent or higher in four
circuits.555 Similarly, one fifth of district court judges reported
reviewing all unpublished decisions in their circuits.556 These
numbers indicate that far from regarding them as easy and easily
forgettable opinions, both appellate and district judges are taking
time either crafting or reviewing the content of these opinions.
This again makes sense, given that roughly a third of district
court judges expressed concern that some area of the law in their
circuits was inconsistent or difficult to know, a problem which
over half ascribed, at least in part, to inconsistency between
published and unpublished opinions or a lack of circuit decisions
557
on point.
Even prior to Anastasoff federal courts and lawyers
practicing before them found some value in unpublished
opinions. Dean Robel summarizes this behavior aptly:
Large numbers of participants in the federal appellate
system, including judges, use unpublished opinions in ways
not contemplated by the publication plans, although
completely consistent with common-law understandings of
practice surrounding precedent. 5.
While the benefits and contours of the continued adherence to a
common law understanding of precedent can be argued
normatively, the fact that such adherence is firmly embedded, so
firmly embedded that it overrides in many respects rule-based
proscriptions against following it, seems beyond dispute.
554. Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 15, 49 (including survey data for, respectively,
appellate and trial judges).
555. See id. at 15 (indicating that twenty-seven percent so reported, and that the Fourth,
Seventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits are at or over the fifty percent mark).
556. See id. at 49 (noting that twenty percent so reported).
557. See id. at 48 (indicating that thirty-seven percent indicated some area of circuit law
as "inconsistent or difficult to know," and that twenty-three percent identified the cause as
inconsistency between published and unpublished opinions, while twenty-nine percent
identified the cause as a lack of circuit decisions on point). The reader should note that
these responses were not mutually exclusive, and that a respondent who was so inclined
could choose several responses to this survey question.
558. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 414.
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More recently, two important surveys were undertaken as
part of the federal rulemaking process that eventually resulted in
Rule 32.1. In 2004, the proposed rule was well on its way to
being approved, but the Judicial Conference's Standing
Committee (the last stop before submission to the Supreme
Court for approval) decided to have the issue studied further by
the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
559
The FJC study surveyed all active and senior circuit judges
and a random selection of attorneys who had appeared in recent
federal cases, 560  and corroborated some of the White
Commission's findings. For example, forty-four percent of
judges in circuits that allowed citation said they found citations
to unpublished decisions helpful "occasionally," "often," or
"very often."561 Moreover, thirty percent of those judges noted
that unpublished opinions are "occasionally," "often," or "very
often" inconsistent with published precedent. 562 These numbers
support the contention that decisions rendered in unpublished
opinions are neither routine nor easily discarded. They are,
however, very much in use already in the federal courts of
appeals. The FJC's survey of attorneys revealed that attorneys
research unpublished opinions, even when they cannot cite
them, and that attorneys frequently find unpublished decisions
that would aid their cases. 56 In addition, the study found that
attorneys reported, on average, that permitting citation would
have "no appreciable impact" on their workload. 56
The AO study examined the nine circuits that then
permitted citation of unpublished opinions in some form and
found that allowing citation to unpublished decisions did not
increase the courts' workload or the disposition time of cases
before the courts.56 5 Like the FJC study, it confirmed that
559. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra n. 1, at 1453-55.
560. Reagan et al., supra n. 250, at 3, 15 (noting that response rate was 86% for both
judges and attorneys surveyed).
561. Id. at 39 (tbl. K).
562. Id. at 40 (tbl. L).
563. Id. at 15-17.
564. Id. at 17. See also id. at 49 (tbl. U).
565. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 65 (citing John K. Rabiej,
Chief, R. Comm. Support Off., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Memo. to Advisory Comm. on
App. R. at 1 (Feb. 24, 2005)).
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unpublished opinions were being used and valued even before
the institution of Rule 32.1.
The Advisory Committee itself heard similar comments
regarding the use and importance of unpublished opinions.566 As
one scholar concluded after reviewing the comments, "[t]he
evidence is overwhelming that unpublished opinions are indeed
a valuable source of 'insight and information.' ' 567 He pointed
out that
[f]irst, unpublished opinions are often read .... Second,
unpublished opinions are often cited by attorneys ....
Third, unpublished opinions are often cited by judges ....
Fourth, there are some areas of the law in which
unpublished opinions are particularly valuable .... Fifth,
unpublished opinions can be particularly helpful to district
judges, who so often must exercise discretion in applying
relatively settled law to an infinite variety of facts ...
Sixth, there is not already "too much law," as some
opponents of Rule 32.1 claim.568
Similar comments regarding not just use, but also legal
significance, came to light during the Rule 32.1 adoption
process. 569 First, many commentators rejected the idea that a
court can predict which cases will have precedential value:
[o]nly when a case comes along with arguably comparable
facts does the precedential relevance of an earlier decision-
with-opinion arise.... Lacking omniscience, an appellate
panel cannot predict what may come before its court in
future days.
570 "
Others pointed out that courts often struggle to predict the legal
significance of cases and often designate as non-precedential
cases that should be precedential-as evidenced by the many
unpublished decisions that contain dissents, concurrences, and
566. Id. at 44-49.
567. Id. at 44 (citing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S.,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules ofAppellate, Bankruptcy,
Civil, and Criminal Procedure 33-34 (2003)).
568. Id. at 443-46 (footnotes omitted).
569. Id. at 44-47.
570. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 773 (quoted in Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions,
supra n. I, at 47 (noting that Professor Cappalli sent this article as an attachment to his
comment to the Advisory Committee)).
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reversals.57 1 For example, one research study found that
publication decisions, when combined with limited-citation
rules, do affect the substance of precedential law.
Unpublished decisions do not reflect routine applications of
existing law with which all judges would agree. If they did,
these decisions would not include a noticeable number of
reversals, dissents, or concurrences, nor would they show
significant associations between case outcome and judicial
characteristics.
572
Other surveys show similar results. Professor Barnett,
whose work in this area has been prolific, 573 conducted a survey
of federal public defenders regarding their use of unpublished
decisions in both permissive and restrictive citation circuits.
574
He found that sixty-seven percent of those polled favored the
citation of unpublished opinion and found the use of such
opinions a routine part of existing practice. 575 Many of those
polled indicated that the additional research presented by
unpublished opinions required no additional effort and that there
was no disparity of access.576 Indicative of the overall sentiment,
Barnett noted these two comments from federal public defenders
regarding the citation of unpublished opinions: "That doesn't
bother me at all. I always do the research; that's part of my job,"
and "as an advocate, I always use anything I can."
577
Both scholarly commentary dating back to the enactment of
limited publication and citation rules and several recent surveys
and studies indicate that the use of opinions as precedent is too
fundamental and persistent to be set aside by rule. Three decades
of circuit rules have been unable to overcome the strong cultural
commitment to the idea of precedent as inherent in every
571. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 48.
572. Merritt & Brudney, supra n. 328, at 120.
573. See generally e.g. Barnett, supra n. 338; Stephen R. Barnett, In Support of
Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1: A Reply to Judge Alex Kozinski, 51
Fed. Law. 32 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter Kozinski Reply]; Barnett, supra n. 354.
574. Barnett, supra n. 338, at 1550-51 (analyzing responses of federal judges and federal
public defenders to questions regarding unpublished opinion usage).
575. Id. at 1551.
576. Id. at 1514, 1518, 1519 (reporting that the cases frequently "come up" or "pop up"
on Westlaw or other commercial services and, as one public defender explained,
"[r]esearch isn't what it used to be.")
577. Id. at 1519.
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decision courts make. The purposes for which the limitations on
precedential effect were instituted-limiting publication and
limiting citation-have fallen away, laying bare a practice
which, even if it may exist consistent with our Constitution,
ought not to exist in accordance with our sense of how the legal
system works.
3. Ideas for Addressing Volume
There remains the problem of volume. It is easy to see that
the increase in the number of filed cases has grossly outstripped
the increase in the number of federal judgeships.5 7 Some, such
as Judge Arnold, have argued that the fundamental principle of
precedent should not to be trumped by pragmatic concerns: "The
remedy, instead, is to create enough judgeships to handle the
volume, or, if that is not practical, for each judge to take enough
time to handle each case. If this means that backlogs will grow,
the price must still be paid. ' '5 79 Others have argued that the issue
of volume alone is not persuasive.58 °
Nevertheless, at least three potential solutions take the
volume-based arguments made by the opponents of full
precedential status at face value. To fully explore the costs and
benefits of each is beyond the scope of this article, and this list is
by no means exhaustive.
a. Expand the Judiciary
First, the federal judiciary could be expanded. This
expansion-an increase in federal judgeships-is not a novel
suggestion. It is both the obvious response to the suggestion that
there are too few judges to do the work of the courts and a
578. See White Commission Report, supra n. 544, at 14 (tbl. 2-3, "Authorized District
and Circuit Judgeships and Filings per Judgeship") (showing increase in filings per
appellate judge from forty-four to 300 between 1892 and 1997).
579. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.
580. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra n. 5, at 415 (posing this thought experiment:
"To see why the argument from caseload is unpersuasive, take it seriously. Imagine that
courts continue deciding cases in exactly the same way they are deciding them now, giving
to each case exactly the attention it now gets, and writing exactly what they now write, no
more and no less. Next imagine that the only change is to the rules that govern what
lawyers can do with those opinions. What would be lost in abandoning limitations on
citation?" (footnote omitted)).
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recommendation of the Hruska Commission in 1975:
[t]he creation of additional appellate judgeships is the only
method of accommodating mounting caseloads without
introducing undesirable structural change or impairing the
appellate process. Accordingly, the Commission
recommends that Congress create new appellate judgeships
wherever caseloads require them.58
1
Such a response, however, is not without its costs, including, for
example, added judicial pay, added administrative costs, and
perhaps even court restructuring. Still, as the most
straightforward method of dealing with the issue of volume, it
should be considered further.
b. Encourage Streamlined Opinions
Second, opinion writing in cases designated as unpublished
can remain streamlined. A short opinion format-more detailed
than the simple "affirmed," but far shorter than the typical multi-
page unpublished opinion-is likely to supply sufficient critical
information to satisfy both the parties in the case at bar and later
litigants. Many presently unpublished opinions are written in
this fashion and are workable.5 82 Once judges know that these
opinions will now be citeable in wake of Rule 32.1, it seems
likely that some standardization or development of short
opinions will occur regardless of the precedent issue. And it
bears noting that the use of short opinions is not a novel
proposal:
[S]hort opinions ought to be utilized for the eighty percent
of appeals now being archived as non-precedential. Should
a policy reversal occur and appellate judges begin to treat
all appeals as precedential, no judicial retraining would be
necessary. Nor would retraining be necessary under a
system where brief, published explanations are required.583
581. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System Structure and
Internal Procedures, Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 201 (1975) (This
Commission was dubbed the "Hruska Commission" after its chairman, Sen. Roman L.
Hruska.)
582. Barnett, Kozinski Reply, supra n. 573, at 33 (pointing out that "[o]ne need only
page through the Federal Appendix, that oxymoronic publisher of 'unpublished' opinions,
to see that the opinions are serviceable and in no way beyond the realm of citability").
583. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 796.
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Advocates of keeping unpublished decisions non-citeable
and non-precedential suggest that unpublished decisions are the
easy cases, which do nothing more than apply well-settled law
to new facts in a manner that does not meaningfully expand the
law.584 If that is so, then it should be straightforward to dispose
of such a case in a one-to-two paragraph opinion setting forth
the governing authority, the facts of this case that bring it within
that authority, and the result. What matters in such decisions is
what the court does and not what the court says it is doing:
585
[T]he true content of law is known not by the verbal rule
formulations but by the application of those verbal
formulations to specific settings. Astute lawyers look for
cases analogous to theirs decided under abstract rule
formulations; they search for on point precedents. In sum,
the actual scope of a doctrinal formulation is learned
through its applications and not through the words chosen
. 586to express the doctrine.
A long and carefully crafted opinion seems unnecessary in this
context.
c. Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of Appeals
Third, the federal courts' jurisdiction could be restricted in
some fashion. Congress could restrict the federal courts'
jurisdiction either by making certain appeals discretionary or by
limiting the courts' subject matter jurisdiction. These are
extreme solutions, both, but either would serve to address the
584. See Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra n. 1, at 32 (citing Stephen S.
Trott, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 9th Cir., Letter to Peter G. McCabe, Secy., Comm. on R.
of Prac. & Procedure 1 (Jan. 8, 2004)).
585. See e.g. Barnett, Kozinski Reply, supra n. 573, at 32 (pointing out that "law is not
what judges say, but what they decide"); Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 772-79 ("It is sound
practice for appellate courts to estimate the rules they craft to decide the case .... Still, it is
only an estimate because the power to determine the holding of a judicial precedent resides
in future judges applying it"); Boggs & Brooks, supra n. 288, at 17 (acknowledging that
"[t]o the common lawyer, every decision of every court is a precedent; ... [and] "it is the
decision-not the opinion-that constitutes the law").
586. Cappalli, supra n. 5, at 768-69; accord Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297-98
(1956) (noting that an appeal is a review of a judgment, not of an opinion, and that
precedent-applying courts have not only the power but a duty "to look beyond the broad
sweep of the language and determine for ... [themselves] precisely the ground on which
the judgment rests").
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volume issue. More creative and drastic solutions likely exist.
For example, two appellate judges, in response to the White
Commission survey, proposed the abolition of the existing
federal courts of appeals in favor of a single national court of
appeals. Such a system would help to equalize judicial caseloads
between judges and promote uniform national appellate
decisions. 58
7
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether by constitutional case decision or by the adoption
of a new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, the practice of
issuing non-precedential opinions should be ended. Failure to
recognize every decision as precedential represents and
perpetuates a serious problem in our judicial system because the
practice conflicts with both our constitutional and community
values.
Evidence suggests that unpublished opinions are already
published. They have long been researched despite the rules
against their citation, and they are now fully citeable under Rule
32.1. Unpublished decisions are already being published,
researched, and cited because they are perceived to have
precedential value within our legal system. This value should be
recognized rather than denied.
The Supreme Court has aptly cautioned in another context
that "[1]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."588
Yet for over three decades, the federal courts' policy of creating
"non-precedential precedents" 589 has increasingly fostered a
jurisprudence of doubt. After three decades of limiting the
publication, citation, and precedential effect of their opinions,
federal courts are still carefully avoiding the "morass of
jurisprudence" 590 involved in closely examining the precedential
587. See Working Papers, supra n. 314, at 31, 34 (reporting an opinion expressed in
some detail by a judge of the Third Circuit and echoed much more tersely by a judge of the
Seventh Circuit). This potential solution is mentioned not to promote it, but only to suggest
by example that other ideas for dealing with the issue of volume are out there.
588. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992).
589. See Reynolds & Richman, No-Citation Rules, supra n. 5, at 1167 (quoting
testimony of Seventh Circuit Judge Robert Sprecher before the Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System).
590. Standardsfor Publication, supra n. 4, at 20.
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status of unpublished opinions. However, the winds have
changed.
The limitation of publication now exists in name only. The
limitation of citation has been removed by Rule 32.1. The
limitation on full precedential status for all decisions of the
federal courts of appeals, initially instituted to help realize the
gains believed to flow from the other two limitations, is the last
remaining vestige of a flawed and failed experiment. The
practice of deciding ex ante which cases join the body of
precedent and which do not should be abandoned. Both the
dictates of American constitutional law and the traditions of the
American legal community require it.

